Here's a list of my academic work. Much of it challenges the popular philosophical justifications for legal punishment. As part of this work, I've written several papers on the nature of punishment. I've also written on desert, harm, and moral responsibility as well as some topics in epistemology, metaethics, and political philosophy. I recently finished a draft of a book manuscript defending the view that legal punishment is almost never morally justified.
In Preparation
Against Legal Punishment: A Philosophical Defense of Abolitionism (book manuscript, available on request)
Publications
"On Using and Abusing Those We Punish," The Oxford Handbook on Philosophy of Harm, eds. Erik Carlson, Jens Johansson, and Olle Risberg, Oxford University Press (forthcoming).
"Against Legal Punishment," The Palgrave Handbook on the Philosophy of Punishment, ed. Matt Altman, Palgrave MacMillan, (2023).
“Punitive Intent,” Philosophical Studies, 179: 655-69 (2022).
“Why Punitive Intent Matters,” Analysis, 81: 426-35 (2021).
“The Nature of Punishment Revisited: Reply to Wringe,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 23: 89-100 (2020).
“Hitting Retributivism Where It Hurts,” Criminal Law and Philosophy, 13: 109-27 (2019).
“The Nature of Punishment: Reply to Wringe,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 20: 969-76 (2017).
“Harm: Omission, Preemption, Freedom,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 93: 251-73 (2016).
“Philosophical Success,” Philosophical Studies, 172: 2109-121 (2015).
“Moral Luck Defended,” Noûs, 48: 683-98 (2014).
“Retributivism Revisited,” Philosophical Studies, 167: 473-84 (2014).
“Facing the Consequences,” Criminal Law and Philosophy, 8: 589-604 (2014).
“Two Claims About Desert,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 94: 41-56 (2013).
“It’s Only Natural: Legal Punishment and the Natural Right to Punish,” Social Theory and Practice, 38: 598-616 (2012).
“Against Phenomenal Conservatism,” Acta Analytica, 26: 213-21 (2011).
“Cosmic Coincidence and Intuitive Non-Naturalism,” Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 4: 1-5 (2010).
“The Passions of Punishment,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 90: 232-250 (2009).
“Liberalism and the General Justifiability of Punishment,” Philosophical Studies, 145: 325-349 (2009).
“An Argument for Voting Abstention,” Public Affairs Quarterly, 23: 275-286 (2009).
“Say What? A Critique of Expressive Retributivism,” Law and Philosophy, 27: 123–150 (2008).
“Socrates and Superiority,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 45: 251-268 (2007).