In spite of the disputes, it is nonetheless possible to get a fix ondesire itself. Desiring is a state of mind that is commonly associatedwith a number of different effects: a person with a desire tends to actin certain ways, feel in certain ways, and think in certain ways. IfNora desires tea, for example, then Nora will typically make herself acup of tea; if she does not get herself some tea right away she willnonetheless typically feel the urge to do so; she will find the thoughtof tea pleasant and will find her current lack of tea unpleasant; shewill find her thoughts repeatedly turning to the idea of tea; she willjudge that tea seems like a good idea; and so on. These various effectshave been the focus of efforts to develop theories that are theories ofdesire.
Understanding desires requires at least two things: first, to have atheory of desire itself, and second, to have some familiarity with thevarieties of desires that there are. Once acquired, an understanding ofdesire can illuminate a number of controversies surrounding desire.
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There is a simple, conservative theory of desire according to whichhaving a desire is a matter of having dispositions to act. According tothis theory, dispositions to act are the only essential feature ofdesires; the tendencies a person has to feel certain ways or think incertain ways when she has a desire are interesting but inessentialtendencies. If Nora desires tea, this is because she is disposed to getherself some tea, and her dispositions to feel good about tea, thinkpositively about getting tea, or to keep having her thoughts turntoward getting tea are merely associated effects of her desire. Thesimple, conservative theory has a number of competitors, eachemphasizing something different from, or in addition to, dispositionsto action.
According to this theory, for Janet to desire to have a yellow mangois just for her to be disposed to go to the fridge, or the store, or toask her friend, or to do whatever else she believes likely to get her ayellow mango. She need not actually do any of these things, for shemight desire to do something else even more, or might be asleep, ordrugged, or otherwise prevented from doing the things she is disposedto do, but she must be (at least to some extent) disposed to do themall else being equal. Likewise, for John to desire that Janet love himis for John to be disposed to take whatever actions he believes arelikely to make it the case that Janet loves him. And so on, for thevarious desires that people and other organisms are capable of having.Michael Smith has very clearly articulated this sort of theory ofdesire in a number of works (Smith 1987; 1994).
An important variant of action-based theories of desire holds thatdesires are mental states that have the function of producing actions,rather than mental states that merely dispose agents to act. On thesetheories, a desire might or might not dispose an actor to satisfy thedesire, but causing that result is the job or purpose of the desire(the biological function of the desire), or bringing about thesatisfaction of the desire is how the action-production systems dotheir jobs or fulfill their purposes (Millikan 1984; Papineau 1987).While these variations do well with Stampe-type objections (because itis not the purpose of a belief that one is going to double fault tocause a double fault), they nonetheless would seem to be subject toobjections by those who think that beliefs in the good can also performtheir functions by moving one to act.
To overcome these latter objections, the action-based theorist mayfollow any of a number of lines of argument. The action-based theoristmay argue that mere beliefs in goodness cannot move agents to act,given an independently motivated theory of belief in general (aposition open to many philosophers of mind with complementary theoriesof belief and desire). Or he may argue that there is an incoherence inthe principles by which one should revise a belief in goodness and bywhich one should revise one's dispositions to act (see thediscussion of Lewis below in section 1.3), so that there is somethingincoherent in the idea of a belief in goodness that also moves one toact. Or, in a more concessive spirit, he may allow that theaction-based theory of desire should be supplemented with otherelements (dispositions to pleasure, for instance) not characteristic ofbeliefs in goodness.
One further difficulty for action-based theories of desire comes fromapparent desires for things that action is ill-suited to bring about(evidence, that is, that the action-based theory of desire isexcessively restrictive). For example, suppose it is possible for meto desire that pi be a rational number, or to desire that I had neverbeen born, or to desire that a committee decide in my favor regardlessof what I do (Schroeder 2004). These are desires that do not seem toexist in virtue of facts about dispositions to action, even factsabout what actions I would perform if I were so foolish as to believethat I could fulfill my desires by actions. In response, theaction-based theorist may hold that these attitudes are not truedesires at all but only related conative attitudes: wishes, perhaps. Adifferent line of response might be to hold that, even for suchdesires, dispositions to act still exist, even if they are unlikely tobe acted upon in moderately reasonable people (Wall 2009).
