Abstract: This paper analyzes a nonsmooth model of probabilistic voting with two parties and a broad family of other-regarding behavior, including fairness and quasi-maximin preferences, income-dependent altruism, and inequity aversion. The paper provides conditions for equilibrium existence and uniqueness. It also characterizes the Nash equilibrium in pure strategies when parties hold either symmetric payoffs, or minor forms of asymmetries. The characterization shows that the two parties converge to an equilibrium policy that maximizes a mixture of a “self-regarding utilitarian” social welfare function and an aggregate of society's other-regarding preferences. These results are shown to be applicable to other nonsmooth frameworks, such as probabilistic voting with loss averse voters. The characterization also shows that the direction and the size of the inefficiencies emerging from electoral competition depend in a subtle way on the nature of the other-regarding preferences (and resp., loss aversion).

JEL Classification Codes: C72, D72, D78.

Abstract: This paper explores the implications of voter loss-aversion and imperfect recall for the dynamics of electoral competition in a simple Downsian model of repeated elections. The interplay between the median voter’s reference point and political parties’ choice of platforms generates a dynamic process of (de)polarization, following an initial shift in party ideology. This is consistent with the gradual nature of long-term trends in polarization in the US Congress.

JEL Classification Codes: D72, D78.

Abstract: Despite the empirical support for other-regarding behaviour in humans, spatial voting theory has largely overlooked the role of social preferences. This work takes the perspective that individuals not only harbour selfish preferences regarding material possessions, but also experience emotions such as envy and guilt regarding the possessions of others. By exploring how these emotions, manifested as inequity aversion, shape collective decision-making, this research deviates from the predominant focus on self-interest. Instead, it delves into the influence of guilt and envy on distributive politics, proposing two sensible constraints on these emotions, called limited and chained other-regardingness. These domain conditions on social preferences are aligned with the empirical estimates of inequity aversion; and they aim to ensure the stability (non-emptiness), uniqueness, and fairness of the majority-rule core.

JEL Classification Codes: D70, D71, D91,

Abstract: This paper investigates the impact of None-of-the-Above (NOTA) voting on the responsiveness of policy-making. We develop a career concerns model in which voters -  classified as `strategic' or `engaged' - derive expressive utility from voting and share common priors about candidate competence. The model shows that NOTA facilitates information aggregation by allowing strategic voters to delegate electoral decisions to engaged voters, thereby improving selection while weakening disciplinary incentives. The effect on policy responsiveness depends critically on voter information quality and the degree of political competition. To test these predictions, we exploit the exogenous introduction of NOTA in Indian state assembly elections in October 2013. Using constituency-level panel data between 2012 to 2021 and an instrumental variable strategy, we find that NOTA adoption led to a 7.5%-10% increase in log nighttime luminosity - a proxy for local economic activity. Consistent with the model, the effects are concentrated in moderately competitive constituencies. While richer voter information attenuates the impact of NOTA, the overall effect remains positive and statistically significant. Robustness checks confirm that our results are credible. Our findings highlight the nuanced role of expressive voting mechanisms in enhancing democratic accountability and economic performance.

JEL Classification Codes: D72, D82, O43.