Pitman's Ferry

Pitman Ferry was a major river crossing on Current River and was located near the Missouri / Arkansas State Line.  Originally known as Buck Skull the area on the Missouri side of the river, 1/2 mile below the crossing,  is now known as Currentview. 

William Hix (Hicks) was the first to operate a ferry beginning about 1804 at Indian Ford.  Henry Schoolcraft, a noted American geographer, geologist and entnologist, makes mention in his writings of crossing Hick's Ferry on Monday, January 25, 1819.  "At three o'clock I reached the banks of the river at Hicks' Ferry, and was conveyed over in a ferry-flat, or scow."  "It is 1,000 feet wide at the Ferry, and has an average depth of eight feet."  "At Hicks's Ferry, a town is in contemplation.  The site is dry, airy, and eligible, and will command many advantages for mercantile purposes."

The Natchitoches Trail, improved in the 1830's as the "Old Military Road", passed through this area.  It was also a location along the mail route between Cape Girardeau, Missouri  to Batesville, Arkansas.  The Benge Party of Cherokees used this road during the winter of 1838-39 as they were being relocated to Oklahoma Territory, making it a part of the "Trail of Tears."

The ferry was sold to Dr. Peyton Pitman and was run by him and later his son, Erasmus.  During the Civil War, this area was utilized by both the North and South throughout the war.  Four skirmishes occurred here in 1862 on April 1, July 20, October 27 and November 25.

Lawrence Dalton, in his "History of Randolph County Arkansas, published in 1946-47, gives this account of battles fought at Pitman Ferry.

"There was also a camp of soldiers at Pitman Ferry for several months.  General Hardee was there awhile after moving from Pocahontas.  His camp was across the river from Pitman just south of "Buckskull," on the bank of Current River.  Gen. Jeff Thompson and his men were in camp exactly on the line between what is now Clay and Randolph County, just south of the old Pitman ferry.  On July 20, 1862, a real battle was fought here between the soldiers who had been ordered to move from Pocahontas to Greenville, Missouri, up the old Military road by way of Pitman.  After this battle they are reputed to have drove the Federals away and went on to Greenville, where they were ordered back on account of a threat of invading forces of Federals from the northwest.  Here they again met in an engagement, November 25, 1863.  A large portion of the troops which spent some time at Pitman and at Pocahontas finally were ordered to Bowling Green, Kentucky, going up by way of Bird's Point on the Mississippi, just south of Cairo, Illinois."

On the left is the East Side of the crossing, and on the right is the West Side of the crossing.  These are actually looking North and South as the crossing is below a bend in the river where Current River runs West to East.  Both sides are in Arkansas just south of the Missouri State Line.  On the right side, of the picture on the right, is a structure built on a cannon emplacement, which the Confederate Army used to defend its position.   Below is a closer look at the emplacement from upstream.

Colonel William Dewey, gives a very detailed account of another battle which occurred October 27, 1862.  It as well as other references to Pitman Ferry, which occur in the "War of the Rebellion:  Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies" are as follows:

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CINCINNATI, OHIO, July 30, 1861.

Major General GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, War Department: from reliable information I learn that about 7,000 or 8,000 Mississippi Tennessee troops have left Corinth, Union City, Camps Cheatham and Troubles for Eastern Virginia.

About 2,400 Tennesseeans from Mound City have gone down the Tennessee River to Big Sandy, where they have boats; thence they intend going by Paducah and receive re-enforcements; thence to Caledonia, on Ohio River, above Cairo, and land. A portion are to cross to Illinois Central Railroad track and destroy bridges. The batteries of 32 and 64 pounders I informed you of, which were at Dover, on the Cumberland River, are to go with this division. They have also eight 6-pounder and four 12-pounders. Troops sickly and discontented. Ammunition rather scarce. All armed with mixed description of muskets and rifles.

I telegraphed you on the 12th to Roaring River, Virginia, of Tennessee and Arkansas troops going by White River to Pocahontas and Pitman's Ferry; to this I have to add that on the 23rd, 24th, and 25th instant about 12,000 troops from Union City, Randolph, Memphis, and other points left randolph by steamer John Walsh and four more boats for New Madrid, Mo., distant from Bloomfield, on the other side of the Great East Swamp, about 30 miles, over which I have just discovered a good plank road.

Bloomfield id distant from Pitman's ferry 55 miles by good county road. A portion of the troops landed at New madrid are to march to Bloomfield and join the troops from Pocahontas and Pitman's Ferry, thence proceed to Thebes, Ill., opposite Cape Girardeau. All boats are to be stopped going down the Mississippi at Cape Girardeau, while the forces at New Madrid are to stop all boats coming up, and the troops going down the Tennessee River are to stop all the boats on the Ohio, and a simultaneous made on Cairo and Bird's point from Thebes and the Ohio bank, in the rear of Cairo, and the expedition from New Madrid.

The rebels have taken possession of the Mobile and Ohio Railroad for their exclusive use. I know the camp at Cairo and Bird's point is full of spies, good fellows, and gay ladies, who are bestowing their favors on and spending their money liberally with the general and regimental officers. I do not say they reside in the camp, but they visit it daily, and by some means also at night. The rebels are in possession of accurate drawings of the whole defenses at these points, corrected daily when necessary.

Rosecrans telegraphs me from Clarksburg, Va., that he fears there is something wrong Cox, as he had not heard from him since the 26th. All was right when my men left Cox. He is reported to have left Charleston - direction of the Gauley - Wise retreating. i advised Cox fully of the dangerous points between Charleston and the Gauley. Will send men there and investigate and report to you and rosecrans, as he desires.

E. J. ALLEN.

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HEADQUARTERS UPPER DISTRICT ARKANSAS, 

Greenville, Mo., August 11, 1861.

Major-General POLK, Commanding, Memphis:

GENERAL: I had placed myself in communication with General Jeff. Thompson, and had planned with him an attack on Ironton. He left me fully intending to co-operate cordially in my operations and to carry out his part of the programme. The same night he received a peremptory order from Governor Jackson to repair forthwith to New Madrid to assist General Pillow in his operations against General Fremont. As the general felt compelled to obey, and being too weak without his assistance to make the attack, I have been compelled to defer making an advance until I get re-enforcements from below or General Pillow joins me. I have had no information from that officer for several days. I feel anxious to know what is going on at New Madrid, and what are his plans. I have ordered the occupation of Fredericktown, 40 miles in advance of this place, with 600 Missourians, under Colonel Lowe, and 250 mounted Arkansans, the whole under command of Colonel Borland. I have directed this officer to seize all the lead at mine a la Matte, to send it to this place for transportation to Pitman's Ferry. I have also directed the same officer to send out a party of mounted men, and at all hazards to cut the communication between Ironton and Saint Louis. I shall leave to-day for Pitman's Ferry, via Pocahontas, to look after the troops and supplies in that direction. I am much embarrassed for want of transportation for my command. I hope you are affording Colonel Cross every facility in obtaining the 50 teams I sent him for. As I do not wish to send more letters absolutely necessary by my courier, I will thank you to send this letter or a copy of it to General S. Cooper, adjutant-general.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. J. HARDEE,

Brigadier-General.

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF LIBERATION, 

New Madrid, August 11, 1861.

[General POLK:]

GENERAL: I write on board the steamer Kennett, returning to Madrid, under your orders received last night. I had embarked my whole force and had started down all my boats but three before the dispatch was received. Upon its reception I dropped down to Point Pleasant, and sent down the Mohawk to overtake and order back all my transports; three of my boats were overhauled and are now [on] the return with me; the others were far ahead and may not return before to-morrow.

My object in going to Point Pleasant was to inform myself thoroughly of the condition of that road, and to take my departure as early as possible upon the visit indicated in your dispatch. The road has 6 miles of trestle bridge. The sills are rotten, the plank broken and full of holes, and so rotten that it is impossible to move my trains of wagons and artillery over it. This information I obtained from Colonel Walker, who commands a regiment of Missouri troops, and lay out at the west end of that road three months of the summer. I am satisfied that I cannot pass over that road, and I am also satisfied I can pass Cape Girardeau on mu right, and unite my force with Hardee and Thompson by a fine road, affording plenty of well water and of forage for my animals.

Your dispatch directs me to abandon this place as a base and unite with Hardee. That I will do, and avoid the enemy in force on my right. In this I understand myself as complying with your instructions. I want my transports, of which you speak, and my subsistence to come forward to this place. The positions of Pocahontas and Gutman's [Pitman's?] Ferry are too far south for me to reach them with the transportation of which you speak, viz, 200 covered wagons. I can go forward without difficulty. I am in possession of information that Fremont is much perplexed to know what to do. My position threatens him on the south and on the river, while the advance of McCulloch and Hardee threaten Saint Louis, and he is running his troops up and down the river. He does not know what to do or which way to turn. Your order to fall back casts a deep gloom over this army, and caused me the most anxious and painful day I ever experienced, but still I promptly complied with it, as you have seen from my movements. I send down Captain W. H. Jackson, who is a most accomplished officer and full of energy, and wish you to let him bring forward to me as promptly as possible the field battery at Randolph, with the rifled cannon. It is not needed there; and the company you will send, from the inclosed dispatch from Major Stewart, is without officers. If you could, in addition, spare me one other regiment, Walker's or Neely's-the latter preferred, because it is entirely composed of Americans, the former by Irish-I will give you a good account of the campaign. Do let me have Neely's. The enemy above will have neither time nor force to think of a descent on the river. We will expel him from and he will contend hard for the prize. If I were not perfectly satisfied you were all safe down south, I could not be induced to ask any force to [be] brought away, for my large interest is all below, as you know. Let me have the regiment, and if I fail anywhere all the responsibility shall rest on myself. I want more ammunition for my 6-pounder guns and the metallic fuse of my 8-inch howitzer. Please have them moved up. I send down six of my 30-pounder guns to Fort Pillow, as you direct. I will write you again in a few days.

Yours, truly,

GID. J. PILLOW,

General, Commanding.

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HEADQUARTERS UPPER DISTRICT ARKANSAS, 

Pitman's Ferry, September 17, 1861.

Major General LEONIDAS POLK,

Commanding Department Numbers 2, &c.:

GENERAL: Your dispatches of the 14th instant came to hand within the last two hours.*

The order from the War Department to which you refer, placing the military operations in Arkansas and Missouri under your control, has not been received. I shall, not, however, on that account raise any objection to your authority, but will comply cheerfully with your orders to move my command to the Mississippi River.

I have already given Colonel Cleburne orders to move with his regiment as soon as practicable and repair the Point Pleasant plank road. I agree with you that this route, if practicable, which I shall soon ascertain, is the shortest and easiest by which I can place my command in supporting distance of your force.

I am much embarrassed by the number of sick. The morning report shows 900 sick in a command of 4,529 present. This number does not include that part of my command at Pocahontas, numbering about 1,100 men. I take for granted you do not intend that I shall take my entire force from this place, but that I shall leave a force sufficient to protect my hospital and supplies.

As soon as the plank road is repaired, I shall transport my command to Point Pleasant with the least practicable delay. I will write again in time to have supplies sent to meet my command at that point.

With high respect, your obedient servant,

W. J. HARDEE,

Brigadier-General.

As your messenger was so long in coming to me, I shall send this by Pocahontas and Memphis, with the hope that it will reach you within three days.

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HEADQUARTERS UPPER DISTRICT ARKANSAS, 

Pitman's Ferry, September 18, 1861.

Major General LEONIDAS POLK,

Commanding Department Numbers 2, Columbus, Ky.:

GENERAL: I send herewith a copy of my communication to you last night, and sent by express from Pocahontas to Memphis. I shall send this by courier direct to Columbus, Ky.

I have nothing to add, except that I shall bring you about 4,000 men, including all arms. I have twelve pieces of artillery in tolerable condition. The greater portion of my cavalry I shall feel compelled to leave here, and one regiment of infantry, not yet organized, for the protection of the hospital supplies and the inhabitants in this part of the State. Colonel Wirt Adams, of Mississippi, wrote me that he had orders to join my command, and as I shall be deficient in cavalry, I wish you would telegraph him to bring forward his regiment without delay and re-enforce me. One of my regiments of infantry has just been organized, the others are improving in their drill, and are able even now to get from one position to another with tolerable facility.

With high respect, your obedient servant,

W. J. HARDEE,

Brigadier-General, Commanding.

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HEADQUARTERS UPPER DISTRICT ARKANSAS, 

Pitman's Ferry, September 18, 1861.

Major General A. S. JOHNSTON,

Commanding Department Numbers 2, &c.:

GENERAL: I received information to-day through the papers that you had been assigned to the command of Department Numbers 2, which I may be permitted to say, without disrespect to your predecessor, gave me great pleasure. I deem it proper to inform you at once, and without waiting for your order assuming command, that I received last night an order from Major-General Polk, directing me to move my command to the Mississippi River. A copy of my reply is herewith inclosed.* The route indicated to me by Major-General Polk is by the way of the Point Pleasant plank road, which is the shortest route for me to take in order to join your command in Kentucky by many miles, but at present this route is impracticable for cannon. I shall start Colonel Cleburne with his regiment in the morning to put the road in thorough repair. In the mean time I shall get my wagons repaired, my mules shod, and every-thing in readiness for a forward movement. After leaving a sufficient force here and at Pocahontas to guard our hospitals and supplies, I hope to be able to join you with 4,000 effective men.

With high respect, your obedient servant,

W. J. HARDEE,

Brigadier-General.

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HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT, Saint Louis, Mo., September 28, 1861.

General GRANT, Commanding at Cairo, Ill.:

Colonel Carlin reports from his headquarters, at Ironton, Mo., under date of September 26, that there is no rebel force nearer that point than Pitman's Ferry, Ark., except small marauding bands near Bloomfield.

On the 23rd instant Hardee was at Pitman's Ferry and Pocahontas with 7,000 men. Three of his regiments left that day for Columbus, Ky., via Point Pleasant, Mo. For the latter place the balance of the force was to leave about next week. The whole command was composed of nine regiments and twenty-six pieces of artillery.

CHAUNCEY McKEEVER, 

Assistant Adjutant-General.

