Uri Rosenthal, Commissioner Global Commission on Stability of Cyberspace, Special Representative to Global Conference on Cyberspace (‘London process’); Chairman Dutch Advisory Council for Science, Technology and Innovation Policy; President COT Institute for Safety, Security and Crisis Management (since 2008 an Aon Company). Professor of Political Science and Public Management, Erasmus University Rotterdam and Leiden University, 1980-2010.
Once upon a time information and communication technology, with special reference to the internet, was the exclusive domain of idealists, optimists and daring explorers. At Brazil’s 2014 Netmundial, a large part of the audience carried badges declaring the people’s ownership of the internet. But when, at the same time and in a similar vein, Google’s Eric Schmidt and Jared Cohen told us that “the Internet is the largest experiment involving anarchy in history”, they immediately added: “Consider too what the lack of top-down control allows: the online scams, the bullying campaigns, the hate-group websites and the terrorist chat rooms. This is the Internet, the world’s largest ungoverned space.”[1]
Over the years, we have experienced dramatic changes in cyberspace. Not too long ago, ICT and the internet were an integral part of high-trust society. The future was theirs. With billions of people to get access to the internet, it would be just a matter of time for the North-South divide to dwindle. Digital technology was to be the enabler of the enabling technologies. Estimates had it that at least 30% of the growth of global trade would be based on the production and consumption of ICT- and internet-dependent goods and services. And the golden age of digital democracy seemed in the offing.
Today, we are sadder and wiser. When we talk cyber, the straightforward association is with security and, to a lesser extent, safety concerns. Increasingly, cyberspace and the digital world are looking like a double-edged medal. On the one hand, we should cherish the indispensable benefits of digital technology, including big data and artificial intelligence. Although the United Nations are warning against an upcoming digital divide between North and South, there are remarkable instances of leap-frogging in the Southern continents. A number of emerging, if not big powers are leaning heavily on a felicitous combination of domestic software development and the conversion of high-tech into low- and medium-tech products and services that enables them to reach out to remote areas and scores of people left behind in the past.
On the other hand, there have been negative developments. Several states, especially authoritarian ones, repudiate the free, creative and entrepreneurial flow of information and communication, and do indeed claim full ownership of the internet. As President Putin said, “the internet is mine.” His offer to the other BRICS countries to follow suit on his Russian Internet Law is not very reassuring. Unfortunately, on the domestic front, all this is going hand in hand with the increase in high-tech surveillance methods that more often than not put the upholding of human rights at serious risk. In the global arena, they engage into industrial espionage and direct or proxy attacks against cyber-sensitive or physical domains in other countries. On the escalation ladder, the prospect of cyber wars activates questions about the application of the Law of Armed Conflicts.
At the same time, the unconditionally golden era of the American Big Four/Five/Six (Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple, Microsoft, Netflix) and other software and data providers is history. Consumers have come to understand that there is no such thing as a free data lunch. On top of their increasing awareness of the business case underpinning the seemingly free provision of data, their concern about intrusions into their personal life is growing. The Big ones are under increasing pressure to acknowledge that they have a pivotal role to play in countering the abuse of the social media by criminals, terrorists, anti-democratic extremists and circulators of fake news. That to play this pivotal role is easy to declare but loaded with dilemmas and predicaments, is clear.
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Let us then focus on the institutional setting behind this mix of positive and negative developments and look at appropriate ways to reinforce the positive side, while mitigating the adverse trends in cyberspace.
* In 2011, when I served as Minister of Foreign Affairs of The Netherlands, I launched the Freedom Online Coalition. By now more than thirty countries are participating in this intergovernmental institution. The chief objective is the advancement of internet freedom, including free expression, association, assembly, and privacy online. One could call the coalition a gathering of like-minded countries and ask oneself whether it would not be more useful to spend scarce resources involved to engage in encounters with governments that take a different stance on the need for a free and open internet. But apart from the fact that there is no shortage of discussions and efforts encompassing governments with varying and indeed antagonistic views, it is important for the like-minded members of the Freedom Online Coalition to create sufficient critical mass to counter those who controvert internet freedom.
* It is crucial to adhere to a comprehensive well-balanced strategy promoting three complementary objectives: firstly, safeguarding the access to a free, open and privacy-guided internet; secondly keeping the internet safe and secure, all the way from fostering cyber hygiene to fighting cyber crime and other abuses; thirdly, utilizing ICT and the internet to stimulate economic growth and social development. Global platforms like the Internet Governance Forum and the Global Conference on Cyberspace would render a tremendous service to all stakeholders to strike that balance with due perseverance.
* In order to prevent misplaced claims between the various stakeholders in cyberspace, it is crucial to endorse the multistakeholder approach to ICT and internet governance – governance not being the same as government. It goes without saying that the competences, rights and duties, and responsibilities of the relevant stakeholders in cyberspace differ to a significant degree. This applies to states, private actors, the non-governmental players, the technical community, academia, and the end users. Despite quite some setbacks, obstacles and hiccups, there is sufficient support for the multistakeholder approach to stand its ground.
* On the path towards a Global Framework for Cyber Peace and Digital Cooperation, diplomatic efforts should be stepped up. In many ways, there is still a lot to be done. It is not so long ago that in many countries the political leaders took no interest in cyber matters, if only because they felt more comfortable to leave the intricacies of cyber and the internet to the administrative experts and the technical community. First and foremost, then, cyber peace as well as digital cooperation demand the undivided attention of the political leaders. Secondly, cyber diplomacy should reach beyond the exclusive domain of governments – the so-called 1.0 track. Within the United Nations and other supra- and inter-governmental settings cyber issues require active multistakeholder participation. If the technology companies want to prevent over-regulation on the part of governments, they should take a pro-active stance in setting the cyber agenda.[2]
* To ensure that the political leaders pay proper attention to proposals concerning the governance and, for that matter, the stability of the cyberspace, such proposals should be clearcut. Because of the vital interests involved, such proposals also need to be compelling. One promising proposal has been brought forward by the multistakeholder Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace. Among other things, the Commission has identified an urgent need for non-interference with the public core of the internet: “Without prejudice to their rights and obligations, state and non-state actors should not conduct or knowingly allow activity that intentionally and substantially damages the general availability or integrity of the public core of the internet, and therefore the stability of cyberspace.” The Commission defines the public core of the internet to include packet routing and forwarding; naming and numbering systems, the cryptographic mechanisms of security and identity, and physical transmission media – for non-experts undersea cables, landing stations and data centers.[3]
I would say it would be just a matter of well-understood national and respective self-interest for governments and other stakeholders to adopt this kind of proposal.
[1] The New Digital Age: Reshaping the Future of People, Nations and Business, London 2014, p. 3
[2] See The Global Tech Accord and their commitment to the Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace. In: Jurrien Hamer et al.: Cyberspace Without Conflict: The Search for De-escalation of the International Information Conflict, The Hague 2019.
[3] Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace, work in progress.