Abstract: This paper analyzes a nonsmooth model of probabilistic voting with two parties and a broad family of other-regarding behavior, including fairness and quasi-maximin preferences, income-dependent altruism, and inequity aversion. The paper provides conditions for equilibrium existence and uniqueness. It also characterizes the Nash equilibrium in pure strategies when parties hold either symmetric payoffs, or minor forms of asymmetries. The characterization shows that the two parties converge to an equilibrium policy that maximizes a mixture of a “self-regarding utilitarian” social welfare function and an aggregate of society's other-regarding preferences. These results are shown to be applicable to other nonsmooth frameworks, such as probabilistic voting with loss averse voters. The characterization also shows that the direction and the size of the inefficiencies emerging from electoral competition depend in a subtle way on the nature of the other-regarding preferences (and resp., loss aversion).

JEL Classification Codes: C72, D72, D78.

Abstract: This paper explores the implications of voter loss-aversion and imperfect recall for the dynamics of electoral competition in a simple Downsian model of repeated elections. The interplay between the median voter’s reference point and political parties’ choice of platforms generates a dynamic process of (de)polarization, following an initial shift in party ideology. This is consistent with the gradual nature of long-term trends in polarization in the US Congress.

JEL Classification Codes: D72, D78.

Abstract: Despite the empirical support for other-regarding behaviour in humans, spatial voting theory has largely overlooked the role of social preferences. This work takes the perspective that individuals not only harbour selfish preferences regarding material possessions, but also experience emotions such as envy and guilt regarding the possessions of others. By exploring how these emotions, manifested as inequity aversion, shape collective decision-making, this research deviates from the predominant focus on self-interest. Instead, it delves into the influence of guilt and envy on distributive politics, proposing two sensible constraints on these emotions, called limited and chained other-regardingness. These domain conditions on social preferences are aligned with the empirical estimates of inequity aversion; and they aim to ensure the stability (non-emptiness), uniqueness, and fairness of the majority-rule core.

JEL Classification Codes: D70, D71, D91,

Abstract: This paper examines how None-of-the-Above (NOTA) voting affects policy responsiveness. We develop a career-concerns model in which NOTA enables strategic voters to delegate electoral decisions to engaged voters, improving candidate selection while weakening discipline. Exploiting NOTA’s exogenous introduction in Indian state assembly elections in October 2013, we use constituency-level panel data from 2012–2021 and an instrumental-variable strategy. Consistent with theoretical predictions, NOTA increased night-time luminosity—a proxy for local economic activity—by 7.5%–10%, with effects concentrated in moderately competitive constituencies. Although richer voter information attenuates the effect, it remains positive and statistically significant. These findings show how expressive voting mechanisms can improve democratic accountability and economic performance. 

JEL Classification Codes: D72, D82, O43.

Presentation: EEA-ESEM Congresss (Dublin, 2026) (slides), ACEGD (New Dehli, 2025), European Winter Meeting ES (Nicosia, 2025) 

Abstract: We analyze the implications of three stylized facts about trust in political institutions for the role of elections in improving discipline, constraining pandering, and improving selection of politicians. First, trust in political institutions (politicians, political parties, and the legislature) has declined in recent years. Second, within countries, there is heterogeneity across citizens in their level of trust in institutions, and third, at the individual level, trust is malleable, especially when young. We add these features to an otherwise standard model of electoral agency. Unlike the standard model, where the quality of the candidate pool is assumed known, citizens are born with imprecise and heterogeneous priors over the quality of the pool, so young citizens learn not only about the incumbent, but also about the pool quality. An increase in precision increases both the discipline and selection effects of elections, whereas an increase in heterogeneity of prior beliefs has the opposite effect. The effect of changes in average trust in the population is generally ambiguous. When candidate entry is modelled, these findings extend to endogenous pool quality. The implications for citizen welfare and civics education are discussed. 

JEL Classification Codes: H11, C72.