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HDQRS. FIRST MILITARY DISTRICT MO. S. G., 

Camp at Carter's, Mo., October 22, 1861 - 8.30 a. m.

DEAR SIR: Having learned on Sunday that the enemy was advancing from the east and west on my position at Fredericton for the purpose of cutting off my retreat, I fell back southward 12 miles, and leaving my train in a condition to move, I marched back at 1 a. m. Monday, for the purpose of occupying the town with my troops alone, and fighting either party that made its appearance first. The enemy had heard of my marching the evening before, and, by a forced march, occupied the town before I reached it. I could not possible learn their number, and wasted the whole morning in endeavoring to find out their number and position by spies, but could not succeed. At 12 o'clock I placed my men in position, nd then drove in their pickets. They came, and in more than double our numbers, and deployed immediately in our front, and opened with their rifled cannon. We returned their fire with one 12-pounder and one of our sixes. This we kept up for thirty minutes, when their line, having advanced within musket range of Lowe's regiment (which I had places in ambush, a considerable distance from our main line), a galling fire was opened upon it, which was only returned when Lowe's men could get dead aim. The object for which Lowe was placed having been accomplished, he should have fallen back; but, with unparalleled courage, he remained until he was shot thought the head and immediately killed, when his men fell back behind my main line. About this time their rifled cannon had found the range of my guns and the main line, and their percussion shells were bursting in quick succession among us. One of them knocked off the two drivers of the limber of the 12-pounder, and the horsed ran entirely away, leaving the gun without ammunition or power of motion. It being a double trailed gun, and all the others being stock-trailed, it was impossible to remove it, and therefore I left it on the field.

Too much praise cannot be awarded to Lieutenant Sam. Harris, who served this gun, with but one assistant (the other having gone in pursuit of the limber) until the ammunition in the trail-chest was exhausted. About this time one of the shells, just passing the top of the hill, behind which the Second Regiment was lying down, struck Captain Flourney in the left breast, and, exploding, instantly killed him and Captain Neveille, who was leaning on his shoulder. Captain Flourney was transferred to my command from the Bluff City Grays, of Memphis, and was a gallant young gentleman. Captain Neveille was from Stoddard County, Missouri.

Finding now that the enemy were being re-enforced with a regiment of cavalry from Iron Mountain, I ordered a retreat by the right wing, placing each battalion in ambush, to check a pursuit by their cavalry. I had scarcely placed Brown's battalion when a charge was made by their cavalry pst the fence behind which they lay. When at twenty yards a fire was poured into them, which emptied nearly every saddle. A running fight was continued for nearly 6 miles, my men keeping perfect order, except my dragoons, who were completely stampeded several times. I continued my retreat to this place, which is 26 miles from Fredericton. I will leave here at 12 o'clock to go to Greenville, and then shape my course by the circumstances which arise.

Major Shall has been hovering on the south side of Ironton, with 250 dragoons and 100 Missourians, to assist me, but to-day I have received a dispatch from him that his duty impels him to return to Pitman's Ferry, to prepare to defend that post, which will be 50 miles in my rear, if I can maintain myself at Greenville. I hope you will send a few regiments over into Stoddard County, to encourage the people, as they may be discouraged by my defeat. I will give you a detailed report of the whole expedition as soon as I reach a permanent camp.*

Yours, most respectfully, M. JEFF. THOMPSON, Brigadier-General, Commanding.

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CAMP GREENVILLE,October 23, 1861 - 7 o'clock p. m.

SIR: I have just been informed that the enemy in strength, say 5,000 men, are in 20 miles of me, with the intention of following me to Pitman's Ferry. I will start immediately, and go to Bloomfield, as I mentioned in my letter of yesterday, and if the forces I have asked are sent me, I think I can prevent their return to Ironton.

Activity will now accomplish much, and I hope to have your assistance. I will send you information constantly, and if the enemy return, you shall know it. They will try, i expect, to take Bloomfield, and I wish your troops there to disappoint them.

Yours, most respectfully, M. JEFF. THOMPSON, Brigadier-General, Commanding. Major-General POLK. BLOOMFIELD,

Friday, October 25, 1861 - 7 o'clock p. m.

SIR: I reached here an hour ago, having left my command at Saint Francisville. From what I can hear to-day the enemy have not followed up their intentions of pursing us, and have returned to the line from Cape Girardeau to Ironton. I have a splendid position for defense or unexpected sortie, and by Monday I hope to begin another march after them if my horses are enough rested. My deserters have mostly come in, and I have more men, and in better spirits, now than ever before, although I did not get as many as I expected in the upped counties, on account of the scarcity of guns. The troops stationed at Pitman's Ferry have not acted with the gallantry they should have. My adjutant will made a detailed statement as soon as possible. Let me know by courier if any re-enforcements have been sent me, so that I may make by arrangements accordingly.

Yours, most respectfully, M. JEFF. THOMPSON, Brigadier-General, Commanding. 

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Major General LEONIDAS POLK, C. S. A., Columbus, Ky.

COLUMBUS, KY., October 25, 1861.

General A. S. JOHNSTON, Bowling Green, Ky.:

GENERAL: You will see by the inclosed the state of things with Thompson.* My reply to him is, I have no regiments to send to him for the purpose he proposes. I have my hands full with what is immediately before me and around me. My advice to him, sent forward today, is to fall back on Pitman's Ferry, if he thinks that the better line for the security of his command and of the interests of the campaign, and unite with the forces left there by General Hardee. If he cannot accomplish that from the point at which he is (Bloomfield), then he must pass out to the plank road, and if the is pursued and cannot make successful resistance, to cross the river and join his forces to those at Island Numbers 10 until we can get aid from below. That is the best disposition he can make of his force, should he be pursued by the enemy, as he may be. So long as we hold this point the enemy is powerless to do mischief by attempting to cross troops below this point with boats. I am hurrying the regiments from Arkansas now in and near Memphis to get them ready for the field, but the reparation of arms bodes on slowly.

I will keep you advised of the progress of events.

Respectfully, your obedient servant, L. POLK,  Major-General, Commanding.

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HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  Columbus, Ky., October 25, 1861.

Colonel SOLON BORLAND:

SIR: A dispatch from General Thompson of 23rd informs me that the enemy in force, as he is informed, to the number of 5,000, were following him in his retreat to Pitman's Ferry from Greenville. I inferred from his letter that he did not intend falling back on Pitman's Ferry, but would pass across the swamp to Bloomfield, and then to the river by way of the plank road. He will no doubt have informed you of his and the enemy's movements.

My object in this note is to say that I think you should remove the stores you have at your command down the river and beyond the reach of the enemy, as far as you have means of doing so. The powder and other ammunition especially you will take care to have removed. My advice is that you send all not necessary for your wants and that of any command likely to operate with you there round by water to Memphis. The same with the other stores.

You have no doubt considered all the contingencies that might happen and have discussed them with General Hardee, and are prepared to make such dispositions as he may have advised and as you shall think expedient, but I have thought it best ot send to you a courier stating such facts as I have mentioned above of the enemy and to advise as to the safety of the stores under your charge.

I have thought it best and safest to send two small steamers from all the circumstances it would be safe to retain in that part of the State; the rest send to Memphis. If you have boats in the river, take possession of them for the service of the Government for the purpose above stated.

I do not know the amount of force you have at your disposal or can command, but take it for granted you have not enough to enable you to resist for any long time the amount of force General Thompson says was in motion.

I am mainly concerned for the stores that are with you, and have no idea that the enemy in that force will think of pressing far into the State.

Not doubting you will act wisely in the whole matter, I remain, respectfully, your obedient servant, L. POLK, Major-General, Commanding.

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HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, WESTERN DEPARTMENT, 

Columbus, Ky., October 25, 1861.

Brigadier-General THOMPSON, Commanding Missouri State Troops:

SIR: I am in receipt of your letters of the 18th, 20th, 22th, and 23rd.*

The reports of your operations are highly interesting, and we have been pleased to know that you have so completely accomplished the main object of your expedition-that relating to the destruction of the bridges. I am glad to know that you can speak so satisfactorily of the behavior of your troops at Fredericktown, but regret to their you should have sustained a loss of the valuable men whole names you mention. I note what you say of sending you regiments to support you from my command. I regret to say that the information we have of the position and purposes of the enemy in our immediate front makes it impossible for me to detach any portion of my force for service remote from my position. I have not the force to spare.

My opinion is that you should do one of two things, either fall back into Arkansas to Pitman's Ferry, or fall back on to the plank road and come out at Point Pleasant. If you conclude to do the former, you can cross the river at the Ferry, and take al the boats at the western side, and make your stand on the opposite side, where you can make successful resistance.

If you conclude to take the latter course, which, considering you are at Bloomfield, I think the most probable, then you must make your way to the river by the plank road, and if you cannot maintain your position on the other side, you must cross over and take up your position on the bank at Island Numbers 10.

Your force can be usefully employed there until we can obtain re-enforcements from the South and be prepared to move on Southeastern Missouri. I am making that position one of strength, and it is as important to Missouri as to any other State. I shall have a boat always at Island Numbers 10, where you might be crossed over, or, if you think to go below, wherever you want her. I hope you will keep me well advised of your movements. I send by one of your messengers a dispatch to Colonel Borland, to advise him of the course and purposes of the enemy. You will have no doubt given him warning yourself, but I have certain suggestions to make to him which I hope will be in time.

Respectfully, your obedient servant, L. POLK, Major-General, Commanding.

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No. 2. Report of Captain H. P. Hawkins, Independent Company Missouri Cavalry.

PATTERSON, MO., Sunday p.m., November 16, 1861.

SIR: In conformity with your desire, expressed in order of 12th instant and received at Greenville, I visited Doniphan, Ripley County, and went within 6 miles of the State line. I have just returned to this place with my company, all safe. I succeeded in capturing the lieutenant in command of the rebel pickets at Doniphan. Owing to our want of knowledge of their location, the rest were enabled to escape by a most precipitate retreat. From the manner of their start, would not be astonished to hear they were still running. We followed them on the Pitman Ferry road some 2 miles south of Doniphan, and would have gone through to the ferry, but prudence dictated a retreat. We had accomplished all we expected. We routed the pickets, captured 1 or 2 horses, several guns, pistols, blankets, saddles, &c...................

HENRY P. HAWKINS, Commanding Independent Missouri Cavalry.

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HDQRS. TRANS-MISS. DISTRICT, DEPT. Numbers 2, 

Jacksonport, February 7, 1862.

General STERLING PRICE, Commanding Missouri Troops, Springfield:

DEAR GENERAL: I am sorry that I am compelled to postpone my visit to your headquarters. I learn this morning that the enemy have taken possession of Greenville in such close proximity to my depot and base of operations that I must stay here to look to it. It is said that a regiment of infantry, three companies of cavalry, and a section of artillery are there as an advance to other troops moving down from Fredericktown, and that it is the intention to fortify at that point. I must not let them make a lodgment so near to me. I have ordered back Colonel McCarver's Arkansas regiment to Pitman's Ferry; have ordered down Colonel M. C. Mitchell's regiment from the neighborhood of Yellville, Colonel Le Moyne's regiment from Little Rock, and will hatter together such troops as I can in this vicinity to oppose this attempt of the enemy to seize so desirable a position.

I shall order General Pike to take position in Lawrence County near you, say Mount Vernon, with instructions to co-operate with you in any emergency. He has, as he told me, about 8,000 or 9,000 men and three of artillery. Three of his regiments are, I believe, whites. The others half-breed Indians, &c. All true men, he says.

I will try to raise an army here (Jacksonport). McCulloch and McIntosh I will move to Pitman's Ferry and Poplar Bluff. I hope you will be enabled to increase your command to 13,000 or 15,000 men by the 20th of March, when I desire to open the campaign, and earnestly hope that I can. I have called on Arkansas for 10,000 men, say I get 5,000. I have called on Louisiana for several regiments, say I get three (2,500.) I have called on Texas; several fine regiments there already organized, armed, equipped, and disciplined. One on Red River of 1,100 men en route to join me; say from Texas 2,000 men by the 20th. McCulloch's will have 10,000. This will give me here 5,000+2,500+2,000+10,000=19,500. Artillery added, say 20,000. You will have, I hope, 15,000; Pike, 10,000. With these, can we not hope to take Saint Louis by rapid marches and assault? But we will speak further of this when I have the opportunity to visit you.

So many mistakes have occurred during this war by the similarity of flags that I have had a battle-flag made, one of which I send you for our army. Please have one made for each regiment of your army, to be carried in battle.

Hoping soon to have an opportunity to see you, I am, general, very sincerely and respectfully, your obedient servant,

EARL VAN DORN, Major-General.

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HEADQUARTERS TRANS-MISSISSIPPI DISTRICT, 

Pocahontas, Ark., February 14, 1862.

Major General STERLING PRICE, Commanding Army of Missouri:

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your dispatch by the hands of Colonel Taylor, your aide-de-camp. I send orders in the morning by express to General McCulloch to send all of this infantry under Colonel McIntosh to Springfield to report to you. I presume (I have no returns) that he has about 5,000 men. I had already ordered General Pike to Mount Vernon, in Lawrence County, with about 7,000 men, mostly cavalry, from the Indian Territory. I am told by the general that most of these are half-breed Indians, and good, reliable men. His force will be increased by several regiments of Arkansas infantry now in process of organization, also by two or three batteries of artillery.

General McCulloch, with the cavalry, will come here, where I am raising an army from Texas, Arkansas, and Louisiana; I hope 12,000 or 15,000 men or more. I hear of active measures being taken in Arkansas to comply with my call for 10,000 men. Louisiana will probably send me 4,000. This will give me, with McCulloch's cavalry and some other troops here and coming, say 18,000 men at the Missouri line above this point. You at Springfield will have of Missouri troops, say, 10,000 men by the 1st of March, McIntosh 5,000, Pike 8,000, in all 23,000 for defensive operations, or 15,000 for offensive operations (Pike's command being intended for defense alone or as a corps of observation on the Kansas border).

