Buyer Power and the Effect of Vertical Integration on Innovation, w/ Claire Chambolle. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy (2026), 35: 294-310.
Merger Remedies and Bargaining Power in the Coffee Market, w/ Yann Delaprez. DIW Discussion Paper 2088, 51 S (2026).
Revise & Resubmit, Journal of Industrial Economics
This paper analyzes a merger of large manufacturers with divestiture in the French coffee market. In contrast to previous approaches used to study the effects of upstream divestitures on prices and welfare, we model the vertical market structure. First, our results show that the standard policy recommendation to require divestiture to small recipient firms may not hold when asymmetric bargaining power between firms is considered. Second, models that abstract from vertical market structure imply higher cost levels. In our setting, costs are about 16 percent lower. Last, divestiture can lead to marginal cost savings for the buyer of the divested brand.
Paper awarded the best May Forum paper 2021 at EUI.
On Bargaining Power and the Inconsistencies Between Prices, Costs and Markups, w/ Yann Delaprez.
Effectiveness of Horizontal Merger Remedies in Vertical Markets, w/ Yann Delaprez. Concurrences No 1-2024, Art. N° 116766, pp. 32-37
Fusionskontrolle muss Verhandlungsmacht in Wertschöpfungsketten beachten, w/ Yann Delaprez. May 2024, DIW Wochenbericht, DIW Berlin, vol. 91(22), pages 323-328
Evaluation Support Study for the Revision of the Guidelines on State Aid to Airports and Airlines, European Commission, March 2026.
Innovation, Imitation and Vertical Competition, w/ Céline Bonnet and Zohra Bouamra-Mechemache
Understanding Prices and Markups through the Evolution of Bargaining Power, w/ Yann Delaprez - Awarded BCCP seed grant (2024)