We study management practices and performance of public sector organizations in Germany. For a representative sample of municipalities, we provide survey evidence for substantial heterogeneity in the use of structured management practices. This heterogeneity is not driven by differences across states, regional types, or population size. Moreover, we document a systematic positive relationship between the degree of structured management and a diverse set of performance measures capturing municipalities' attractiveness for citizens and firms. Topic modelling (LDA) of survey responses suggests that management styles differ indeed in the extent of structured management, with many municipalities displaying relatively little of it.

We conduct a laboratory experiment to analyze cooperative behavior between a manager and an employee in the presence of misbehavior and protected whistleblowing. Before taking part in a trust game with her employee, a manager has the opportunity to embezzle money at the expense of a third party. Her behavior is observed by the unaffected employee who may trigger an investigation by a report. We vary the framework with respect to monetary incentives and anonymity in case of a report and compare misbehavior, reporting and cooperative behavior across treatments. Our results suggest that a whistleblower law could deter wrongdoing, but could also have a detrimental e ect on cooperation in organizations when it increases the probability for false whistleblowing.

We conduct a laboratory experiment to test theoretical predictions about subjects' performance in an effort task conditional on their peer group's composition and relative performance feedback. Subjects are grouped either randomly or according to their ability, with the feedback being the best or average performance of their group. While theory-derived hypotheses on aggregate treatment differences cannot be confirmed, we find evidence when gender differences are taken into account. Male subjects perform significantly better when they compare themselves with the best peer instead of the average, while the opposite is true for females. With respect to the grouping treatment, we find that random grouping is beneficial for male subjects, and ability grouping for female subjects. These differences are explained by gender differences in (non-linear) reactions to the reference point and an aversion of females to competitive environments.

We investigate the influence of correlation neglect on information aggregation when a voter has to weigh external information against her preferences. In an online experiment, the subjects have to vote on either a safe or a risky payment of the same expected value for their society. The voters receive either one or two signals providing a hint about which alternative may yield a bonus or a penalty for each member once implemented. Our findings suggest that, in line with theoretical evidence, information aggregation may be improved by correlation neglect since it reduces uninformed voting.

We study the impact of managers on the success of professional soccer teams using data from the German Bundesliga, where we are exploiting the high turnover rate of managers between teams to disentangle the managers’ contributions. Teams employing a manager from the top of the ability distribution gain on average considerably more points than those employing a manager from the bottom. Moreover, estimated abilities have significant predictive power for future performance. Managers also affect teams’ playing style. Finally, teams whose manager has been a former professional player perform worse on average compared to managers without a professional player career.

Extending the die rolling experiment of Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013), we compare gender effects with respect to unethical behavior by individuals and by two-person groups. In contrast to individual decisions, gender matters strongly under group decisions. We find more lying in male groups and mixed groups than in female groups.