The above will be our probable force by the 1st of April; at least I hope so. I will first state, general, my plan for the campaign in Missouri; afterwards what I desire should be your plan of action. It was my wish to see and consult with you on this subject in person; but I found I could not leave here, at least for the present, and am therefore compelled to put in writing what would have been better discussed personally. I shall, however, instruct Colonel Taylor to destroy this dispatch in the event of his being arrested, for its contents should be known only to yourself.

I design attempting Saint Louis. As soon as I can get my wing ready to march from Pitman's Ferry I intend putting your column in motion toward Salem, in Dent County, covering your object by moving your advance towards Rolla. I will move so as to join you between Salem and Potosi, leaving Ironton to my right. These movements will be made secretly and rapidly, without tents or baggage, except for the sick. From the point of junction of the two columns I will push on by rapid marches to Saint Louis, and attempt it at once by assault. As we advance, the bridges on the railroads from Sedalia, Rolla, and Ironton will be destroyed, thus throwing the enemy upon the wagon roads, and preventing him from re-enforcing the city soon enough to oppose us there.This seems to me the movement best calculated to win us Missouri and relieve General Johnston, who is heavily threatened in Kentucky. Once in the city of Saint Louis, the railroads leading to ti from the east should be at once destroyed by our cavalry as far as practicable; also the road to Cairo. We should fortify opposite, on the Illinois side. The city once ours the State is ours, and the armies of the enemy on her soil and in Kansas would supply us with arms for her people, who would gather to our standard from the west and north.

Flour, salt, and a little bacon in our wagons, and beef cattle driven with us, should be our commissariat. Grain-bags, to contain two days' rations of corn, to be carried on our troopers' saddles, and money our paymaster's department, and sufficient ammunition our ordnance department.

Being between Ironton and Rolla, if we are immediately threatened on either hand we can strike without whole force to the right or to the left, as might seem most advisable, taking the two armies in detail. If we were repulsed from Saint Louis, or if we found it not advisable or practicable to attempt it, we could attack the enemy in the field towards Rolla and Sedalia, passing up the river, and gathering together our friends in that section of country to re-enforce us.

This is as much, general, as I can now write, as I desire to send off couriers early in the morning to Generals McCulloch and Pike and Colonel Hebert; but I hope to see you before the 1st of April, when I will confer fully with you upon the subject.

Now, with this plan in view, I do not think it advisable to disturb the enemy or alarm him any more than is necessary until we are ready to march. But if in the mean time, with the force at your disposal, you think it perfectly practicable to strike him a blow at Rolla, secure his arms, and check his intention of advancing for a while, it is well to do so. Having done this, pause where you are, and call in recruits from northwest, and maneuver your column over the country between Rolla and Springfield until I am in readiness with my column to join you at or near Potosi. Pike can id you in this, but he should not go too far, as he would leave Western Arkansas, the Indian Territory, and the counties west of you exposed too much to the half-savage enemy in Kansas.

If I could enter more fully into this subject and set forth the advantages which it presents to my mind, I think, general, that I would have your hearty co-operation in the campaign in Missouri. I am truly devoted to the interest of the whole Confederacy, and look to the whole field of operations from the Potomac to the plains of New Mexico for my study, and pray God to guide me in the true paths to victory and my country's independence.

I sincerely hope that if you attempt this move you may add new laurels to the wreath already encircling your brow, and that Missouri may again boast of having struck another gallant blow for her liberty and the vindication of her rights.

I send you copies of letters I had sent to Generals McCulloch and Pike.* I send them in the morning orders to move, as I have already stated, and to hurry the troops on to you. I have taken it for granted that you can supply these re-enforcements from the country around you by purchases. I have been informed by Colonels Snead and Taylor, as well as by other reliable gentlemen,, that the counties around you are rich in everything in the way of provisions needed by an army. Let me know as soon as possible what you will require. I have a depot at Jacksonport, and can, I hope, supply you with many things you may want. Please keep me advised of your movements and intentions, as well as of the movements and strength of the enemy, so far as you are able to learn them.

I have ordered a line of expressmen from Memphis to Springfield. By it regular communications may be made twice a week. Send special couriers with important matter.

Excuse the hurries style of this letter, general, and believe me, very truly and respectfully, your obedient servant,

EARL VAN DORN, Major-General.

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSISSIPPI, 

Saint Louis, April 6, 1862.

General CURTIS, Cassville, Mo.:

General Steele will cross Black River at Pitman's Ferry and observe Pocahontas. As you approach he will move towards Salem or that vicinity to join you. Great carer should be taken in your flank march not to be attacked in flank. Steele will observe same precaution. I think your combined forces will be sufficient for anything the enemy can bring against you. If certain that main body of enemy has moved to Black River, you should move by rapid marches, so as to prevent his driving Steele back before you can effect a junction.

H. W. HALLECK, Major-General.

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSISSIPPI, 

Saint Louis, April 6, 1862.

General CURTIS, Cassville, Mo.:

Some time must elapse before the Fort Scott forces will be in a condition to do much. I think a large force should be left in southwest if you can spare it. General Steele will be directed not to advance beyond Pitman's Ferry, but to hold himself in readiness to co-operate with you. If the enemy should concentrate near Batesville or Jacksonport, Steele will unite with you.

H. W. HALLECK, Major-General.

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REEVES' STATION, April 22, 1862.

Major-General HALLECK, Pittsburg, Teen.:

The telegraph line has not ben in operation for the last week. One brigade is at Pocahontas, two regiments of infantry and one of cavalry; two regiment of cavalry are at Pitman's Ferry and two of infantry en route for that place.

Our movements have been delayed by constant heavy rains and high water. The supply trains could not be across the streams between this and Pilot Knob; the pontoon bridge was not sent forward for want of transportation. I shall leave here for Jacksonport this p. m. or tomorrow morning. The rebel troops have all left Arkansas except 500 Missouri cavalry and Pike's Indians. I shall not be able to reach the Mississippi River from Jacksonport, except by river transportation, for some weeks hence. The Cache River bottom is impracticable. My spy sent to General has not returned. The general was reported at Forsyth on the 10th instant. There appears to be a strong Union feeling in Arkansas. Committees have been sent to welcome us.

FRED'K STEELE,Brigadier-General.

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PITMAN'S FERRY, May 15, 1862.

J. C. KELTON, Assistant Adjutant-General:

Having been order by Major-General Curtis to march with four regiment of infantry to Tennessee via Cape Girardeau, I left my camp post near Batesville on the 13th instant, and reached this place. Pitman's Ferry, on Current River, at State Line, yesterday evening, making 68 miles in three days. To-day will cross my command and trains and resume my march early tomorrow morning. My artillery and cavalry were ordered to remain in Arkansas.

ASBOTH, Brigadier-General, Commanding Second Division.

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OCTOBER 27, 1862.- Skirmish at Pitman's Ferry, Ark.

REPORTS.

Numbers 1.- Major General Samuel R. Curtis, U. S. Army.

Numbers 2.- Brigadier General John W. Davidson, U. S. Army.

Numbers 3.- Colonel William Dewey, Twenty-third Iowa Infantry.

Numbers 1. Reports of Major General Samuel R. Curtis, U. S. Army.

OCTOBER 28, 1862.

Colonel Boyd reports further success in General Davidson's (southeast) district. Colonel Dewey, commanding Twenty-third Iowa, with detachment from his own and First, Twenty-fourth, and Twenty-fifth Missouri, with a section of Stange's battery, attacked 1,500 rebels at Pitman's Ferry on the 27th, killing several and taking over 40 prisoners. Our troops behaved well.

SAML. R. CURTIS, Major-General.

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Major General H. W. HALLECK, Washington, D. C.

NOVEMBER 1, 1862.

General Davidson has furnished me Colonel Boyd's dispatch of 31st ultimo, showing that Colonels Dewey and Lazear formed junction in Arkansas and pursued the enemy in a running fight 15 miles. The pursuit extends to within 5 miles of Pocahontas. We have taken about 100 prisoners, who say they were ordered to attack Springfield and cut off Schofield's supplies. Still later dispatches from Lazear, dated Bollinger's Mill, Ark., October 31, say he has killed, captured, and dispersed 200 of Boone's command.

SAML. R. CURTIS, Major-General.

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Major General H. W. HALLECK, Washington, D. C.

Numbers 2. Reports of Brigadier General John W. Davidson, U. S. Army.

HEADQUARTERS SAINT LOUIS DISTRICT, 

Saint Louis, Mo., October 28, 1862.

COLONEL: I have the honor to report the continued success of the troops forming my division. Boyd says:

PATTERSON, MO., October 28, 1862-8 p. m.

Express just in from Pitman's Ferry. Colonel Dewey, commanding Twenty-third Iowa, with detachments of his regiment, of the Twenty-fourth and Twenty-fifth Missouri Volunteers, and of the First Missouri State Militia, with a section of Stange's battery, attacked 1,500 rebels, under Burbridge, at Pitman's Ferry yesterday, killing several and taking over 40 prisoners. Rebels made but slight resistance and fled on Yellville road. So far the new troops behaved like veterans.

This makes the ferry crossing perfectly safe for Lazear, crowning the two movements with entire success.

I remain, sir, your most obedient servant,

J. W. DAVIDSON, Brigadier-General.

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HEADQUARTERS SAINT LOUIS DISTRICT, 

Saint Louis, Mo., October 31, 1862.

COLONEL: I have again to announce the continued success of the two expeditions under Lazear and Dewey, now combined under the latter officer. You may remember that I had sent a force of infantry under Dewey to cover Lazear's crossing at Pitman's Ferry. After Dewey's action with Burbridge at that point he formed junction with Lazear beyond the ferry on Current River, and continued the fight and pursuit of Burbridge to Bollinger's Mill, within 2 miles of Pocahontas.

Many officers of Burbridge's command have fallen into our hands; among them Colonel Greene, of Saint Louis, and Campbell, of Springfield. These officers state that they had Hindman's orders to fall in rear of Schofield by forced marches to Springfield and attempt to cut off his supplies. Dewey and Lazear are returning. Thus I think the southeast has kept pace with the southwest in enterprise. Our loss is small.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. W. DAVIDSON, Brigadier-General, Commanding.

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Numbers 3. Report of Colonel William Dewey, Twenty-third Iowa Infantry.

HDQRS. TWENTY-THIRD REGIMENT IOWA VOLS., 

Camp Patterson, Mo., November 2, 1862.

COLONEL: In accordance with your order of the 24th ultimo I left Camp Patterson at 6 o'clock in the morning of Saturday, the 25th, with three companies of my regiment (Twenty-third Iowa Volunteers), under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Kinsman; five companies of Twenty-fifth Missouri Volunteers, under Captain O. P. Newberry; two companies of First Missouri State Militia, and a section of Stange's battery, under Major Jaensch, and 18 men of the Twelfth Missouri Volunteer Cavalry, under Captain Leeper. At Morrison, 12 miles from this place, I was joined by three companies of Twenty-fourth Missouri Volunteers, under Captain Vaughan.

My instructions were to march for Pitman's Ferry, on Current River, which place I was to reach by 3 o'clock p. m. on Saturday, the 26th, form a junction with Lieutenant-Colonel Lazear, and attack any rebel force at that point. You informed me that Colonel Lazear had orders to meet me there at that time and co-operate with me. The first day I marched 26 miles, to Black River, which I reached at 4 o'clock p. m. I found the stream wide and deep and the crossing difficult, but I was determined to get the infantry and baggage train over that night. I placed the transportation of the troops in charge of Captain O. P. Newberry, of the Twenty-fifth Missouri, with orders to cross at all hazards. After an immense amount of labor the untiring energy of the captain was successful, and at 11 o'clock at night he reported all safely over, except the artillery and one company of the First Missouri State Militia, left to guard it. The next morning at daylight Captain Newberry commenced crossing the artillery. The ammunition was shifted from the caissons and transported in wagons and the whole train crossed in safety. I commenced the march from Black River at 8 o'clock a. m. Sunday, 26th, and reached Vandeer's after a march of 20 miles. A mile this side of Vandeer's my advanced guard of cavalry, under Captain Leper, drove in the enemy's pickets, all of whom unfortunately escaped and thus betrayed my advance. I now was 17 miles from Pitman's Ferry, and it was important to make a rapid march and gain possession of the boat. I accordingly detailed Lieutenant Buzard, of the Twenty-fifth Missouri, with 40 picked men to move rapidly forward with the cavalry and gain possession of the ferry. They started at 1 o'clock on the morning of the 27th, and at 2 I followed with the reserve body. The men marched without breakfast. Ten miles this side the ferry the advance guard surprised a scouting party of the enemy and captured a captain and 13 men. Leaving these prisoners under guard, they pushed rapidly forward and succeeded in surprising the guard at the ferry, which they dispersed by a volley from Lieutenant Buzard's men. Private Richard Lloyd, Company F, of the Twenty-fifth Missouri, swam the river and brought the boat over to this side. When about 2 miles from the river, at 8 o'clock in the morning, I received information that the great object of my anxiety, the ferry-boat, was safe in our possession. When a mile from the river a messenger brought me word that the enemy was forming line of battle on the other side. I immediately ordered the artillery forward at a gallop, the infantry regardless of their long and fatiguing march, following at a double-quick. I halted the column about 100 yards from the river bank and formed in line of battle on each side of the road. The right wing consisting of the Twenty-third Iowa, under Lieutenant-Colonel Kinsman; the center consisting of the artillery and the two companies of the First Missouri State Militia, under Major Jaensch, and the left consisting of the five companies of the Twenty-fifth Missouri, Volunteers, under Captain Newberry. The two companies of the Twenty-fourth Missouri acted as a reserve and guard to the prisoners under Captain Vaughan.

