Publications

This paper investigates the determinants and consequences of manipulating coronavirus statistics in an authoritarian federation using the Russian case. It abandons the interpretation of the authoritarian regime as a unitary actor and acknowledges the need to account for a complex interaction of various bureaucratic and political players to understand the spread and the logic of manipulation. Our estimation strategy takes advantage of a natural experiment where the onset of the pandemic has adjourned the national referendum enabling new presidential terms for Putin. To implement the rescheduled referendum, Putin needed sub-national elites to manufacture favorable COVID-19 statistics to convince the public that the pandemic was under control. While virtually all regions engaged in data manipulation, there was a substantial variation in the degree of misreporting. A third of this variation can be explained by an asynchronous schedule of regional governors’ elections, winning which depends almost exclusively on the support from the federal authorities.

with Michael Alexeev, 

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2022.

We investigate the relationship between oil windfalls and income inequality using the subnational data of one of the resource-richest and highly unequal countries in the world – Russia. While previous literature produced contradictory findings due to the use of an aggregate measure of oil rents mainly in cross-national settings, we focus exclusively on oil rents that accrue to the subnational governments across one country. Our estimation strategy takes advantage of the two specific features of Russian oil taxation: 1) the policy change when sharing oil extraction taxes with local budgets was discontinued; and 2) the oil tax formula being tied directly to the international oil prices making oil price shocks an exogenous measure of change in oil rents. When we look at the period with oil tax revenues shared with the regional governments, we find that oil windfalls had increased income inequality and benefited the wealthiest quintile of the population in regions with more intense rent-seeking. Further, positive oil price shocks combined with greater rent-seeking reduced the share of labor income but increased the income share from unidentified sources traditionally associated with corruption. These effects of oil windfalls disappeared after the Russian government discontinued oil tax revenue sharing with regional governments. Finally, we examine some political implications of rising inequality due to the appropriation of oil windfalls. We find a positive effect of rising inequality on the frequency of protests associated with grievances among the poor and disadvantaged social groups; this effect, however, exists only in relatively democratic regions.

The paper proposes an asymmetric relationship between oil rents and institutions such that only positive oil windfalls adversely affect institutional quality, and negative oil windfalls have no impact. We test this theory empirically by studying the dynamics of institutional quality in Russian regions. We find that increases in tax revenues caused by exogenous positive oil price shocks do not change regional income but increase corruption and reduce regional democracy and governance quality; declines in tax revenues from negative oil price shocks do not affect institutional quality but decrease regional income.

European Journal of Political Economy, 2019.

This paper investigates the relationship between corruption and fixed capital investment in the setting of a corrupt country. Using different measures of corruption – registered cases of bribe taking and incidents of experienced corruption by the population – we find a negative relationship between investment and corruption. We then address the problem of endogeneity of corruption using an instrumental variables approach: when corruption is instrumented with freedom of the press and violations of journalists' rights, we find an even bigger negative effect. Disaggregating investment by ownership-type shows that only private investment is affected by corruption, but not investment made by state-owned companies. The negative effect is larger for companies with full or partial foreign ownership. Additionally, we look at the relationship between corruption and foreign direct investment (FDI): similar to the investment in fixed capital, we find a negative relationship; however, its statistical significance varies across specifications with different data sources for FDI and different corruption measures.

with Günther G. Schulze,

a chapter in the Handbook on the Geographies of Corruption,  ed. Barney Warf, 2018.

This paper argues that corruption in Russia is systemic in nature. Low wage levels for public officials provide strong incentives to engage in corruption. As corruption is illegal, corrupt officials can be exposed at any time, which enforces loyalty towards the powers that be; thus, corruption is a method of governance. We trace the systemic corruption back to the Mongolian empire and demonstrate its persistence to the current regime. We show the geographic distribution of contemporary corruption within Russia, survey the literature on the causes, consequences, and cures of corruption in Russia, and discuss entry points to fighting it.

with Günther G. Schulze and Bambang Suharnoko Sjahrir, 

Journal of Law and Economics, 2016.

We analyze the determinants of corruption in Russia using law enforcement data on corruption incidents for a panel of 79 Russian regions for the period 2004–13. We find that the relative salaries of bureaucrats determine corruption levels: corruption declines as relative salaries rise, yet at strongly diminishing rates. Furthermore, we show that even very limited media freedom helps to curtail corruption. Other important determinants are the strength of law enforcement, education levels, and unemployment rates.