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Voting on Corporate Disclosure, solo-authored
Award: Best Presenter at the 2026 Canadian Academic Accounting Association Craft of Accounting Workshop
On the program: the University of Zurich, the 2026 Junior Accounting Theory Conference at Duke, the 2026 Canadian Academic Accounting Association Annual Conference, and the 2026 Workshop on Accounting and Economics at ESSEC, the 2026 SARC Doctoral Consortium at BI Norwegian Business School (scheduled), the 2026 Symposium on the Economic Analysis of the Firm at Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz (scheduled)
Summary: Motivated by stylized facts that shareholders vote for disclosure proposals as a strategic pre-step for subsequent policy reform, this paper analyzes the determinants and consequences of shareholders voting for disclosure decision. Specifically, the model predicts that higher market liquidity makes exit cheaper, raising shareholders' support for disclosure since the option to exit hedge the downside risk of disclosure, making disclosure a learn-then-act option; more concentrated passive ownership increases the power of the passive blockholder, leading to a larger subsequent policy shift. However, when the passive ownership is too large, it will eventually hurt the support for disclosure, since the policy is shifted to the blockholder's ideal point but hurts other shareholders.
Empirical tests using 2,686 disclosure proposals at U.S. public firms (2006–2025) support the model's predictions: support for disclosure increases with stock liquidity and it exhibits an inverted U-shape in passive ownership.
Working Papers
This figure traces the equilibrium funds' announced mandates and implemented positions, with the shaded bands giving each funds' capital share
The figure displays the dynamic effects of analyst portfolio overlap on corporate site visits before and after the 2012 regulation.
Corporate bond issuance process, with the variables marked in red our measures for investor demand and bond pricing in the primary market
Investor weight on firm disclosure with investors' coordination motive, when firm report clarity is high
Shareholder Democracy and Strategic Differentiation in Capital Markets, with Hui Chen (UZH) and Zeqiong Huang (Yale)
On the program: Carnegie Mellon University, Texas Christian University, the University of Zurich, the 2024 Brazilian Accounting Research Conference, the 2025 EAA Doctoral Colloquium, the 2025 Accounting Research Workshop, the 2025 Junior Accounting Theory Conference at NYU, the 2025 Conference on Financial Economics and Accounting, and the 2025 HKUST Accounting Research Symposium
In the news: Columbia Law School Blog
Summary: Shows how shareholder voting influences the social impact, capital distribution, and social welfare when firms compete for capital from investors with heterogeneous non-pecuniary preferences.
Portfolio Overlap, Information Competition, and Firms’ Fair Disclosures, with Fan Wu (CUHK) and Haoran Liu (CUHK)
On the program: the Frankfurt School of Finance & Management, the 2025 EAA Annual Congress, the 2025 China Financial Research Conference at Tsinghua University, the 2025 Australasian Finance & Banking Conference, and the 2026 Hawaii Accounting Research Conference
Summary: Develops theory and evidence that overlapping portfolios reduce analysts’ incentives to gather information, weakening the information environment.
I Need a Network: Determinants and Real Effects of Bond Roadshows, with Fulvia Oldrini (UZH) and Sike Chen (Barclays)
On the program: the University of Zurich, the 2025 Rising Scholar Conference in Finance, the 2026 Hawaii Accounting Research Conference
Summary: Uses novel German bond roadshow data to show that roadshows lower bond financing costs and increase investor demand in the primary market.
with Hui Chen (UZH)
On the program: the University of Waterloo, the 2026 EAA Annual Congress, and the 2026 Canadian Academic Accounting Association Annual Conference
Summary: Analyzes how accounting information affects market efficiency and investor welfare when investors have coordination motive and access to macro-economic signal.
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