Riding to the front, Lieutenant Poser, commanding the artillery, informed me that the enemy were planting a battery on the other side. I ordered him to open upon them immediately, which he promptly did, and after a few rounds the enemy scattered and disappeared.  I then ordered Lieutenant Millar, of the Twenty-first Missouri, to cross the river with his company and deploy as skirmishers and follow the enemy as far as practicable, and to guard his retreat I ordered Captain Houston, of Company A, Twenty-third Iowa, to form his company on the river bank near the ferry, leaving the rest of the command in line of battle. At 12 m. Lieutenant Millar returned and reported the enemy retreating. I had been for several hours anxious to learn the whereabouts of Lieutenant-Colonel Lazear and his command. Everything depended upon his co-operating with me. I knew that with my small force of infantry, exhausted by a long and fatiguing march and without food since the previous night, it was folly for me to attempt a pursuit.  Lazear's route to join me led him directly across the road by which the enemy had retreated, and I waited in deep suspense for some intelligence from him or for some evidence of his presence. At noon I sent Leeper over the river with his 18 men to scour the country and try to gain intelligence of Lazear. After a fruitless search he returned without any tidings, and I reluctantly ordered the men to camp. They had performed a forced march of 65 miles, and had been twenty hours without food, without murmuring. They were still ready to go forward if there was any prospect of overtaking the enemy, but without Lazear cavalry pursuit would be useless. I had hoped that the sound of the cannonading would reach him and von to him tidings of my presence, but it did not. The next morning, 28th October, I sent Captain Houston, with his company, up the river, and Captain Rosenstein, with his company, down, both on this side, to explore the country and ascertain the position and practicability of the various fords. I also sent Captain Leeper, with such infantry as I could mount, over the river to explore the different roads leading to the ferry, with instructions to find Lazear if possible. About 11 o'clock I received a dispatch from Colonel Lazear, directed to you, of which the following is a copy:

OCTOBER 26-4 o'clock a. m.

Colonel BOYD: Yours of 7 and 10 o'clock 24th reached me at 10 o'clock last night. I cannot reach Pitman's Ferry and find out what is at Thomasville before 29th. Will be there then. We scattered Boone's men in every direction yesterday, killing 6 or 8; 18 prisoners, 25 guns, 12 horses. They are all broken up but Crow's company, who had gone east of Current River.

B. F. LAZEAR, Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding.

I immediately recalled the scouting parties and crossed my command, with the exception of the artillery and Captain Vaughan's men, over the river. Late in the evening I received another dispatch from Lazear by Lieutenant Going, informing me verbally that he was marching from the direction of Thomasville, on the Pocahontas, and would be ready to co-operate with me at any time after midnight. This road leads directly across the road to Yellville, by which the enemy retreated, and they had already passed the point of intersection at least thirty-six hours before. Of course pursuit was now useless, and I directed Lieutenant Going to rejoin Colonel Lazear, with orders to join me as soon as possible on the Pocahontas road. On the morning of the 29th I crossed the artillery over the river, and leaving Captain Vaughan to guard the ferry and the prisoners I marched toward Pocahontas, and formed a junction with Colonel Lazear at Bollinger's Mill, 15 miles from the ferry. I immediately ordered a detachment of 50 cavalry, under Major Lippert, to march to Pocahontas and search for horses and contraband goods. Major Jaensch accompanied the detachment. They dispersed a small scouting party, taking 8 or 10 horses, and found a number of rebel sick in a hospital, whom Major Jaensch paroled, and a list of whom accompanies this report. The next morning, October 30, I commenced my march back to Patterson, which point I reached at 6 o'clock p. m., November 2.

Too much praise cannot be awarded to the officers and men under my command in this expedition. They performed a march of 65 miles to Pitman's Ferry (the first day through a severe storm) in less than two days and a half, crossing a wide and deep stream. The last twenty hours they were on the march of 80 miles in four days, crossing two wide and deep streams.

I have no hesitation in saying that, had the force under Lieutenant-Colonel Lazear been able to co-operate with me by reaching the road to Yellville by which the enemy retreated at the time I reached Pitman's Ferry on the morning of the 27th, we would have routed the entire rebel force and captured the baggage train and artillery. This force I estimate, from reliable information, at 1,000 cavalry, 500 infantry, and four pieces of artillery, under command of Colonels Burbridge, Green, and Mitchell. It retreat toward Yellville, at which point I understood the enemy is concentrating a large force, and where they have a powder-mill in operation.

My thanks are especially due to the following officers detailed on special duty: To Captain Newberry, Twenty-fifth Missouri, for his efficiency in crossing the command over Black River; to Lieutenant Waterbury, Twenty-third Iowa, assistant adjutant; to Lieutenant Brown, Twenty-third Iowa, assistant quartermaster, and to Lieutenant Buzard, Twenty-fifth Missouri, commanding advanced guard of infantry.

Very respectfully, &c.,

WM. DEWEY, Colonel, Commanding. S. H. BOYD, Colonel, Commanding.

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HDQRS SECOND MISSOURI STATE MILITIA CAVALRY, 

Bloomfield, March 23, 1863.

SIR: I have the honor to report that, in accordance with your instructions, I left this post on the evening of the 19th instant, for the purpose of making a tour of reconnaissance west of the Saint Francis River. For this purpose, I took with me 75 men, 25 of whom I left at Williams' Crossing, on the Saint Francis River, under command of Lieutenant [J.] Donahoo, to guard two ferry-boats, one of which I captured on the Mingo, and the other at Punches' Crossing, on the Saint Francis, together with several canoes, all of which I floated won stream to the point above indicated, about three-fourths of a mile south of the junction of the Mingo with the Saint Francis River.

Shortly after daylight next morning, I crossed my party, arriving that evening at Poplar Bluff. Here we were enthusiastically hailed by the few inhabitants that remain, and who express more Union sentiment, and are more truly loyal, than any people I have yet met with in Southeast Missouri.

Aware of the small force at my disposal, and being now 40 miles from any support, I deemed it prudent to withdraw from town,and encamp at the foot of the bridge over Blackwater River, on the east side of the village, there holding a position that no enemy could well force. Not being able to ascertain any information relative to the reported advance of Marmaduke's army, I resolved to push still farther in the direction of Pocahontas, until I could meet his advance or capture his pickets, or strike his trail in case he had moved north.

About 1 o'clock next day [21st], I surprised a picket, consisting of 5 men, who fled at our approach. They were stationed about 20 miles from Poplar Bluff, at the junction of the Pitman's Ferry and Doniphan roads.  I captured 3 of the pickets and killed and remaining 2.  I will state that the two who were killed had good horses, and exhibited a degree of bravery worthy of a better cause. Being well mounted, myself and Captain [Perry D.] McClanahan, commanding Company C, of this regiment, soon took the lead of our men and each singled out his man and pursed him. Several pistol shots were exchanged during the chase, and not until we were within 3 miles of Doniphan could we get fairly up with them. Here my antagonist shot my horse, and at the same instant I killed his; both horses fell together, and we (my butternut friend and myself) rolled over and over, when he broke loose and attempted to get away on foot, but I soon caught him and put an end to the desperado.

At some little distance I found my friend McClanahan, standing over the remains of him he pursued. We were both exhausted,and had to wait until our party came up.

I must make special notice of Corporal Blurton, of Company B, for his zeal and bravery throughout.

From the pickets captured, I learned that Marmaduke's main force as still encamped in the vicinity of Batesville, and that Jeffer's Clark's, and Lewis' men were acting as his advance guard, making their regular reports to him, and being guided and instructed from his headquarters. One of the prisoners captured was lately from Little Rock, Ark., and seemed to have been acting in the capacity of postmaster, as the inclosed package of communications, found upon his person, will indicate.

The road from Bloomfield to the Saint Francis is tolerably good, passing over gentle ridges and plateaus, or glades, through which levees have been constructed, with the necessary culverts. A train of artillery, in good weather, could easily pass over, with some repairs being done to the bridge over Lick Creek. I would calculate the distance at about 18 miles. Forage very scarce.

From the Saint Francis to Poplar Bluff the roads are excellent, with the exception of about 1 miles through the Blackwater bottom, passing over a high, barren, and uncultivated ridge.

A couple of thousand bushels of corn might be collected at poplar Bluff from the farms on the Blackwater bottom. This is all an army could depend upon. I must be nearly 20 mils from Williams' Crossing, on the Saint Francis, to Poplar Bluff. From Poplar Bluff to Pitman's Ferry it must be about 35 miles, and about an equal distance to Doniphan. The roads are good and practicable for trains or artillery. But few cultivated farms, and forage very scarce.

The telegraph constructed by General Steele has been completely destroyed and strewn carelessly along the road. I had several horses thrown by it in the charge, and some of the riders seriously injured.

Before concluding this hurried report, I would state that, in the neighborhood of Pitman's Ferry, I found Saint Louis newspapers of a more recent date than we could obtain at Bloomfield, thus clearly demonstrating that the rebels are in direct communication with that city.

My command arrived safely at this post at 1 a. m., having been absent four entire days. We took with us but a limited supply of hard bread; marched 150 miles during that time without either tents of blanket, and during the entire trip I never heard a murmur.

I am, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

FRED. R. POOLE, Regimental AdjutantColonel JOHN McNEIL,Commanding Southeastern Expedition.

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CAMP MARMADUKE, April 16, 1863.

Major HENRY EWING,

Assistant Adjutant- General:

MAJOR: Captain Surridge, who was lately at Doniphan, informs me that it will require a half day to cross the ford at that place, and that he thinks it unsafe to cross the ammunition. He suggests that the amminition and artillery be crossed at Pitman's Ferry, which would throw them on the east side of Current, 10 miles from Doniphan. If I find this to be the case, will it be objectionable to cross the ammunition at the ferry! I know the ford at Doniphan; it is bad, deep, and rapid. Captain S. also reports that there is no forage on the stubble field road; thinks the troops which have just passed over have consumed it. I can cross below Black's Ferry and make the necessary arrangements. Captain S. is further of the opinion that it will take me two days to put my command at Doniphan (crossing included).

Young has just notified my that he will be here during the day. Nothing from [W. J.] Preston. All of Jeffers' men (armed) are with him. In ordering me to report to a given point, you will please bear in mind that it will take me two days, or nearly two, to be at Doniphan.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

COLTON GREENE,Colonel, Commanding Brigade.

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HDQRS. THIRD MISSOURI STATE MILITIA CAVALRY, 

Pilot Knob, May 9, 1863.

GENERAL: I have the honor to submit the following report of an engagement near Patterson, Mo., on the 20th day of April, 1863, between a portion of my regiment and the Confederate forces, under the command of Marmaduke. Having information from my spies and scouts that a large rebel force was moving into Missouri from Batesville, Ark., I kept my front as well picketed as my limited force would permit keeping scouting parties on Black River, at or near all the available fords on that stream, which was some 20 miles to the front of my post. The rebel force approached in three columns from the Doniphan, Van Buren, and Pitman's Ferry roads commanded, respectively, by Shelby, Greene, and Burbridge. They thus succeeded in capturing or cutting off my scouting parties, and preventing their communicating will me. Their immediate approach was not known until within 6 miles of Patterson, where they met and commenced an engagement with a scouting party, 20 in number, under the command of Captain Hunter. This party, making a strong resistance to their approach, compelled the enemy to commence a brisk cannonade. ....................

EDWIN SMART,

Colonel Third Missouri State Militia Cavalry.

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PILOT KNOB, May 30, 1864

Lieutenant H. HANNAHS, Acting Assistant Adjutant-General:

Major Wilson telegraphs from Patterson that General McRae, with a force of not less than 600 men, is on the road to Patterson from Pitman's Ferry.

Gets the information from soldiers of Eleventh Missouri Cavalry paroled by McRae.

J. F. TYLER,Colonel, Commanding.

-.-. .-. . .- - . -.. / -... -.-- / -.. .- -. / .... .. .-.. .-.. 

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF WEST TENNESSEE, 

Memphis, Tenn., September 14, 1864.

Major General H. W. HALLECK,

Chief of Staff, Washington, D. C.:

GENERAL: On the 10th instant a brigade of cavalry, supposed to be about 1,500, was at Pocahontas; another brigade, was moving up Black River on the west side, and were near Powhatan; while another force of about 3,000, under McCray, was moving on the east side of Black River. These men are all of Shelby's command. Price and Marmaduke crossed the Arkansas at Dardanelle eight or ten days ago, and will join Shelby unless the force sent from here shall be moved to intercept them, of which I think there is some prospect. That our troops will succeed in preventing a junction with Shelby is very probable, but that they will head off the raid is, in my opinion, extremely doubtful. While Shelby will probably enter Missouri near Pitman's Ferry, Price, to avoid our forces, will probably strike off toward Springfield. It he gets a day or two the start our forces can never overtake him, as he will consume everything in his line of march, and a pursuing force could not live. My information in regard to Shelby's position I consider entirely reliable, and my informant-a British subject that I employed to go within their lines, a man of great intelligence-says that there can be no doubt that they intend to invade Missouri. They expect on reaching there to receive a very large accession to their strength, and that the movement has been delayed by the non-arrival of General Price as soon as expected. I give you these facts for what they are worth. Major-General Forrest, with Chalmers' division, dismounted, left Grenada on the 5th instant, on the cars, for Mobile.

I am, general, your obedient servant,

C. C. WASHBURN, Major-General.

Links:

The Encyclopedia of Arkansas History and Culture

THE EXTRAORDINARY STRATEGY

Political Intrigue Surrounding a Backwoods Missouri Election

Sets the Federal Military Campaign in Arkansas Back By a Year

    In late summer 1862, large numbers of pro-secession Missourians moved out of their home state and into Arkansas seeking to avoid mandatory service in the Enrolled Missouri Militia, a Federal military reserve organization.  To take advantage of this influx of manpower a rigid Confederate conscription and recruiting program was set up in Arkansas that greatly swelled the ranks of Secessionist military units in the state.  With the reinforcement of these forces by a number of Texas regiments sent into the area, a vigorous attempt was mounted by the Confederacy to push into southwestern Missouri—an attempt that was accompanied by strong shows of force below the Union strongholds of Pilot Knob and Rolla which were intended to divert Federal attention from the southwest as well as impede the flow of Federal supplies and troops into that area.

    Simultaneous to this buildup came the approach of the fall congressional elections, the first to occur since the outbreak of hostilities.  With the ejection of secession supporters from the Missouri state government in months gone by as well as the requirement of the recitement of a loyalty oath as a prerequisite to participation in the electoral process (both as a candidate and a voter), the political parties in the state consisted solely of Unionist organizations.  Divided into Conservative and Radical factions, with these parties came a variety of splinter offshoots that pursued varying, more specific agendas, but which maintained close ties to the two larger groups.

