Charlie Kurth
Email: charles.kurth [at] wmich [dot] edu
Office Hours: Thursdays, 2:00-3:30 pm, and by appointment
Office Location: Moore 3010
Predictive Processing (PP) accounts of the mind are rapidly gaining influence. In fact, the philosopher Jakob Hohwy has recently suggested that PP accounts are “set to dominate the science of mind and brain in the years to come.”
So what’s the fuss all about? The core tenet of PP is simple: the brain is a hypothesis-testing machine. More specifically, the brain’s job is to minimize errors in the predictions that it makes about the world (predictions that are based on incoming sensory information). But in their most ambitious forms, PP advocates take this humble foundation to be capable of explaining the whole mind—everything from the nature of perception, attention, and action to consciousness, thought, and emotion.
In this seminar, we will look at one of the most prominent philosophical defenses of predictive processing: Andy Clark’s Surfing Uncertainty (2016). To help draw out the philosophical significance of PP, we will start by looking at some of the issues in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science that PP accounts challenge. In particular, we will start by reviewing philosophical thinking on questions like: Is the mind modular and, if so, to what extent? What is mental content and how is it related to sensory input? Should we understand the mind on an internalist model, or is some sort of extended mind thesis more plausible? In addition to these questions, we will also explore issues regarding the nature of concepts and debates in comparative cognition (e.g., do non-human animals have emotions?).
Andy Clark, Surfing Uncertainty (available at the bookstore and via Amazon and the like)
Selected readings available on the course web site
This course will have three graded components.
1) Class participation (15%). This course is structured as a seminar. So you will be expected to come to class prepared to discuss the readings. To give you some guidance, I will provide weekly reading questions. While you are not required to write up answers to these questions, you should come to class prepared to talk about them.
2) Reading responses (40%). Throughout the course, you will write four brief critical response essays. More specifically, you need to write two responses for Part 1 of the course and one response for each of Parts 2 and 3 (the readings for Jan 7, Apr 7, and Apr 14 are not eligible for reading responses). Those constraints aside, you are free to choose which reading you write about and you can use the reading questions as guide for your response papers. These essays should be approximately 500-600 words long (standard formatting).
In your response paper, you should focus on just one of that week's assigned readings. Having picked a reading, you should then do two things. First, you should summarize one argument from the reading you selected (not the entire paper) by putting it into standard form. That is, explicitly lay out your understanding of the argument's premises and conclusions. Second, you should raise an objection to the argument you've presented. As a rough guide, presenting the standard form version of the argument should 30-40% of your discussion with the balance left for your objection.
The essays are to be emailed to me by noon on the Monday before the relevant Tuesday class meeting.
3) Long paper (45%). The longer paper assignment invites you to explore one of the topics that we will be discussing in the course. For graduate students taking the course for 3 credits: your paper should be approximately 15 pages long (double spaced, standard formatting). For undergraduates and grad taking the course for 2 credits: your paper should be approximately 12 pages long (double spaced, standard formatting).
Though you are free to choose the topic for your long paper, you must get it approved by me before you start working on your draft. I strongly recommend that you begin thinking about you paper topic early and you must have a proposal signed off on by April 1.
- Look here for some possible paper topics.
You will need to turn in a draft of your paper by noon on Sunday, April 19. I will provide you with feedback by Thursday, April 16 (hopefully earlier). The final version of the paper will be due at noon on Saturday, April 25. You should email both your draft and your final papers to me.
While your draft needn't be a highly polished piece, the more developed it is, the better the comments I will be able to give you. Turning in a cursory draft may result in a grade penalty.
Grading: Final grades will be calculated based on the percentages noted above (using the average for the four reading responses). Here is a tentative guide for the grading scale: A=100-92, BA=91-88, B=87-83....
In order to help ensure a successful class, please heed the following rules and policies:
- Due Dates. Baring unusual circumstances, the due dates on the syllabus are non-negotiable. If you think you have reason to miss an assignment, it is best to inform me well in advance.
- Classroom Environment. Please arrive to class on time. All cell phones must be turned off during class. Texting, web surfing and the like is not permitted. Abuse of these courtesies may lead to penalties.
- Academic Honesty. As a student at WMU, you are responsible for making yourself aware of the University policies and procedures that pertain to Academic Honesty. These policies include cheating, fabrication, falsification and forgery, multiple submission, plagiarism, complicity, and computer misuse. In this class, you will be expected to abide by these obligations. This means that all work presented as original must, in fact, be original; the ideas and contributions of others (be they quotes, summaries, or paraphrases) must be appropriately acknowledged. More information about the WMU Academic Honesty rules as well as the rights of accused students can be found here.
- Accommodations for Disabilities. I am happy to make accommodations to assist students with documented disabilities (e.g., physical, learning, psychiatric, vision, hearing, etc.). Those wishing to arrange reasonable accommodations must contact Disability Services for Students. A disability determination must be made by this office before any accommodations are provided by the instructor. More information can be found here.
