E1: [JPM]
Title: Consumer Similarity and Predictable Returns.
Abstract: This paper shows that the stock prices of firms interconnected in the consumer market—by serving a similar class of consumers—can be predicted using consumer similarity measure. Using geospatial data on consumer visit patterns, I introduce a novel method to quantify the consumer similarity of publicly traded brick-and-mortar firms. With this measure, I construct a Clientele Network for each firm in the sample. I then create a unique portfolio for each firm based on its clientele network and show that the lagged return of this portfolio is a robust and significant predictor of stock returns. My findings reveal that stock prices do not immediately incorporate news about consumer-similar firms, leading to predictable returns across assets.
JEL: G10, G11, G12, G14
E2: [ Available at SSRN]
Title: Sale Pricing and Demand Dynamics.
Abstract: I study imperfect price discrimination in markets where consumers can store goods for future consumption. I develop a dynamic model in which consumer decisions incorporate inventory costs, including both replenishment and holding costs. I show that when sellers know the distribution of inventory costs, they can discriminate between consumers with heterogeneous price sensitivities. Using store-level data, I estimate the model parameters and identify the share of less price-sensitive consumers who do not store versus more price-sensitive consumers who take advantage of sales. I find that (i) static models understate own-price elasticities by up to 50 percent, (ii) storing consumers exhibit higher cross-price elasticities, highlighting the primacy of price over brand loyalty, (iii) sellers increase profits by up to 10 percent when combining volume discounts with intertemporal price discrimination, and (iv) while sales and discounts primarily benefit storers, incorporating inventory costs substantially tempers these gains.
JEL: D12, D43, L11, C61
E3:
Title: Evolution of Price in Vertical Licensing Contracts. [with Ziyao Wang]
Abstract: Brand licensing is a pervasive vertical arrangement whereby an upstream licensor grants a downstream firm the right to manufacture and distribute a branded product in exchange for a sales-based royalty or fee. Despite its prevalence—ranging from food and beverage categories to consumer electronics and entertainment—there is surprisingly little causal evidence on how licensing, as distinct from mergers or joint ventures, shapes product variety, pricing, pass-through, and welfare. This paper develops a structural framework to analyze price evolution under vertical licensing contracts with a focus on the instant coffee market. Using NielsenIQ scanner data and exploiting the 2018 Global Coffee Alliance between Starbucks and Nestlé, we estimate a random-coefficients logit demand model combined with a flexible supply system that accommodates ad-valorem royalties and multi-product ownership internalization. Our counterfactuals compare pre- and post-licensing equilibria under alternative royalty rates, two-part tariffs, and bargaining structures. We find that licensing acts like an increase in effective marginal cost via the royalty wedge, raising retail prices but also expanding distribution and product variety. Pass-through is incomplete because of double marginalization, and consumer surplus falls modestly relative to pre-licensing pricing but could increase under lower royalties. The findings provide policy-relevant insights for antitrust enforcement and contract design in vertical markets.
JEL: D22, D43, L13, L24,L42, L66
James D. Dana (Chair)
Professor of Economics and Strategy, Department of Economics and the D’Amore-McKim School of Business at Northeastern University.
Email: j.dana@northeastern.edu
Office Phone: (617) 373 7517
Office Address: 306 Lake Hall
John E. Kwoka
Neal F. Finnegan Distinguished Professor of Economics, Department of Economics at Northeastern University.
Email: j.kwoka@northeastern.edu
Office Phone: (617) 373 2252
Office Address: 308 Lake Hall
Ali Sharifkhani
Assistant Professor of Finance at the D’Amore McKim School of Business at Northeastern University.
Email: a.sharifkhani@northeastern.edu
Office Phone: (617) 373 5051
Office Address: 414D Hayden Hall
Title: Price, Cost Pass Thorough, and Market Power. [ with John Kwoka]
Abstract: This paper examines how market dominance influences airline pricing strategies during periods of general inflation. Using a decade of route-level airfare and market data, the analysis shows that dominant carriers consistently charge higher fares on routes where they control the majority market share. Regression results confirm that dominant firms not only respond to inflationary pressures but also use such periods to expand profit margins, leveraging their market power to implement price increases that exceed cost-based adjustments. These findings align with theoretical models of imperfect competition, where firms in concentrated markets face less competitive pressure and can strategically pass through cost increases, amplifying inflationary effects. Inflation provides a “cover” for dominant firms to raise prices that might otherwise face scrutiny, further contributing to broader inflationary dynamics. This underscores the critical role of market structure in shaping pricing behavior and highlights the need for regulatory attention to mitigate the impact of market concentration on inflation and consumer welfare.
JEL: L11, L16, L22, L25
Title: Auction Pricing, Market Efficiency, and Consumer Welfare: Evidence from StockX's Secondary Market. [ with Ziyao Wang]
Abstract: This paper investigates how StockX’s bid-ask auction mechanism influences price discovery, efficiency, and consumer welfare in secondary markets for sneakers and other limited-edition goods. Unlike posted-price e-commerce platforms, StockX functions like a continuous double auction, with buyers posting bids and sellers posting asks. We develop a structural framework to study how bid-ask spreads, platform fees, and trading volume affect both price convergence and surplus, so far we have
Built theoretical model of double-auction pricing with buyer/seller frictions and platform fees.
Designed empirical strategy to test price convergence and estimate consumer surplus.
Began constructing transaction-level dataset with resale prices, margins, and volatility measures.
Next 12 months: Estimate convergence speed regressions, compute counterfactual welfare under alternative fee structures, and compare auction outcomes with posted-price platforms.