    Illustrating the state of affairs in late 1862, at this moment in time General-in-Chief of the United States Army Henry Halleck wrote to Brigadier General John M. Schofield in Missouri and noted how Northern politics were affecting military decisions. “It has almost ruined the Army,” Halleck complained, “and if carried out will soon ruin the country.”  In the course of his commentary General Halleck went on to advise Schofield that Radicals were on the brink of a leap in influence.

    In the Fourth Congressional District in Southwest Missouri, 48-year-old pre-war Democrat John S. Phelps, an eighteen-year veteran Congressman from Springfield, Missouri, was running for re-election as a Conservative Unionist/Anti-Emancipationist.4  His opponent in the election was 34-year-old Republican Emancipationist Sempronius H. Boyd, former city attorney and mayor of Springfield.  While “Pony” Boyd never formally identified with the Radical Union party, as an “avowed Emancipationist” he drew a large measure of support from them.5  

    Ironically, just a year before these two men had been close allies—with the formation of Phelps’ Regiment of Home Guards in June 1861, the Congressman assumed the top leadership position while the next two slots went to Lieutenant Colonel Marcus Boyd and his son, Major Sempronius Boyd.  After the regiment was disbanded several months later both Phelps and the younger Boyd parted ways and went on to greater responsibilities.6 

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    In the course of carrying out the Confederate plan to enter Missouri in force, an army of up to 7000 men under Colonel Douglas H. Cooper was sent to the vicinity of Newtonia, thirty miles or so inside Missouri, while Brigadier General James S. Rains with 6000 infantry occupied the area around Pea Ridge near the state line and Cross Hollow a dozen miles to the south.  In addition, there were several thousand unarmed conscripts with these forces that were waiting to receive weapons with which to fight—a situation complicated by the recent capture of thousands of rifles intended for the Rebels by Federal gunboats on the Mississippi River.7  

    Major General Thomas C. Hindman, senior commander of Confederate troops in Arkansas, was regularly shuttling between Southwest Missouri and Little Rock to bring up arms and supplies.  To round out the picture, Brigadier Generals James H. McBride and Mosby M. Parsons were positioned in northeast and north central Arkansas with several thousand troops poised to strike United States forces stationed at Pilot Knob and Rolla.  As this situation unfolded, the Union command in St. Louis was inundated with reports that the Rebels were pressing Missouri at all points and could commence an invasion at any time.8 

    With this intelligence, Greenville, the seat of Wayne County in Southeast Missouri, was the focus of a Federal defensive reinforcement and quickly became a bastion of strength in the region as more than 2000 soldiers took up residence.  Sempronius Boyd, now colonel and commanding officer of the recently formed Twenty-fourth Missouri Infantry, was placed in charge of the Greenville garrison and was soon given authority over the companies of the Twelfth Missouri State Militia Cavalry that were stationed in the region.9

    In due course Boyd was accused of attempting to draw attention to himself in order to give a boost to his nascent Congressional campaign.  This effort was assisted by the fact that he was the first line of defense between the Confederates to the south and the key Federal city of St. Louis to the north.10

    Standing in the path of Boyd’s run for national office was John S. Phelps.  One and the same John Phelps that was recently Boyd’s superior officer in the Home Guard back home in Springfield and was that area’s nine-term incumbent Congressman.  Causing further difficulty for Boyd’s political designs, in August 1862 Phelps added the office of military governor of Arkansas to his resume.11  Thus the election for the Fourth District pitted Emancipationist/former City Attorney/former Mayor Boyd against Conservative Anti-Emancipationist/present Congressman/present Governor Phelps.  Underdog Boyd had his work cut out for him.     

    Upon arriving at Greenville in early August 1862 as a regimental commander, Colonel Boyd promptly began issuing reports about a significant Confederate presence below him and stated that Rebel General McBride had men spread from Independence County, Arkansas, to Oregon County, Missouri.  The initial military reports disseminated by Boyd held that although McBride had a substantial number of unarmed or poorly armed men with him, this force intended to attack Greenville as soon as it could be equipped.  During this time Boyd also audaciously asked his superiors if he could march on Confederate-occupied Little Rock.12

    In the wake of the reports that Greenville was in danger, on September 5 Boyd was given authority over all military activities encompassing the Missouri counties of Wayne, Cape Girardeau, Scott, Stoddard, and Butler.13  To assist him in his defense of the region, detachments of the Third Illinois Cavalry and Thirteenth Illinois Cavalry were brought in to supplement the troops of the Twelfth M.S.M. Cavalry and Twenty-fourth Missouri Infantry already under his command.  Although he did not receive a promotion in rank the additional support effectively put him in command of a brigade of troops.14

    Political rival and Arkansas Military Governor John S. Phelps, based at Helena, was preparing with Brigadier General Frederick Steele to undertake an assault on Little Rock—an assault that was anticipated to put Phelps in the governor’s mansion no later than October 20, over two weeks before the November 4 congressional election.5  With the attendant positive publicity, gloriously entering his seat of government at the head of a conquering army on the eve of balloting would probably do wonders for Phelps’ chances at being re-elected to Congress.  

    However, Phelps was feeling very uneasy about the state of affairs developing between Boyd in Missouri and McBride in Arkansas (strangely, these three men had all been attorneys from Springfield before the war—Boyd and McBride had even been appointed to serve together as co-counsel for the Springfield Bank).16  As Phelps was involved in completing plans for the upcoming Arkansas campaign he became increasingly concerned that McBride was in position to cut his lines of communication and supply to the north, and that Boyd would not be able to keep those lines open.7  Probably weighing heavily upon Phelp’s thought-process was Boyd’s considerable conflict of interest.  If Boyd supported Phelps, Phelps’ secure military position might result in Phelps’ re-election.  If Boyd’s support was less than enthusiastic, Phelps’ weakened position might reflect on him personally and result in Boyd’s election.

    The same day Boyd was given control over the five Southeast Missouri counties, Governor Phelps turned to fellow Conservative Unionist General John Schofield in St. Louis and asked him to provide Boyd with additional troops.  Phelps may have been thinking that with additional troops might come a general, or at least a colonel with more seniority that would preempt Boyd.  In any event, Phelps’ request for more troops for Greenville proved impractical for Schofield since he was in the process of mounting his own campaign into Southwest Missouri to counter the escalating Confederate threat there.18  Instead, the Twenty-third Iowa Infantry under Colonel William Dewey was ordered down to Boyd from the Hawkeye State.  This unit was just being formed, with the majority of its personnel presently undergoing their initial training in Des Moines.  While the troops were raw recruits fresh off the farm, they would have to do since nothing else was available at the moment.19

    As the drama continued to develop, fears of an invasion into the region escalated when the drunken 100-man Federal garrison at Bloomfield suffered a surprise attack by Confederate Colonel William L. Jeffers on September 11, and as many as six Enrolled Militia were killed and five wounded.  Not only did this exhibit a growing boldness on the part of the South, it also turned out to be a supply windfall for its ill-equipped fighters as two artillery pieces and hundreds of small arms were captured.20 In response to this assault and rumors that Greenville was next, at 3:00 o’clock that same night Boyd began a forty-mile march to Bloomfield.  Upon his arrival twelve hours later he shelled the town and then pursued the retreating Secessionists for the next day and a half.21  

    When Boyd returned to Greenville on the night of the 14th he found orders waiting from General John W. Davidson directing him to pull in the satellite outposts of the Twelfth M.S.M. Cavalry stationed at Fredericktown and Patterson, and to concentrate them at Greenville with the rest of the command.  Boyd was further instructed to mount patrols well in front of his position and, as a last resort, to fall back on Pilot Knob in the face of a superior force.  As if to punctuate the commentary and the need to maintain alertness, General Davidson pointedly ordered Boyd to place Captain John Hyde of the First Wisconsin Cavalry under arrest and send him to St. Louis under close guard for having allowed the militia under him to be surprised at Bloomfield.22

   Boyd was also advised in Davidson’s message that an experienced officer that was native to the region—Lieutenant Colonel Samuel P. Simpson of the Twelfth Missouri State Militia—was being sent to Greenville to assist in the command and defense of the post.  In light of Simpson’s resignation that same day in order to assume a leadership position in a new U.S. Volunteer regiment, the promise of the aid and skills of the future Adjutant General of Missouri was not to be kept.23

    In compliance with the orders to keep patrols out well in his front, on the afternoon of September 17 Boyd sent out sixty troopers from Companies E and F of the Twelfth M.S.M. Cavalry under Captain Peter Hagan with orders to penetrate into the state of Arkansas and obtain intelligence on rumors that “a large force of rebels, consisting of Arkansas bushwhackers and Texian Rangers were congregating at Pittman’s Ferry, on Current River….”  While camping that night nine miles below Greenville, firefights broke out three times between Hagan’s pickets and opposing combatants “supposed to be a small scouting party of bushwhackers.” 24

    Proceeding with their mission, the next morning the Twelfth M.S.M. rode to Reeves Station where they scouted for Secessionists recently reported to inhabit the area.  After failing to make contact with them, the Federals resumed their southward march and stopped for the night at the crossing of the Little Black River.  The following morning Hagan’s reconnaissance was complicated by the loss of over a tenth of his strength when a number of horses came up lame due to the poor road conditions.  Moving forward with the reduced force, one of Hagan’s men afterward commented, “we marched cautious, so as to guard against a surprise, our advance keeping a sharp look out on all sides….” 25

    Around noon on September 19 the U.S. Cavalry reached its destination of Pitman’s Ferry and found it to have been recently vacated.  Placing his soldiers in line of battle on the bank of the Current River to cover him in the event of surprise, Hagan then selected a handful of men and forded the waterway via the ferryboat.  Once on the other side, the Bluecoats guardedly approached five or six log structures.  Seeing a number of bunks inside the buildings and observing that chinking had been knocked out for use as rifle portholes, the little hamlet was put to the torch.  After spending an hour around the premises the troopers then rejoined their comrades, turned the boat loose to float down the river, and cut the crossing rope.  “As we were now in the land of Dixie, and having destroyed property we considered of great importance to the enemy, and being within a few miles of a large force of rebels, we considered it best to return to Greenville.”  Thereafter undertaking a rapid march, the men of the Twelfth M.S.M. were back within the safer confines of their base exactly 24 hours later.26

    More importantly, in the course of the patrol Hagan came across a Federal prisoner that had been released on parole.  Confederates scattered from Little Rock to Pocahontas were reported, with 2000 troops said to be located a dozen miles south of Pitman’s Ferry, as well as additional concentrations at Smithville and below Pocahontas.  Consequently, Greenville was sealed off to all outsiders.  “No suttlers are allowed here—no peddlers of cider, cakes, or pies; and, in fact no citizens are allowed to pass by the picket guard,” wrote one soldier stationed there.  “The most exacting rules in force that I ever saw.  It is like taking liberty away sure enough.  It however does one thing: it makes the little army safe, and I believe that is about all the Colonel cares for.” 27

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     Despite Colonel Boyd’s dire predictions regarding impending attacks on Greenville, there was a body of thought that a greater danger was posed to Rolla, Missouri.  Since a move on Rolla could directly affect General Schofield’s supply lines to the southwest, intelligence on McBride’s troop disposition was forwarded to Schofield at Waynesville on September 20, where he had moved his army en route from St. Louis to carry out his planned Southwest Missouri operation.28      

    In response to the threat of McBride and in the hope of relieving pressure on his army, two days afterward Schofield sent an urgent message to Brigadier General Frederick Steele, senior commanding officer of U.S. troops stationed at Helena, Arkansas.  Steele had the only other Federal force of note in this area of the Trans-Mississippi and was requested by Schofield to either attack Little Rock in order to divert Rebel attention to that point, or to attack McBride’s soldiers from their rear.  Schofield also presented a third option, which was for Steele to move his troops by steamer to Cape Girardeau and attack McBride from that point.  Schofield urged Steele to act with haste, whatever he decided to do.29

    In an additional dispatch sent on September 25 to Major General Samuel R. Curtis, the top Northern commander in Missouri and Arkansas, Schofield made a second plea for Steele’s troops to be ordered to either attack Little Rock or move against McBride.  Schofield further requested that Curtis authorize Steele to send additional regiments to him for use in Southwest Missouri.30 

    Complicating matters was the fact that Curtis had also been a Congressman before the war, and as a Republican had sat on the opposite side of the aisle from Democrat John S. Phelps.  Curtis was now a darling of the Radical Unionists and Emancipationists—a heartening situation for Pony Boyd but one that boded ill for Conservatives Schofield and Phelps.31 Significantly, just three months previously Curtis had led a Federal incursion into northern Arkansas and had urgently requested support from Schofield—a request Schofield had rejected as being “impossible.” 32  With the tables now turned, Curtis rejected Schofield’s desperate pleas using Schofield’s own word in his reply—“impossible.” 33

    While this was occurring, a vocal Sempronius Boyd found himself further in the limelight as he advised the military hierarchy in St. Louis that the Pocahontas Confederates under McBride appeared to be stationary, but had recently received a very heavy reinforcement.  He went on to claim that Confederates under Solomon Kitchen and Bill Jeffers—the newly forming Seventh Missouri Cavalry (CSA) and Eighth Missouri Cavalry (CSA)—were active in the area and that he thought a body of them would strike in his direction.  Colonel Boyd also noted that a new Rebel presence on the Eleven Point River in Missouri had been detected—a presence that was to move about Thomasville and Van Buren in Oregon and Carter Counties for the next few weeks and eventually have significance for the fortunes Lieutenant Colonel Bazel Lazear and the Twelfth M.S.M.34

    As General Schofield was marching to the southwest, a large number of outside Confederate troops were reported to have moved into southern Arkansas, causing additional concern to the Federal leadership.  Back at Greenville, on September 27 Boyd sent out a patrol in a manner that caused it to draw fire from his own pickets.  The ensuing friendly fire incident between the two Northern squads resulted in one man and two horses receiving wounds.  Playing the mix-up to his advantage, Boyd reported that the Rebels had probed the Greenville defenses and had killed one of his men and wounded two others.  This bit of creativity tended to keep attention focused on both Southeast Missouri and Colonel Boyd and served to underscore Boyd’s dire reports of impending attack.  Adding to the alarm, Boyd also reported McBride’s army was now actually on the march and moving towards him, throwing the senior command into a quandary in deciding whether to strengthen Greenville at the expense of Rolla and consequently leave that latter stronghold weakened.35

    Adding fuel to the fire, although there is no real evidence that McBride ever had more than two infantry regiments—2000 men at best—Colonel Boyd was reporting the Confederate general now had 5000 to 6000 troops.36  All eyes were on Boyd’s seemingly beleaguered Greenville outpost and away from John S. Phelps, while General Schofield was moving closer and closer to the primary Confederate force in Southwest Missouri.  