As just suggested, philosophers who complain that an action-basedtheory of desire fails to distinguish judgments of goodness from desiresometimes suggest that pleasure is the key to this distinction.According to these philosophers, a person moved by a desire alwaysenjoys what is desired, or eagerly anticipates the desire'ssatisfaction, whereas a person moved only by a judgment of goodnessdoes not share these feelings (Schueler 1995; Vadas 1984; see alsoDavis 1986). Insofar as this seems right, there is reason to try out atheory of desire according to which dispositions to pleasure (anddispleasure) are all there is to desire. Perhaps desires onlycontingently move us to action, but necessarily give rise to certainfeelings. A simple version of this theory holds:
In addition to considerations in moral psychology, there are alsoreasons to prefer a pleasure-based theory of desire that stem from thephilosophy of mind. Galen Strawson defends a pleasure-based theory ontwo grounds: first, Strawson holds that being a desire foranything (or being a belief about anything or otherwiseexhibiting intentionality) requires consciousness, and pleasure anddispleasure are the states of consciousness most closely linked todesire. And second, Strawson holds that it is conceivable that there becreatures who would lack dispositions to act but who would havedispositions to feelings of pleasure and displeasure, and that thesecreatures would seem to have desires for the things that would pleasethem. These creatures might include actual human beings suffering fromneurological injuries removing their dispositions to act, and theymight include purely imaginary beings never born with capacities toact, just capacities to feel (Strawson 1994).
A difficulty for pleasure-based theories of desire is that pleasurehas seemed to some to have a causal or representational relationship todesire. According to these philosophers, net satisfaction of desire, ornet increase in satisfaction of desire, is the standard cause ofpleasure, and the pleasure caused perhaps represents this change indesire satisfaction. If such views are correct, then it seems desiresmust be ontologically distinct from pleasure in the way that causes aredistinct from their effects, or objects of representation from theirrepresentations (Davis 1982; Schroeder 2004).
While some philosophers hold that desires need to be stronglyseparated from judgments of goodness, other philosophers think thatthey need to be more closely linked. It was perhaps the view ofSocrates that to want something is simply to think it good, and it issimple enough to formulate a theory of desire on this basis.
Recommending such a theory is the intuition, shared by many, that weare motivated to do what we judge good just because we judge it good(and the intuition that, if I am motivated to do something, I desire todo it). If I judge it good to go to a meeting of the PTA, then thatsuffices to motivate me to go to the meeting, it would seem, and thus(perhaps) to desire it.
David Lewis has mounted a challenge to such theories of desire onthe basis of results from decision theory (Lewis 1988; 1996). Lewisconsiders the thesis, Desire As Belief, that a rational individual ismotivated to make true a proposition p to the extent that shebelieves p to be good, and shows that within a familiardecision-theoretic framework inconsistencies result. In Lewis'sargument, the result follows because of the differences betweenrational belief revision and rational desire (or motivation) revisionwithin the decision-theoretic framework. In response to Lewis, a numberof philosophers have sought to defend the general idea that desires arebeliefs in goodness (or are entailed by such beliefs in rationalindividuals) by defending different specific formulations of the thesiswithin decision theory (e.g., Price 1989; Byrne and Hjek 1997).There have also been efforts to show that formal decision theory mightnot be formalizing the right things to draw conclusions about desireand goodness (e.g., Broome 1991).
In a less formal mode, Dennis Stampe and Graham Oddie haveindependently advanced very similar good-based theories of desireaccording to which desires are a kind of high-level perceptual state: aperception of goodness.
Good-based theories of desire are motivated by considerations sodifferent from action-based theories of desire (or pleasure-basedtheories) that it is very rare to see advocates of the one attack theother, with the exception of Lewis's very technical work and theliterature following from it. As a result, difficulties for good-basedtheories of desire have not been richly explored in the philosophicalliterature. One puzzle for such theories might be to explain therelationship of desires to non-human animals. On the one hand, it wouldseem that rats desire to get away from cats, desire to be around otherrats, and the like. On the other hand, it would seem that rats do notrepresent anything as good (they would both seem to lack the concept ofgoodness and to lack a perceptual-style representation of goodness thatwould be well poised to generate such a concept). But if rats candesire without representing the good, then why would people bedifferent? The options available for solving such puzzles have not yetbeen fully explored. be457b7860
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