Embedded Files
publications
More Talk Less Discovery: Evidence from Requiring Informal Discovery Conferences with Eric Helland
We investigated the impact of court management techniques on the reduction of litigation costs. Specifically, we examined the effect of Informal Discovery conferences (IDCs) implemented by courts in recent years. The primary objective of IDCs is to decrease discovery costs by minimizing the need for discovery motions. Our research focuses on the use of IDCs, wherein parties meet with the judge prior to filing a motion to compel, which is one of the most frequently encountered discovery motions.
To determine the causal impact of IDCs, we employed an instrumental variable identification strategy. By leveraging the random assignment of judges within the Los Angeles County Superior Court, where a judge conducts the IDC and subsequently departs, we were able to establish a reliable framework for analysis. Our findings indicate that IDCs effectively reduce not only the frequency and presence of discovery motions but also the case durations.
Progress: accepted at American Law and Economics Review Draft
Methods for Assessing Civil Justice Reform: The Case of “Meet and Confer” Requirements for California Demurrer with Richard Sander, Carolyn B. Kuhl, Henry Kim, Jacob Kempf, and Eric Helland (Conference Proceeding)
This paper has two objectives. At a substantive level, we evaluate a modest experiment launched by the state of California in October 2015, which requires parties that file a demurrer in most civil cases to first “meet and confer” with opposing counsel to attempt to resolve the issues raised by the demurrer. At a methodological level, we present an innovative and efficient strategy that we use to evaluate the “meet and confer” experiment, and which can, we hope, be readily adapted to other types of evaluation.
working papers
Criminal Decarceration Policies and the Effect on Community Safety
This paper examines the negative effect of two consecutive decarceration policies on deterrence. In 2011 and 2014, California implemented decarceration policies—AB 109 and Prop 47, respectively—targeting the same offenses. AB 109 reallocated state prison inmates convicted of non-serious property offenses to local county jails, while Prop 47 reduced penalties for certain non-serious property crimes, leading to the release of those offenders from county jails into local communities. Its humanitarian goal was to provide offenders who committed specific non-violent crimes with a second chance while alleviating the burden on county jails by integrating offenders into local communities.
AB 109 mechanically increased overcrowding in California jails. Following its passage, recidivism rates increased among offenders who repeatedly committed offenses explicitly covered under Prop 47, but this trend was not observed after the passage of Prop 47 itself. However, recidivism rates for offenses not covered by Prop 47—but similar to those that were—increased and persisted after the enactment of both policies. This endogenous behavioral change raises important questions about prison overcrowding, decarceration, and deterrence.
Recidivism Trend between Groups
Nixing the Judge: The Politics of Judicial Disqualification for Prejudice with Eric Helland
We examine the impact of ideology on judicial disqualifications for prejudice in the California courts, where both the plaintiff and the defense decide whether to challenge the judge. We model the decision to challenge based on the attorney’s ideological distance from the judge assigned to the case and the distance from the pool of potential replacement judges who could be randomly assigned the case if the attorney challenges the judge. The model predicts that lawyers will be more likely to challenge judges who are ideologically distant from them. The model also predicts that ideologically distant from the median judge is likely to replace them. The results follow the prediction that a one percentage point higher probability of drawing a judge closer to each side raises the probability of challenge the current judge by 0.5 percentage points. Furthermore, particular judges are challenged by both defense and plaintiff sides, implying both sides avoid strict judges.
automation project
Los Angeles criminal court data from web-scraping to final flat file
Progress: one-time scripts constructed.
Google Sites
Report abuse