Research

Job Market Paper

"Broken Windows Securities Enforcement" (solo-authored dissertation)

- Committee: John Griffin, Matt Kubic, John McInnis (Chair), and Sara Toynbee

Abstract:

In policing terms, a broken windows approach asserts that detecting and prosecuting minor violations will deter more severe crimes. I study the effectiveness of a broken windows approach to securities enforcement. Using SEC Chair Mary Jo White’s policies during 2013-2016, I find evidence consistent with broken windows securities enforcement policies deterring accounting fraud. This result is robust to several alternative research designs and reverses during the subsequent SEC administration starting in 2017. I also find that executing a broken windows policy constrains enforcement resources, resulting in tradeoffs in the investigations the SEC pursues. Overall, my findings suggest benefits to a broken windows approach to securities enforcement.

This figure presents the number of SEC enforcement sweeps by year. I define a sweep as a single SEC press release that identifies multiple unassociated parties who are subject to enforcement actions with similar alleged minor violations.

Co-authored Working Papers

"Specialization in Securities Enforcement" with Matt Kubic and Sara Toynbee

Under second round review at the Journal of Accounting Research
Developed from my second-year summer paper

"Beyond Misconduct: What Explains DOJ Involvement in SEC Enforcement?" with Matt Kubic and Sara Toynbee
- Revising for resubmission to the Journal of Accounting and Economics
- Featured on the Business Scholarship Podcast and Matt Levine's "Money Stuff"

"Decentralizing Voting Power" with John McInnis, Brian Monsen, and Laura Starks
- Under review at the Review of Financial Studies
- Featured on the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance

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