Research

I consider a fixed network of players endowed with idiosyncratic preferences over actions and involved in interactions of various types. The aim is to investigate the interplay between idiosyncratic preferences and interactional incentives on a network. The earlier literature demonstrated the conflict between players' intrinsic preferences and coordination incentives. I show that such a conflict is also present in contexts in which players do not necessarily aim at coordination with their peers. The introduction of action preferences changes equilibrium outcomes in a non-trivial fashion: some equilibria disappear, while other, qualitatively new ones, appear. I characterize equilibria for a large class of games, including games of strategic complements and strategic substitutes, and outline a subclass in which following idiosyncratic action preferences is a unique equilibrium. This equilibrium is Pareto optimal and for many games is also a unique efficient profile. [journal article]

Recently, I run across an interesting discussion of this paper by Marina Uzunova.

I consider network games in which players simultaneously form partnerships and choose actions. Players are heterogeneous with respect to their action preferences. I characterize pairwise Nash equilibria for a large class of games, including coordination and anti-coordination games, varying the strength of action preferences and the size of the linking cost. I find that, despite the symmetry and simplicity of the setting, quite irregular network structures can arise in equilibrium, implying that heterogeneity in players’ action preferences may already explain a large part of observed irregularity in endogenously formed networks. [pdf]

The paper contributes to the literature on the evolution of preferences, developing a model with endogenous observability. Individuals are randomly matched to play the prisoner's dilemma. Each individual is characterized by a subjective preference over outcomes of the game (a social preference) and a level of cognitive intelligence, which determines her ability to observe her opponent's preference. I examine joint evolution of social preferences and cognitive intelligence both within static and dynamic solution concepts. [pdf]

We consider a modified version of the dynamic model of Kovac and Schmidt (2021) with asymmetric countries. This yields a more realistic desciption of international climate cooperation process, as countries do differ in size, costs and benefits. Our model adds to the literature addressing the theoretical "paradox of international agreements", according to which only small environmental agreements can be signed. We show that under reasonable conditions large coalitions, including the grand coalition, can be formed in equilibrium, when countries differ in population size. [pdf is coming soon!]

Many plant species exhibit polymorphism in their defensive traits against herbivores. Despite the abundance of empirical evidence of such genetic variation, it is still not completely clear what are exact mechanisms of its maintenance, in particular, on a local spatial scale. We investigate one of such possible mechanisms - frequency-dependent selection - for the case of bimorphism in Arabidopsis halleri subsp. gemmifera in the presence of the brassica leaf beetle Phaedon brassicae. Several laboratory and semi-field experiments conducted for this study system suggest that conspecific neighbor effects can explain co-existence of two morphs of A. halleri via frequency-dependent selection mediated by the herbivore. Assuming simple behavioral rules for the herbivore, we analyze different dynamic scenarios and derive certain ratios of herbivory pressure and the initial frequency of the defended morph to the cost of defense that allow for co-existence of two morphs. [pdf is coming soon!]

The paper contributes to the literature on other-regarding preferences challenging the narrow self-interest assumption. Experimental evidence confirms that the same individuals might express different other-regarding preferences in different situations or contexts. The structure of their interaction, their relative positions in it might trigger different behavioral patterns. In this paper I propose a model of multi-level other-regarding preferences assuming that different levels are actualized depending on the context in which an individual has to take her decision. I analyze the experimental trust game letting the players have multi-level preferences. Under certain parameterization and asymmetric information assumption, I show that the share given up by the leader of the game in favor of the follower is strictly monotonically increasing with altruism of the former. It is also demonstrated that utilitarian social welfare is increasing with the leader’s altruism if the players are not extremely risk-averse. In the case when information for both players is incomplete, a separating equilibrium exists allowing to distinguish between leaders with different other-regarding preferences. [journal article]