I am a Senior Economist at the Financial Stability Department, Sveriges Riksbank (the central bank of Sweden).

I hold a PhD in economics from Stockholm University.

My research covers household finance and macroeconomics, with a specific focus on how households and firms respond to macroprudential and monetary policies.

Here is my CV.

Abstract: I study how parental transfers shape first-time home purchases and the transmission of borrower-based policy in Sweden. Linking deed-level records on parents’ home equity extractions to their children’s first-home transactions, I identify transfers for the down payment and quantify their effects on housing and mortgage choices. Transfers raise purchase prices, relax down payment constraints, and leave recipients with higher debt-to-income ratios alongside a roughly 11% net housing wealth gain in the year after purchase. Exploiting the 2010 loan-to-value (LTV) cap, I show attenuated pass-through for buyers with access to parental equity: they sustain purchasing power while keeping LTV at (or near) the cap, consistent with a shift from collateral to payment constraints. To clarify why transfers arise, I provide evidence on the supply of transfers: a shift–share instrument for parental house prices shows that a 10% shock to prices increases the probability of transfers with 1 pp. The findings highlight that borrower-based rules calibrated on individual balance sheets overlook the parental balance sheet, with implications for macroprudential design. 

Housing Collateral, Macroprudential Policies, and Corporate Investment
[latest version HERE]

Abstract: This paper studies whether borrower-based mortgage regulation can transmit to real activity through the balance sheets of firm owners. Using an owner-firm matched panel for Sweden, I link controlling households to their closely held firms and exploit the staggered introduction of borrower-based measures during 2010--2018. I find that firms whose owners are exposed to these regulations reduce fixed investment growth persistently relative to an unexposed control group. The decline is economically meaningful at the firm level and is concentrated to the amortization requirements introduced in 2016 and 2018, while I do not find a corresponding investment response around the 2010 loan-to-value cap. On the household side, exposed owners reduce home equity extractions after the reforms. On the firm side, the investment response is strongest among firms that appear more exposed to financing frictions, while firms with more collateral are comparatively insulated. A complementary cross-country event study for advanced economies shows a similar pattern of declining private investment growth following borrower-based tightenings. Overall, the results highlight that policies aimed at reducing household leverage can also tighten collateral-based entrepreneurial finance, with implications for investment and the allocation of capital.

Mortgage relief programs as stabilization tools (joint with Märta Almgren, and Matthias Hänsel)