    With an attack appearing to be close at hand, a final battle plan for the Southeast was readied by the Missouri command as Colonel Chester Harding, Jr. at Pilot Knob was ordered to send his ambulances to Boyd.  If and when the full-scale Rebel offensive transpired, Harding was to take his troops of the Twenty-fifth Missouri Infantry along with Colonel John B. Gray’s First Missouri State Militia Infantry and form a defensive line and/or counterattack into Wayne County.  In addition, 600 troops of the First Wisconsin Cavalry were ordered from Cape Girardeau to Greenville to further strengthen that post.37 Acting according to his instructions, upon the arrival of the Wisconsin troops Colonel Boyd assembled his Twenty-fourth Missouri Infantry and, with the garrison’s sick, withdrew to the much more secure Pilot Knob.  Taking over in exposed Greenville was Bazel F. Lazear of the Twelfth M.S.M. Cavalry, just promoted to Lieutenant Colonel days before to replace Samuel Simpson (Albert Jackson, the Twelfth M.S.M.’s Radical Unionist colonel, had been fired on September 10 by the Conservative governor of Missouri, Hamilton Gamble).  After the latest troop shuffling was completed, Lazear was left with a small brigade of 1200 cavalrymen consisting of his own Twelfth M.S.M. Cavalry as well as detachments of the Thirteenth Illinois Cavalry and First Wisconsin Cavalry.38 

    Headquarters’ foremost order to Lazear:  be vigilant.  In pursuance of this instruction Lazear implemented a series of patrols to scour the countryside a days march around Greenville.  The new lieutenant colonel was firmly advised that cavalry should never be surprised.  Appealing to Lazear’s authoritarian tendencies, he was instructed to remind his troops of this fact “at the point of the sword.” 39

    Soon afterward reports began to trickle in that James McBride was having trouble mounting his offensive into Southeast Missouri for want of shoes for his troops.40 Further confusing matters, it was rumored McBride had been placed under arrest earlier in the month and was in failing health.  Despite Sempronius Boyd’s September 27 reports to the contrary, not only were the Rebels not moving en masse towards Greenville, they were actually anticlimactically leaving the region.  Pursuant to orders issued on September 28, McBride and his men moved west to join Brigadier General Mosby M. Parsons at Yellville, Arkansas.41

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    After Schofield’s September 25 request to have Steele assist him was rebuffed by General Curtis as being impossible, Schofield promptly went over Curtis’ head to Major General Henry Halleck, the General-in-Chief that had recently warned him of growing Radical influence.  Consequently, just one day after saying there was no way he could possibly help Schofield, at “the suggestions of General Halleck” Curtis was making arrangements for the movement of 10,000 troops to do just that.42  However, Halleck’s suggestions were for Curtis to act on the three options Schofield had presented (1. Move on Little Rock; 2. Attack McBride from the south; or 3. Attack McBride from Cape Girardeau).  And despite stating that he was embracing Schofield’s options, Curtis instead charted a fourth course of action.43

    Perhaps stinging from Halleck’s intervention, coupled with political and military rivalries, Curtis ordered Brigadier General Frederick Steele at Helena to transfer a division of his troops to Pilot Knob—an order that was about to result in a firestorm of controversy and have a number of soldiers and newspapermen questioning the logic of the move (splitting hairs, Curtis later argued that since he floated the troops past Cape Girardeau on their way up the Mississippi River he was following Schofield’s third option).44

    General Steele was taken aback, if not outraged, since the transfer would force a cancellation of the imminent Arkansas campaign and cause the “virtual abandonment” of Helena as well as the entire state of Arkansas.  “There is no large force threatening [Southeast] Missouri from Arkansas,” Steele shot off to General Halleck.45

    Even Boyd’s cavalry chief was rejecting Boyd’s claims.  Privately, Bazel Lazear was telling his wife that the Secessionists directly below were harmless and that Boyd had “a little too much steam on hand.” 46      Sempronius Boyd’s political rival, Governor John Phelps, was wholly in agreement with Steele and Lazear.  Seeing Boyd and Curtis emasculating the army intended to secure Arkansas for the Union (and, perhaps, Phelps’ congressional seat), Phelps made accusations that “exaggerated reports of the force of the enemy have been put forth.” 47 Although Phelps had suggested a reinforcement of Southeast Missouri in the first place, he had made it to protect his own position and had never dreamed it would be at the cost of gutting the Arkansas Federal army.    

    Governor Phelps contacted Curtis and attempted to have him rescind the re-deployment orders, which Curtis declined to do.  Phelps, like Steele, argued McBride had only 1500 effective troops—not enough to be considered a threat to Southeast Missouri.  But Colonel Sempronius Boyd was saying that Southeast Missouri was in grave danger and “Boyd . . . ought to know better than Governor Phelps,” or so said General Curtis.48  

    The same day Curtis made this comment, an increasingly desperate Phelps communicated with General Halleck and sought to have him countermand the order to move into Missouri.  Illustrating the level of debate into whom really “knew best,” Phelps stated “we at Helena had a better knowledge of the disposition of the enemy and his strength in Arkansas than any one at Saint Louis.”  Punctuating his entreaty to General Halleck, Governor Phelps continued with an ominous, “I am confident the execution of General Curtis’ order will be attended with disaster.” Disaster for whom remained to be seen. 49

    While Halleck expressed extreme reservations about the Pilot Knob plan he left the decision to Curtis.  Strong hints by Halleck for a different course of action did not change any minds.  Said Curtis on the issue and of Phelps’ desire to be allowed to proceed with the pending assault on Little Rock, “Halleck expressed in favor of that move [on Little Rock], but still left it to me, I declined….”  Curtis was snatching Phelps’ army from him, and along with it, any chance Phelps had to march up the steps of the Arkansas state capitol before the congressional election.50

     On October 13, a fleet of fifteen to twenty paddlewheelers laden with soldiers and artillery arrived at Sulpher Springs, Missouri, almost 100 miles north of Cape Girardeau.51   As the Helena troops boarded trains there to be shipped down to Pilot Knob a newspaper in Chicago was speculating on the “extraordinary strategy” that was prompting the abandonment of the Arkansas campaign when the only Rebels known to be threatening Southeast Missouri were supposedly just a small number of what it referred to as “guerrillas.” Closer to home, the press in St. Louis was more blunt and called the move “a military mistake.” 52 Even the Confederates were baffled.  The ranking Southern officer west of the Mississippi, Major General Theophilus H. Holmes, contacted General Hindman and curiously asked if he had any inkling as to what the Federals were up to.  “What [Steele] has gone to Pilot Knob for I can’t imagine, unless Curtis permitted himself to be alarmed. . . .” 53  Very quickly Curtis’ boss, General Halleck, seemed to be coming awake as to the vastness of this enterprise to defend against a relatively insignificant number of Confederates, as he inquired of Curtis, “are you not employing more troops in Missouri than are really necessary?  The great object now is to open and hold the Mississippi.”  At this Curtis blithely responded to Halleck by heaping praise upon himself regarding his own actions and innocently stating he was merely doing what Schofield and Halleck had asked him to do.54

    In the midst of the intrigues, Election Day drew nearer for congressional candidate Sempronius Boyd, and Boyd knew best, while his opponent John S. Phelps had embarrassingly become a military governor without much of a military force. 

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       Now that everyone’s attention was focused on Southeast Missouri, the stage was set for Boyd to exhibit his soldierly acumen to his electorate.  Hundreds of Confederates were reported to be gathering a day’s ride away around Van Buren in Carter County, Missouri.55 In addition, Colonel John Q. “Jack” Burbridge of the newly forming Fourth Missouri Cavalry (CSA) had moved a brigade of Confederates into northeast Arkansas opposite Colonel Boyd to replace the troops General McBride had moved to Yellville.  With the aid of his second in command, Colonel Colton Greene of the Third Missouri Cavalry (CSA), Burbridge positioned his 1500-1750 soldiers at Pitman’s Ferry near the state line, possibly to use as a jumping off point for a move north.56       

    As this transpired General Steele grudgingly completed his movement of 10,000 troops by rail from Sulpher Springs to Pilot Knob, bitterly disputing reports that Southeast Missouri was in any sort of danger.  His presence in the region only reinforced his beliefs as he grumbled that Sempronius Boyd was blowing the entire situation out of proportion in order to get himself elected to the United States Congress.57

    Another new arrival involved the Twenty-third Iowa.  Once there it did not take Colonel William Dewey long to join in the general cacophony as he complained, “the feelings in my regiment and in other commands here is deeply adverse to Colonel Boyd.”  Dewey, in further commenting on Boyd, spoke of his plight at being “forced as I am to obey orders from a source, so incompetent to give them.” 58

    In any event the Rebel command no longer had Greenville targeted for attack, if it ever did in the first place.  Instead, events were about to come to a head in the region as orders were issued to Burbridge to push northwest towards Rolla to cut Schofield off from the rest of Missouri.59

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    At this time reports found their way into Union camps that 450 well-mounted and well-armed Confederate irregulars were gathering in Carter County under David C. Boone, a recruiting officer for Burbridge (unbeknownst to the Federals, this might have been Burbridge’s advance for his pending demonstration towards Rolla).  Pursuant to this intelligence Colonel Boyd received an opportunity for further acclaim as he prepared to send 500 of his best cavalry troops under good officers to deal with it.60  Boyd’s “best cavalry troops” consisted of picked men from all three regiments in Lazear’s brigade including Company A, Twelfth M.S.M. Cavalry—the Four-Mile Deadshots.  The “good officers” included Lieutenant Colonel Bazel Lazear and Second Lieutenant Thomas Going of the Twelfth Missouri State Militia Cavalry, as well as Captain Algernon Seaton of the First Wisconsin Cavalry and Major Lothar Lippert of the Thirteenth Illinois Cavalry.61

    In anticipation of the mission, elements of the cavalry brigade were transferred from Greenville to Patterson on October 19 where their final orders were withheld until the last moment.  In keeping with a general veil of secrecy over the operation, the detail set out in the dead of night on October 20.  To prevent any word preceding them that might allow the Rebels to slip Lazear’s net, every citizen met along the road that might pass information on to the other side was ordered detained.62

    After arriving in Carter County on the morning of October 21 Lazear spent the next day and a half searching for the Confederate battalion.  Finally locating it north of Van Buren on the evening of October 22, the Federals mounted an attack.  In the ensuing combat the Southerners fared poorly and were swiftly driven from their base, through the streets of Van Buren, and on south into the countryside.  The day’s fighting was reported to be a complete success for the Northerners at the cost of one Federal killed in action.63

    Pursuing the fleeing Confederates, the U.S. troops caught up to them again two-dozen miles to the southwest three days later.  Forced into battle just after a heavy snow had fallen, the Secessionists attempted to make a stand on a high hill between Pike Creek and the Eleven Point River in Oregon County.  As before, Lazear routed the Rebels but this time kept pace and engaged them in a running fight that lasted for six or seven hours.  Greatly assisted by the ability to track his quarry in the fresh snow (which revealed many barefoot Rebels) the Federals chased the Southerners through the Ozarks of South Missouri.  In the course of the fighting Lazear succeeded in breaking up and dispersing Boone’s unit, with the exception of the company of a Captain Crow, which escaped intact across the Current River.  During this round of skirmishing a half dozen or more Confederates were killed and 18 taken prisoner while an additional 200 were scattered in all directions.  Also captured were 25 weapons and 12 horses.64

    As the two encounters had unfolded, express riders were carrying reports to the senior Union leadership.  When word reached General John W. Davidson in St. Louis he ecstatically sent out dispatches praising Lazear’s “unwearying pursuit.” 65 At the same time Lazear, in the course of the wild chase through the region, received information that he had blundered into the midst of a significant concentration of additional Confederates.  With 1000 Southern troops said to be directly west of him at Thomasville and another 1000 south at Alton, the Federal field officer unexpectedly found himself told he was heavily outmanned and outgunned.66

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    In the midst of the cavalry’s sortie events were developing elsewhere.  Three days after Lazear had left Patterson, General Steele was ordered to move his division from Pilot Knob to Patterson and assume command over all troops in the area from Sempronius Boyd.67  Before this could be effected, Colonel Boyd, whose reports of impending doom had set off this chain of events, sought to utilize his general authority one last time before he had to relinquish it.  In the process Boyd managed to make a few more headlines on the eve of the November 4 election while a snookered John S. Phelps languished in Helena instead of sitting triumphantly in Little Rock.

