How does synergy affect bidding behavior: evidence from a Brazilian procurement. (with Guilherme Campanha, Lucas Lima, Marcelo Sant'Anna and Victor Hugo Terziani)
Identification of Cost Synergies in Random-Ending Procurement Auctions (with Lucas Lima and Marcelo Sant'Anna)
Quantile Regression Methods for First-Price Auction (with Emmanuel Guerre). Journal of Econometrics, Vol 226, Issue 2, p. 224-247, Feb 2022.
Winner of the 2024 Zellner Award - Best theoretical paper published at the Journal of Econometrics in the previous two years .
Semiparametric Quantile Models for Ascending Auctions with Asymmetric Bidders (with Emmanuel Guerre and Jayeeta Bhattacharya). Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, p.1-14, April 2021.
Nonparametric Identification of an Interdependent Value Model with Buyer Covariates from First-Price Auction Bids (with Emmanuel Guerre). Journal of Econometrics, Vol 219, Issue 1, p. 1-18, Nov 2020.
Econometrics of Ascending Auctions by Quantile Regression. Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 99, No. 5, p. 944-953, Dec 2017.