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I am an Associate Professor of Economics and Finance at UCL. I work on various topics in finance, economics, and accounting, which share the central theme of strategic information acquisition and disclosure. In particular, I study i) the interplay between security design and information acquisition in corporate finance, ii) the role of information acquisition and disclosure in supporting coordination, iii) incentive contract and monitoring, iv) accounting and optimal information disclosure, etc. My work includes papers published in the Review of Economic Studies, the Review of Financial Studies, Journal of Economic Theory, Theoretical Economics, the Journal of Accounting and Economics, and Management Science.

Publications

• Disclosure of Bank-specific Information and Stability of Financial Systems (with Liang Dai and Dan Luo), 37(4), 2024, 1315–1367, the Review of Financial Studies.

• Optimal Accounting Rules, Private Benefits of Control, and Efficient Liquidation (with Xu Jiang), 70(9), 2024, 6302–6314, Management Science

• Coordination and Continuous Stochastic Choice (with Stephen Morris), the Review of Economic Studies 89 (5), 2022, 2687-2722. 

This paper was previously circulated under the titles "Coordination and the Relative Cost of Distinguishing Nearby States" and "Coordination and Continuous Choice". (old working paper version, slides) 

• Optimality of Debt under Flexible Information Acquisition, the Review of Economic Studies 87 (1), 2020, 487-536. (slides, online appendix)

This paper was previously circulated under the title "Optimality of Securitized Debt under Flexible Information Acquisition". 

The Finance Theory Group Awards for the best theory paper on the finance job market

• Optimal Incentive Contract with Endogenous Monitoring Technology (with Anqi Li), Theoretical Economics 15 (3), 2020, 1135-1173.

• Financing Entrepreneurial Production: Security Design with Flexible Information Acquisition (with Yao Zeng) the Review of Financial Studies, 32 (3), 2019, 819-863, Editor’s Choice (lead article). (slides)

This paper was previously circulated under the titles “Venture Finance under Flexible Information Acquisition” and “Security Design in a Production Economy under Flexible Information Acquisition.”

• Properties of Optimal Accounting Rules in a Signaling Game (with Xu Jiang), Journal of Accounting and Economics 63, 2-3 (2017), 499-512.

• Coordination with Flexible Information Acquisition, Journal of Economic Theory 158 (2015), 721-738. (working paper version, slides)

This paper was previously circulated under the title "Coordination with Rational Inattention."

 Active Working Papers

• Dynamic Contracting with Flexible Monitoring (with Liang Dai and Yenan Wang), (slides), Revise and Resubmit, the Review of Economic Studies

• Coordination and Fragility in Liquidity Provision (with Yao Zeng), Revise and Resubmit, the Review of Financial Studies

• The Optimal Structure of Securities under Coordination Frictions (with Dan Luo)

The Charles River Associates Award for the Best Paper on Corporate Finance, West Finance Association, 2023

• Organizations and Spontaneous Order in Mitigating Strategic Uncertainty (with Liang Dai)

• Payments, Reserves, and Financial Fragility (with Itay Goldstein and Yao Zeng)

• Restoring Unanimity: The Role of Attention Allocation in Committee Decision-Making (with Jidong Chen)

Old Working Papers

• Insider Trading When There May Not be an Insider (with Liang Dai and Yenan Wang)