How does synergy affect bidding behavior: evidence from a Brazilian procurement. (with Guilherme Campanha, Lucas Lima, Marcelo Sant'Anna and Victor Hugo Terziani)
Identification of Cost Synergies in Random-Ending Procurement Auctions (with Lucas Lima and Marcelo Sant'Anna)
Identification and Estimation of Seller Risk Aversion in Ascending Auctions. (with Sorawoot Srisuma and Tonghui Qi). Submitted, September 2025.
Quantile Regression Methods for First-Price Auction (with Emmanuel Guerre). Journal of Econometrics, Vol 226, Issue 2, p. 224-247, Feb 2022.
Winner of the 2024 Zellner Award - Best theoretical paper published at the Journal of Econometrics in the previous two years .
Semiparametric Quantile Models for Ascending Auctions with Asymmetric Bidders (with Emmanuel Guerre and Jayeeta Bhattacharya). Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, p.1-14, April 2021.
Nonparametric Identification of an Interdependent Value Model with Buyer Covariates from First-Price Auction Bids (with Emmanuel Guerre). Journal of Econometrics, Vol 219, Issue 1, p. 1-18, Nov 2020.
Econometrics of Ascending Auctions by Quantile Regression. Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 99, No. 5, p. 944-953, Dec 2017.