    Ordering Colonel Dewey and part of his regiment into the field, Boyd implemented a second thrust to the south, this time targeting Colonel Burbridge at Pitman’s Ferry—a move the bored Iowans were only too happy to make.  “[We had] nothing to enliven the time except a short march down the Current River on the Arkansas line after some bushwhackers,” recounted Private Peter Lynch of Company H, Twenty-third Iowa Infantry.  Although Burbridge’s troops were in fact a conventional force and was not made up of bushwhackers, the comment reveals that the Northern rank and file on the scene was not taking Pony Boyd’s exhortations too seriously.68

    In a movement planned to coordinate with Dewey’s attack on Burbridge, Lazear’s cavalry was to advance into Arkansas from his position in Carter County (where his superiors assumed him to be), sweep below Pitman’s and then surprise the Confederates from behind.  This pincer movement of the two Federal forces was scheduled to culminate at 3:00 o’clock p.m. on October 26.  Since this spur-of-the-moment operation had not been outlined before the assault against Boone was undertaken, on October 24th Colonel Boyd sent two dispatches detailing the Pitman’s plan to Lazear as he was unsuspectingly winding his way on into Oregon County.  In his dogged pursuit of Boone, Lazear had moved ever further away from Boyd’s position.  Consequently the new orders did not find their way to the U.S. cavalry detachment until 10:00 o’clock on the night of the 25th.69

    At 4:00 o’clock a.m. on the 26th, fresh off a full day of fighting and knowing it was impossible to make the scheduled connection with Dewey in just eleven hours, Lazear sent a return dispatch to Boyd advising that he was going to look further into the mass of Confederates he had heard were around Thomasville, after which he would move on Pitman’s.  Lazear further reported he was not going to make the rendezvous before October 29.  While this message was couriered back to Boyd, Lazear sent additional word in the direction of Colonel Dewey’s line of march, hoping it would reach the Iowan in time to allow him to take the late appearance of the cavalry into account and to act accordingly.70

    In the meantime, orders were en route from General Hindman to Jack Burbridge instructing him to advance rapidly towards Rolla, and to then withdraw to Yellville when compelled to do so by Union opposition.  Hindman, perhaps feeling apprehensive about the plan, contacted General Holmes who acknowledged “the enemy are too strong,” but that it was too late to stop Burbridge.  “I fear for his safety,” said Holmes.  Feared for naught as it turned out, for Burbridge was never able to implement his raid.71

   As yet, the developments in regard to Lazear and Burbridge were unknown to Colonel Dewey when he left with his command on the morning of October 25 during the same heavy snowfall Lazear was fighting Boone in to the southwest the same day.  Leading three companies of his own Twenty-third Iowa Infantry and three companies of Sempronius Boyd’s Twenty-fourth Missouri Infantry, Dewey also had two companies of the First Missouri State Militia Infantry, five companies of the Twenty-fifth Missouri Infantry, and one section of Battery E of the Second Missouri Light Artillery.  Captain William T. Leeper and eighteen men of Company B of the Twelfth M.S.M. were also along to act as scouts and advance guard.  With this hodge-podge of 13+ companies from six regiments Dewey had around 1000 men with him.  Including Lazear’s horsemen and the Second Artillery, the United States troops assigned to attack Pitman’s Ferry were a virtual man for man match against Burbridge’s section of artillery, 1000 unmounted troops, and 500 cavalry.72  Although matched in numbers, an advantage lay on one side with the better equipped and better armed Federals, and the other with the Rebels’ veteran leadership.   

    On Sunday, October 26, Dewey’s force was approaching Vandever’s Farm in Ripley County when Captain Leeper met an enemy picket that he unsuccessfully tried to run down.  Upon being detected Dewey felt compelled to undertake a grueling forced march to engage Burbridge before he had an opportunity to prepare for the Union attack.73

     Upon arriving at Pitman’s Ferry on the morning of the 27th, Dewey found the Confederates in camp.  The Federal Colonel immediately rushed his artillery forward and positioned it against his opponents across the Current River.  As the Rebels were maneuvering their own artillery, Dewey opened fire.  Burbridge may very well have thought 10,000 Yankee soldiers he had probably been hearing about were descending upon him.  After an exchange of literally just a few shots he packed up and left, withdrawing to the west towards Yellville.  In doing so he left behind several dead as well as forty of his men caught on the wrong side of the river and taken prisoner when Dewey arrived.  As for the Bluecoats, the aforementioned Private Lynch of the Twenty-third Iowa succinctly summed up the affair by stating “some shots were exchanged, one [Federal] was hurt.”  Thus was the great Skirmish at Pitman’s Ferry.74

    Not yet having cavalry to support him nor having received Lazear’s dispatch explaining his delay, Dewey felt it was foolhardy to attempt a full-scale pursuit of Burbridge and instead sent skirmishers to harass Burbridge’s rear for a few miles.  At the same time he was concerned about Lazear’s force, which had been ordered to approach from the very direction in which the Confederates had fled.  Dewey felt he would be in jeopardy without cavalry support if he further engaged Burbridge, while Lazear would be in jeopardy without infantry support if he met Burbridge on the roads of northern Arkansas (ironically Lazear and Burbridge had resided near one another in Pike County, Missouri, before the war).75

    In an attempt to find Lazear and to further coordinate with him, at noon on the 27th Dewey sent Captain Leeper and his men across the river with orders to determine Lazear’s location and status.  Leeper was unsuccessful and returned later that day without any word on the overdue cavalry.76

    The next morning Dewey sent out additional search parties, including two companies of infantry, with instructions to find the missing troopers.  Detailing one company of footmen downstream and the other upstream, Colonel Dewey also rounded up every horse on which he could lay his hands and mounted additional infantry, which then accompanied Leeper’s cavalrymen on another foray across the river.77

    By now Dewey was becoming alarmed.  Were there more Confederates than had been reported waiting for Lazear in his excursion against Boone in Missouri?  Did Lazear run into Burbridge’s retreating column in Arkansas?78

    Finally, at 11:00 o’clock on the morning of the 28th, Lazear’s 4:00 a.m. message of October 26 advising of his situation in Oregon County reached Dewey, who immediately called off his searchers.  However, while this message gave an explanation for the delay it still did not let Dewey know what had transpired to Lazear’s command after the communication had been sent to him 55 hours earlier.79

    Dewey decided to go ahead and move his troops across the river, with the exception of his cumbersome artillery and a handful of men to guard the crossing.  As the day wore on no further word was received from Lazear.  Finally, by late evening Dewey found the answers to his questions when Second Lieutenant Thomas Going of Company E of the Twelfth M.S.M. reached Pitman’s Ferry.  All was well, Dewey was informed, as the mounted soldiers had uneventfully scouted Thomasville and then pulled out of Oregon County and into Arkansas.  There they moved towards Pitman’s Ferry and had passed a critical road junction just hours before Burbridge crossed the same position via a bisecting road.  Going reported that Lazear was marching in on the Pocahontas Road and would be able to cooperate with Dewey’s movements sometime after midnight.80

    Now having sufficient information with which to make critical decisions, Dewey began formulating his next move and determined that a pursuit of Burbridge was useless.  Burbridge had withdrawn on the morning of the 27th and it would be the morning of the 29th before Dewey could be in position to move after him.  Hearing that his cavalry was at hand, something might yet be salvaged out of the mission so he moved his artillery across the river and decided to march on the Rebel town of Pocahontas, Arkansas.  With the Bluecoat infantry moving south, the guard was left at the river crossing as Lieutenant Going headed back to Lazear with instructions to join Dewey at Bollinger’s Mill a few miles north of Pocahontas.81

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    While Lazear had not remained long scouting around Thomasville after he received his Pitman’s orders, he was still a fair distance from the planned meeting point.  With the Federal horsemen pushing forward they came upon an affluent farm and stopped to rest—probably late on October 27.  To prevent looting, Lazear placed sentries around the house, which by all appearances was deserted.82

    Sergeant William Nevin of the Four-Mile Dead Shots was put in charge of the guard, with orders to protect the property from molestation.  Two hours into sentry duty a woman startled Nevin by climbing out from under a bed.  Upon receiving assurances that she would not be harmed the lady of the manor became very outgoing and talkative.  After asking questions about the men’s families and which army they were with, she reportedly inquired whether the boys had any “flap eared Dutch” with them and made note that “you’ns have better clothes than we’ns.” 83

    Despite this amusing interlude the war was still waiting to be fought, and shortly afterward Dewey and Lazear belatedly joined forces.  Meeting at Bollinger’s fifteen miles south of Pitman’s Ferry, the Union combatants began the hunt for any stray Confederates unfortunate enough to have lingered in the neighborhood.  As the Federal raiders, now made up of parts of eight different regiments, moved to within a few miles of Pocahontas—ordinarily relatively secure Rebel territory—Dewey detached several dozen mounted troops from Lazear’s brigade.  With Major Lippert in charge of one scout and Lazear leading another, a reconnaissance cautiously moved into the city itself to look for enemy troops and to search for horses and contraband goods.  Joining in as an observer was Major Frederick Jaensch of the Thirty-first Missouri Infantry who had apparently tagged along with Dewey on a lark.84

    In town Lippert dispersed a squad of Secessionist scouts, after which around ten horses were confiscated.  In the meantime, Lazear captured the mail (probably with a bit of a joke given that he was the postmaster of Ashley, Missouri, before the war).  Searching through it, he found a worthless five-dollar Arkansas bond that he later sent home to his wife as a souvenir of Dixie.  In the course of the sweep through town a hospital was located that contained a number of injured and sick Southern troops.  Taking them prisoner only briefly and merely in a technical, legalistic sense, the Northerners left the convalescents in their beds while Major Jaensch handed out paroles that would impede their return to active military duty once they recovered (violating a parole could be punishable by death).(85)

   As this was transpiring, General Davidson was concerned about the time Lazear had been in the field and ordered Colonel Boyd to recall him.  After mentioning Lazear’s “great success,” Davidson stated, “we have something more important ahead than hunting bushwhackers” and noted that the cavalry would soon be played out if not given a rest.86  At the same time General Curtis ordered General Steele to advance his troops further south in support of “Boyd’s movement” into Arkansas (Dewey’s force).  In a response reeking with disdain and no small measure of insubordination, Steele sarcastically responded, “Please explain what you mean by Boyd’s movement.  The only movement of Boyd’s that I know of is to get himself elected to Congress.” 87

    The instructions from Davidson and Curtis turned out to be unnecessary, as the Federals moved back into Missouri on October 30.  In the course of the various actions occurring the final ten days of October 1862, Dewey and Lazear reported killing around a dozen Southern troops and captured one hundred.  In his final report Dewey commented that had Lazear been able to make the junction as planned, they might well have routed the entire Confederate force and captured its baggage and artillery.88

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    In final analysis, it appears General Steele’s feelings of Sempronius Boyd’s motives in this affair may have been warranted.  Claiming McBride had up to 6000 troops in northern Arkansas, the Confederate general’s true strength appears to have been less than one-third that number.  As for the Pitman’s Ferry expedition, by not leading it himself he could take credit for any victory, but scapegoat Dewey should there be a problem.  In addition, the planned date for the junction between Lazear and Dewey was an impossible one to meet under the best of conditions, let alone in the midst of a heavy snowstorm.  Dewey started with his infantry on the morning of October 25 with instructions to reach Pitman’s Ferry by 3:00 o’clock the next afternoon.  Pitman’s Ferry was a three-day march away (note that even with the forced march Dewey did not reach Pitman’s until the morning of the 27th).  Also, if Boyd really believed the Rebels to have had as many combatants in Northeast Arkansas as he had been claiming, it seems very unlikely he would have sent as few troops as he did.  

    Furthermore, Boyd had the movement being supported by a cavalry commander that was unaware of the plan and was out chasing Rebels through the bush a couple of counties away when the plan was initiated.  Even if the Pitman’s Ferry orders had reached Lazear in a more timely manner he still would have had just one day to reach the rendezvous, also an impossible task under the best of circumstances.  Lazear thought so much of the order that he did not even try to comply with it and instead brazenly sent a response that he was going to explore Oregon County for awhile instead.  

    At Greenville Boyd had hundreds of additional cavalry troops he could have utilized without the risk of all the unknowns that surrounded the use of Lazear.  Despite this, Boyd chose not to employ them in the action against Burbridge.  Boyd also was well aware, as was everyone else in the region, that Steele was up the road with thousands upon thousands of troops that were preparing to move to Patterson.  If Boyd had delayed three or four more days, several regiments of infantry could have been sent to the east and west of Burbridge at Pitman’s Ferry (note Curtis’ order to Steele to support Boyd’s movement).  With cavalry moving below him, having his baggage and artillery captured would have been the least of Burbridge’s worries—his command may well have been trapped and either destroyed or captured en masse.    

    However, had Sempronius Boyd awaited Steele’s arrival, Steele would have received the headlines.  Instead, Pitman’s Ferry was Boyd’s show all the way.  Not only was General Curtis referring to “Boyd’s movement,” but dispatches passed on to Schofield spoke of how the Confederates “were routed from Pitman’s Ferry by Boyd.” 89

    All in all, the mission appears to have been much more style than substance, with an eye towards gaining a few positive headlines right before the voting, without raising a substantial risk of a defeat that might reflect badly upon his election campaign (the near miss between Burbridge’s 1500 retreating troops and Lazear’s exhausted but advancing 500 cavalry was one unforeseen eventuality that could have proved troublesome).

    Had the offensive been better coordinated with a more realistic rendezvous date the Pitman’s Ferry affair would have been the largest battle of the war in the immediate area.  It is also possible that had Dewey been more aggressive against Burbridge the Rebels still could have been engaged.  Instead, as he fretted incessantly about the possibility Lazear might be overwhelmed he remained static at Pitman’s Ferry. 

