Publications

with Christopher Cotton, Maggie Jones and Lydia Scholle-Cotton. In Lasting Disruption: Economic and Social Impacts of COVID-19 on Canada, McGill-Queen's University Press.

This article provides an overview of Canada’s primary and secondary school disruptions during COVID-19, then summarizes recent data and research showing the detrimental impacts of these disruptions on students. Novel aspects of our analysis include an assessment of the strictness of lockdown restrictions in schools compared to those in in-person dining, salons, and gyms, and an analysis of provincial data from BC identifying differential impacts between public and private schools, Indigenous students, and higher- and lower-performing groups. The paper concludes with a series of recommendations for policymakers and educators. 

Coverage: The Hub, 10 April 2026.

Electoral Studies, volume 101, article 103069.

We investigate whether the confirmation of local candidates during Canadian federal election campaigns affects voter preferences. Using administrative data on candidate confirmation dates merged with survey data from the Canadian Election Study, we estimate difference-in-differences and event-study models. Across three federal elections, we find no statistically robust evidence that candidate confirmation, in the absence of information on individual candidate traits, shifts party ratings or voting intentions. The results suggest that procedural aspects of candidate nomination, including the formal start of local campaigning, do not shape voter preferences in Canada's first-past-the-post system, further highlighting the dominance of party-centered dynamics.

Keywords:  Candidate confirmation; Voting behavior; Electoral competition.

with Roland Pongou, Games and Economic Behavior.

We study efficiency and maximality in anonymous two-sided economies, where each agent only cares about trading with a desired number of partners from the opposite side. For both homogeneous and heterogeneous economies, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition that ensures the efficiency of all pairwise stable (or equilibrium) matchings. In addition, we provide a sufficient condition for maximality in heterogeneous economies. These conditions have implications for the design of markets that function optimally without the intervention of a social planner.

Keywords: Anonymous Two-sided Economies; Pairwise Stable Matchings; Efficiency;

Maximality.