Abstract:

We investigate the presence of gender bias in student evaluations of teaching (SETs) in India using a natural field experiment. In the first two treatments, we randomly assigned 504 students to attend an identical audio–visual lecture, manipulating the perceived gender of the professor. In two subsequent treatments, we provide additional information about the professors’ credentials to signal their competence. When we vary the perceived gender, on average, we do not find any significant differences in SETs received by female and male professors. However, the perceived-female professor receives higher SETs on average in treatments with additional information. Further, we find that in-group bias can be a potential channel to explain our results. Our findings highlight the context-dependent nature of gender bias in SETs and provide evidence of the differential impact of information by gender

[Ungated version]

Abstract:

Effective leaders promote cooperation among their followers. Although many studies have focused on approaches to effective leadership, few have studied how social identity impacts a leader’s effectiveness within the context of a controlled laboratory environment. Using a novel laboratory experiment and a guiding theoretical framework enables us to shed new light on how social identity impacts leader–follower interactions in a decontextualized environment. In our experiment, the leader, if present, may or may not share a social identity with the rest of the group. Our main finding is that ingroup leaders are more effective than outgroup leaders, and outgroup leaders are no more effective than groups without a leader. In particular, ingroup leaders are more likely to suggest greater cooperation among followers, and their suggestions are more likely to be followed. Further, we find that outgroup leaders are less credible leaders. These findings suggest that diversity alone does not drive inclusion and provide evidence of an important challenge to achieving the well-documented organizational benefits that stem from a diverse and inclusive workplace.

[Ungated version]

Abstract:

Electoral clientelism or vote buying has been regarded as undermining democratic institutions and weakening the accountability of the state towards its citizens, especially the poor. Social identity as a form of political mobilization may contribute to this, enabling support to be won with clientelist transfers. This paper reports data from a novel laboratory experiment designed to examine whether clientelism can be sustained as a political strategy, and whether identity impacts the nature or efficacy of clientelism. Specifically, we design a voting and leadership game in order to examine whether individuals vote for clientelist allocations by a leader even at the expense of more efficient and egalitarian allocations. We find group identity does not significantly impact the prevalence of clientelist plans. Leaders are more likely, however, to choose allocations that provide fewer benefits (lower rents) to the leader when the leader is part of the majority in-group than when they are in the minority. 

[Ungated version]

Abstract:

In conflicts with spillovers, agents' efforts have a positive or negative spillover on the rival's payoff. While numerous studies have examined conflict resolution mechanisms, there is limited understanding of which type is more effective in reducing conflict effort when spillovers are present. We use a novel laboratory experiment and a guiding theoretical framework to report data from augmented two-player two-stage contests. In particular, our experiment provides participants with either a binding mechanism, in which players choose a level of investment towards establishing a peacekeeping agency, or a non-binding mechanism, where players communicate to achieve peace between themselves. Our model predicts that the binding mechanism-unlike the non-binding one-is effective in maintaining peace. However, our experimental findings reveal that although neither mechanism succeeds in ensuring complete peace, the non-binding mechanism significantly reduces conflict efforts. Our findings provide evidence of the benefits of a welfare-enhancing costless resolution mechanism in dealing with the challenges of conflicts in business, social, and political environments.

[Ungated version]