    As things turned out, in his retreat Burbridge immediately moved to assist the Confederates fighting General Schofield further west and was able to actively participate in the campaign that was heating up there.90  General Curtis took direct credit for the Confederate withdrawal from Southeast Missouri, citing his massive troop movement as inducing the the evacuation.  Lost somewhere in this logic is the fact that Curtis’ mission was to aid Schofield.  Causing additional enemy troops to directly join the fight against Schofield was hardly acting in assistance of Schofield.91

    As for the Pitman’s Ferry Federals, just one man was “hurt” that belonged to the attacking force; the nonevent of the “Skirmish” At Pitman’s Ferry found its way into newspaper headlines and Civil War historical records; and Sempronius Hamilton Boyd was indeed elected to the United States Congress eight days afterward.  Elected by a razor thin margin that may well have hinged upon news of recent heroics—a swing of just 250 votes would have resulted in defeat for him.  Meanwhile his opponent John S. Phelps, who had had his own chance at heroics taken away from him by Boyd’s political ally, sat dejected in Helena.92

    Samuel Curtis’ actions at a key moment in an election, at the expense of political opponents John S. Phelps and John Schofield, are suspect.  The personal cost to Curtis was considerable, however, as extraordinary disdain was heaped upon his purposeless movement of troops from Helena to Pilot Knob.  Missouri’s most prominent newspaper was making comments such as “why the army was not marched to the capital of Arkansas, where nothing but a broken, fragmentary, demoralized army, of diminutive proportions, stood in its way, must ever be a matter of wonder.” 93

    In an open attempt to deflect the condemnation, General Curtis again claimed it was all General Schofield’s doing and that he was just assisting as he was requested.  Schofield countered that his proposals were limited to an attack on enemy troops in Arkansas—not an abandonment of Arkansas and a movement of 10,000 troops to Pilot Knob, Missouri.94  In taking the lead in the criticism of Curtis, a furious Governor Phelps contacted Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton and stated that Curtis was void of the qualities of energy and enterprise that the position he was in required.  Phelps also contacted General Halleck and raised issues of improper activities on Curtis’ part, claiming that he was involved in the illegal trade of cotton.95  By November 6, Abraham Lincoln was asking Curtis to answer the charges being leveled against him.96  Two days after that General Halleck issued orders for Curtis to place General Steele in charge of the troops at Helena, with instructions that all the soldiers that could be spared at Pilot Knob were to be sent back to Arkansas.97  

    While Sempronius Boyd went on to greater duties, so to did Brigadier General Schofield and Brigadier General Steele.  Both Schofield and Steele were soon promoted in rank to Major General and played prominent roles in the coming months of the conflict.  Steele oversaw the transfer of his troops back to Helena, and finally, in September of 1863, successfully completed the assault on Little Rock.98

    With a strong helping hand from General James G. Blunt of the Army of the Frontier, Schofield saw his campaign in the southwest draw to a successful conclusion with the Battles of Cane Hill on November 28 and Prairie Grove on December 7.  Not long thereafter he assumed Curtis’ job and then eventually the top leadership position in the Army of the Ohio.  In that role he participated in the invasion of Georgia and the final large battles in Tennessee.  After the war he served as Secretary of War under President Andrew Johnson and then as Superintendent of West Point.  Schofield concluded almost five decades in the service of the nation as Commanding General of the United States Army and retired as a lieutenant general in 1895.99

    Samuel R. Curtis moved beyond the debacle of his ill-advised troop deployment to Pilot Knob, but fell into disfavor and conflict with Missouri Governor Hamilton Gamble.  Finding he could not treat the Conservative Unionist civilian governor of Missouri as intemperately as he did the Conservative Unionist military governor of Arkansas, Curtis was soon relieved of his duties in Missouri and Arkansas by President Lincoln, replaced by Conservative Unionist Schofield, and reassigned to the Department of Kansas.100  Before the end of the war Curtis was transferred yet again and given the American equivalent of exile to Siberia as he took charge of the Department of the Northwest adjoining the Canadian border.  Here he served out the remainder of the war, far from any Confederate troops, far from Pilot Knob, Missouri, and far from the Honorable Sempronius H. Boyd, United States Congressman.101

    Neither was Boyd immune to the complaints swirling in the aftermath of Pitman’s Ferry.  Upon his return to camp, in response to complaints of a drunken and verbally abusive Boyd, Colonel Dewey wrote a letter to General Curtis and asked that “we be placed under the command of competent Officers.”102  A moot point, given that Boyd was about to move to the nation’s capital.  

    After one term in Washington D.C., Congressman Boyd was defeated for re-election by a former private that had served under him in the Twenty-forth Missouri.03  Boyd then returned home where he served as circuit judge and as a member of the Republican National Executive Committee.  In 1864 he was a delegate to the Republican National Convention and four years later he was again elected to Congress.  Returning to Springfield after the expiration of his second term, he lived out his life as a businessman and attorney before being appointed to serve as Minister Resident and Consul General to Siam.104

    John S. Phelps resumed the practice of law in Springfield in 1864.  That same year he served as a delegate to the Democratic National Convention and was touted as a possible vice presidential candidate on the McClellan ticket.  Running as a Democrat for the office of governor of Missouri in 1868, for a second consecutive time he came out on the losing side of an election.  Eight years later he repeated as his party’s standard-bearer for the state’s highest office, this time successfully.  In this capacity Governor Phelps became one of very few men that have served as the chief executive of two separate states.105

ENDNOTES

(1) United States War Department, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (130 vols., Washington D.C., 1880-1902) Series 1, Volume XIII, 16-17.  Hereinafter cited as O.R.  Unless otherwise noted, all O.R. volumes cited in this article are from Series 1.

(2) Walter Bickford Davis and Daniel S. Durrie, An Illustrated History of Missouri (St. Louis: A.J. Hall and Company 1876) 179

(3) O.R., Vol. XIII, 654

(4) History of Greene County, Missouri (St. Louis: Western Historical Company 1883) 421

(5) Ibid., 421, 575-580, 743; St. Louis Republican, 11 Nov. 1862, p. 2; St. Louis Democrat, 1 Apr. 1863, p. 1

(6) Ibid., 289, 743.  Annual Report of the Adjutant General of the State of Missouri For the Year 1863 (St. Louis 1864) 99-100

(7) O.R., Vol. XIII, 16-17

(8) Ibid.

(9) J. Randall Houp, The 24th Missouri Volunteer Infantry: “Lyon Legion” (Alma, Ark.: J.R. Houp 1997) 54-57

(10) O.R., Vol. XIII, 773

(11) O.R., Ser. 3, Vol. II, 233

(12) O.R., Vol. XIII, 230-231, 265 

(13) O.R., Vol. XIII, 613

(14) Frederick H. Dyer, A Compendium of the War of the Rebellion (Des Moines: The Dyer Publishing Company 1908) 1029; O.R., Vol. XIII, 265, 694; St. Louis Republican, 22 Sept. 1862, p. 2.  See also, Charles D. Field, Three Years in the Saddle From 1861 to 1865 (Goldfield, Ia.: s.n. 1898)

(15) O.R., Vol. XIII, 751

(16) History of Greene County, 244; Thomas R. Gibson, “Gen. James H. McBride,” Confederate Veteran, XXXIII (1915), 375

(17) O.R., Vol. XIII, 614

(18) O.R., Vol. XIII, 16-18, 614

(19) O.R., Vol. XIII, 552, 668, 694; Unpublished manuscript written by Peter S. Lynch entitled My Civil War Experiences, Texas State Library and Archives, Austin, Texas, pp. 3-4.  Lynch wrote this manuscript from memory in 1923 at Lamar, Colorado.  It was typed and signed by him in May 1930 at Los Angeles, California.  Lynch served in Company H, 23rd Iowa Infantry during the Civil War

(20) O.R., Vol. XIII, 268; Perryville Union, 20 Sept. 1862, p. 2; Vivian Kirkpatrick McLarty (ed.), “Civil War Letters of Bazel F. Lazear,” Missouri Historical Review, XLIV (1950), 264; Letter of Bazel F. Lazear to wife Margaret Jane Lazear, 1 Oct. 1862, Lazear Papers, Western Historical Manuscript Collection—Columbia, Box 1014

(21) Cairo City (Ill) Gazette, 18 Sept. 1862, 1862; Perryville Union, 20 Sept. 1862, p. 2; St. Louis Republican, 22 Sept. 1862, p. 2

(22) O.R., Vol. XIII, 629-630; McLarty, 264

(23) Ibid.; Annual Report of the Adjutant General of Missouri For the Year Ending December 31, 1865 (Jefferson City, Mo.: Emory S. Foster, Public Printer 1866) 230, 516

(24) Perryville Union, 4 Oct. 1862, p. 2; O.R., Vol. XIII, 655

(25) Ibid.

(26) Ibid.

(27) Ibid.; St. Louis Republican, 22 Sept. 1862, p. 2

(28) O.R., Vol. XIII, 604, 655, 656

(29) O.R., Vol. XIII, 22

(30) O.R., Vol. XIII, 22-23

(31) For the politics of Curtis and Schofield and the high-profile Radical/Conservative conflict between the two see, William E. Parrish, A History of Missouri Volume III 1860-1875 (Columbia, Mo.: University of Missouri Press 1973) 56-58, 97-99

(33) O.R., Vol. XIII, 9

(33) O.R., Vol. XIII, 23

(34) O.R., Vol. XIII, 659, 668

(35) While the senior Federal command was reporting a skirmish with enemy forces, one of Boyd’s subordinates, Lt. Col. Bazel Lazear, was writing to his wife and telling her it was a friendly fire incident.  See, O.R., Vol. XIII, 673; O.R., Vol. XIII, 673-674; McLarty, 263

(36) O.R., Vol. XIII, 702.  For McBride’s strength in Arkansas around this time see, Bruce S. Allardice, More Generals in Gray (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press 1995) 155-156

(37) O.R., Vol. XIII, 690; William DeLoss Love, Wisconsin in the War of the Rebellion (Chicago: Church and Goodman, Publishers 1866) 558-559

(38) Ibid.; O.R., Vol. XIII, 689, 693-694, 703.  The Albert Jackson/Hamilton Gamble contretemps was a major event in the Missouri Radical/Conservative conflict and turned out to be a test case for the authority of the governor over the Missouri State Militia.  For the date Jackson had his commission vacated see, Annual Report of the Adjutant General of Missouri For the Year Ending December 31, 1865, 516.  For more on the resulting controversy, see O.R., Ser. 3, Vol. II, 646-647, 658-662, 882-883, 955

(39) O.R., Vol. XIII, 689

(40) O.R., Vol. XIII, 715

(41) O.R., Vol. XIII, 264-265, 883-884.  McBride’s troops later moved to Little Rock but he was too ill to remain with them.  He died near Bluffton in 1864.  See Allardice, 155-156.

(42) O.R., Vol. XIII, 670-671

(43) O.R., Vol. XIII, 25-28, 932-933

(44) Ibid.; O.R., Vol. XIII, 670, 670-671

(45) O.R., Vol. XIII, 671, 685

(46) McLarty, 263-264

(47) O.R., Vol. XIII, 751-753  

(48) O.R., Vol. XIII, 695, 698

(49) O.R., Vol. XIII, 685

(50) O.R., Vol. XIII, 25, 702, 752

(51) O.R., Vol. XIII, 752

(52) St. Louis Republican, 8 Dec. 1862, p. 2; O.R., Vol. XIII, 891-892.  This dispatch included an enclosure of an article from the Chicago Times.

(53) Ibid.

(54) O.R., Vol. XIII, 759, 761-763

(55) William Nevin, History of Co. K, 3rd M.S.M. Cavalry Vols. From Its Earliest Organization in 1861, to Final Muster Out On January 31, 1865, Missouri Historical Society; O.R., Vol. XIII, 337-338

(56) O.R., Vol. XIII, 355-356

(57) O.R., Vol. XIII, 773, 773-775

(58) Houp, 61 

(59) O.R., Vol. XIII, 16, 48, 340-341

(60) O.R., Vol. XIII, 337-338, 754.  Federal reports referred to the Confederate officer simply as “Boone.”  However, a recent publication places David C. Boone recruiting Confederates in Carter and Oregon Counties during the time frame of these events.  See, Missouri: Our Civil War Heritage (St. Louis: Julia Dent Grant Tent No.16 of Daughters of Union Veterans of the Civil War, 1861-1865 1994) 49

(61) O.R., Vol. XIII, 342-344; Annual report of the Adjutant General of the State of Wisconsin For the Year Ending December 30, 1865 (Madison, WI: William J. Park & Co 1866) 588; Love, 558-559

(62) Nevin; O.R., Vol. XIII, 754

(63) Nevin; O.R., Vol. XIII, 337-338

(64) Ibid.; O.R., Vol. XIII, 340, 340-341, 343

(65) O.R., Vol. XIII, 340

(66) O.R., Vol. XIII, 337-338

(67) O.R., Vol. XIII, 758

(68) Lynch, 4

(69) O.R., Vol. XIII, 342-344

(70) Ibid.

(71) O.R., Vol. XIII, 48, 898

(72) O.R., Vol. XIII, 342-344

(73) Ibid.

(74) Ibid.; O.R., Vol. XIII, 340, 341; Lynch, 4

(75) O.R., Vol. XIII, 342-344

(76) Ibid.

(77) Ibid.

(78) Ibid.

(79) Ibid.

(80) Ibid.

(81) Ibid.

(82) Nevin

(83) Ibid.

(84) Ibid.; O.R., Vol. XIII, 344; McLarty, 266

(85) O.R., Vol. XIII, 344; McLarty, 265-266; Letter of Bazel F. Lazear to wife Margaret Jane Lazear, 25 Oct. 1862, Lazear Papers

(86) O.R., Vol. XIII, 767

(87) O.R., Vol. XIII, 773

(88) O.R., Vol. XIII, 344

(89) O.R., Vol. XIII, 768

(90) O.R., Vol. XIII, 355-356; O.R., Vol. XXII, Part 1, pp. 189-190; O.R., Vol. XXII, Part 2, p. 29

(91) O.R., Vol. XIII, 23-25

(92) Federal casualties: Lynch, 4; 500 vote margin: Louisiana (Mo.) Journal, 20 Nov. 1862, p. 1; Election: History of Greene County, 743

(93) St. Louis Republican, 20 Dec. 1862, p. 1

(94) O.R., Vol. XIII, 23-25, 25-28

(95) O.R., Vol. XIII, 683-685, 751-753  

(96) O.R., Vol. XIII, 783-784

(97) O.R., Vol. XIII, 782

(98) Albert Castel, General Sterling Price and the Civil War in the West (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press 1968) 154-158

(99) See, Lieutenant General John M. Schofield, Forty-six Years in the Army (New York: The Century Company 1897)

(100) O.R., Vol. XXII, Part 2, pp. 277, 293-294; O.R., Vol. XXXIV, Part 1, p. 1

(101) O.R., Vol. XLVIII, Part 1, p. 3

(102) Houp, 60-61

(103) Houp, 205

(104) History of Greene County, Missouri, 743; Houp, 205-206

(105) Ibid., 579; Personal Reminiscences and Fragments of the Early History of Springfield and Greene County, Missouri (Springfield: Inland Printing Co. 1914) 80