Research
Working papers
The Geometry of Thought in Common-Interest Cheap-Talk Games
This paper explores a multi-sender common-interest communication model. Senders are language-constrained and the state space is multidimensional, which makes full information transmission infeasible. Efficient communication allows the receiver to process information through convex sets provided that preferences satisfy a generalized single-crossing property. Furthermore, these convex sets can be characterized by a finite set of hyperplanes. This mode of information processing aligns with cognitive psychology literature, as working with convex sets imposes fewer cognitive burdens compared to dealing with mappings or arbitrarily shaped regions. Finally, it establishes that efficient communication through languages with natural properties is generally unattainable, underscoring the tension between the strategic aspects of language formation and natural language properties.
Information Selling under Prior Disagreement (with Ernesto Rivera Mora)
This paper studies information selling in environments in which (1) the seller has limited commitment power, and (2) the buyer and the seller hold different beliefs about the state of the world. We show that in environments with a common prior, there is no advantage to selling information sequentially; the seller cannot achieve higher revenue than by offering an experiment that fully reveals the state in one period. We find that if, on the other hand, the agents agree to disagree about their prior beliefs, the seller achieves a strictly higher revenue by gradually selling information over multiple periods. Moreover, increasing the number of periods of the selling protocol strictly increases the seller’s expected revenue. In addition, in some environments, it is optimal for the seller to first offer a free sample test, i.e., an experiment that partially reveals information, at no charge.
Two-worker competition in gift-exchange: assessing intention-based reciprocity and inequity aversion (with Francesco Bogliacino)
In this article, we study a three-person gift exchange, where two workers compete for a bonus. We derive the equilibrium properties of the models of sequential reciprocity and inequity aversion. We then prove a comparative statics theorem, when one worker becomes more productive. We show that compared with the predictions of the outcome-based model, those of the intention-based model contrast sharply. This creates an ideal setting in which to perform a controlled experiment to test them. Our results largely support sequential reciprocity.
Work in Progress
Strategic Advice for Skill Acquisition
Persuading a Reciprocal Agent