Working Papers
This paper investigates how mandated interoperability affects market contestability and consumer welfare in messaging app markets where consumers can multi-home. We develop a simple model of direct network effects with two vertically differentiated apps: a free incumbent with a large installed base and a paid niche app lacking an installed base but offering superior privacy protection. The niche app chooses between a Mass Strategy, which leverages the proprietary network value generated by its exclusive users to reach a broad user base, and a Niche Strategy, which monetizes its quality advantage more directly by targeting only single-homing users. As interoperability increases, the niche app may switch from the Mass Strategy to the Niche Strategy. By eroding the proprietary network value generated by the niche app's exclusive users, intermediate levels of interoperability can hurt the niche app when the incumbent's installed-base advantage is modest. Our analysis also highlights a potential tension between promoting market contestability and enhancing consumer welfare.
Keywords: Interoperability, Compatibility, Multi-homing, Messaging Apps, Network Effects, Privacy, Regulation, Digital Markets Act