- Mental Health. WMU’s Mental Health Services’ professional staff members work with students to resolve personal and interpersonal difficulties, many of which can affect the academic experience. These include conflicts with or worry about friends or family, concerns about eating or drinking patterns, and feelings of anxiety and depression.
Tentative Schedule of Readings and Assignments
Course Introduction & Overview
Jan 7. Ways of thinking about the mind
- Read syllabus
- Paul Thagard, "Cognitive architecture"
- Barbara Von Eckhardt, "The representational theory of mind"
- Rick Grush, "Cognitive Science"
- Qs: What are the principle differences between rule-based and connectionist cognitive architectures? Which of these models seems more plausible to you (and why)? What is the representational theory of mind and what role does it play in cognitive science? How does the "counter-revolution" challenge traditional approaches to cognitive science (see the Grush)?
Part 1. Philosophy of Cognitive Science: The Traditional Picture
Jan 14. Modularity
Jan 21. Perception
- Casey O'Callaghan, "Perception" (Sec 4.6 can be skimmed)
- David Marr, Vision (Sec 1 can be skimmed)
- Alva Noe, "Is the visual world a grand illusion?"
- Elizabeth Pacherie, "Action"
- Qs: What is the philosophical “problem of perception” (O’Callaghan 4.1) and how does it differ from the puzzles of perception cognitive scientists wrestle with (4.2)? We can distinguish (i) what it is to perceive from (ii) how we come to perceive what we do. Explain this distinction. Does an answer to (ii) get you an answer to (i)--explain? Explain the central elements of Marr’s account of vision. How does it connect to what O’Callaghan characterize as the “contemporary account” of perception (4.3)? What, according to Noe, is the "snapshot" model and what skeptical challenges is it vulnerable to? What is Noe's enactivist solution to the new skeptical challenge?
Jan 28. Mental content
- Nicholas Shea, Representation in Cognitive Science, Chap 1.1-1.2 [recommended: 1.3-1.5]
- Ruth Millikan, "Biosemantics"
- Kathleen Atkins, "Of sensory systems and the “aboutness” of mental states"
- Qs: What is the causal/informational account of mental content? What are some of the challenges these accounts face? Explain Millikan’s distinction between production and consumption (p 283ff). How does this distinction inform her biosemantic account of mental content (p 286ff)? What does misrepresentation amount to on Millikan’s account? How does Atkins characterize the ‘aboutness’ that naturalistic account aim to explain? What is the ‘traditional view’ of sensory function and why does Atkins think it’s mistaken? What conclusion does she draw from this? How might someone like Millikan reply?
Feb 4. The extended mind
- Andy Clark, "Embodied, embedded, and extended cognition"
- Andy Clark & David Chalmers, "The extended mind"
- Kim Sterelney, "Minds: Extended or scaffolded?"
- John Sutton, "Exograms & Interdisciplinarity" [recommended, more on the development of the extended mind hypothesis]
- Qs: What does it mean to say that cognition is embodied and extended (give examples)? How are features like ‘non-trivial casual spread’ or ‘just-in-time information’ used supposed to support the 3E thesis? What is the difference between epistemic and pragmatic action? Why is it important? If we agree with cognitive science that much of cognition is “continuous with processes in the environment” (Clark & Chalmers, 10), should we also agree that the mind itself is extended? Explain (see the Inga and Otto example, p 12f). Explain the direct/perceptual access debate (16). What’s the difference between an extended and scaffolded mind? Explain Sterelny’s extended digestion example? How is it supposed to cause trouble for folks like Clark & Chalmers? Do you think Sterelny’s point sticks? Explain.
Feb 11. Animal cognition
- Sara Shettleworth, "Animal cognition"
- Susan Hurley, "Animal action in the space of reasons"
- Albert Newen & Andreas Bartels, "Animal minds and the possession of concepts"
- Qs: Explain the difference between R being a reason for an agent and R being the agent’s reason. Explain Hurley’s holism and normativity theses. How does the capacity for intentional agency—understood in terms of holism and normatively—contrast with conceptually-driven agency? How do we get from simple control systems (a thermostat) to a system for which error is possible? Explain the chimp candy/number experiments—what does Hurley take them to show, how? How do Newan & Bartels understand the connection between concepts, concept possession, and cognitive capacities? What capacity does Rico lack and why do N&B think it’s important? What’s the difference between a capacity for error detection and a capacity to extract classes (think about Alex)? Why does this distinction matter? What does the N&B proposal imply about concept possession and beliefs for non-human animals? How does their account contrast with the picture we saw from Millikan?
Part 2. Predictive Processing Accounts of the Mind
Feb 18. Predictive processing: setting the stage
- Jakob Hohwy, The Predictive Mind (selections)
- Wanja Wiesse & Thoman Metzinger, "Vanilla pp for philosophers" [Sections 1-3, 5-6]
- Link Swanson, "The predictive processing paradigm has roots in Kant"
- Andy Clark, Surfing Uncertainty, Chap. 1 [through 1.11]
- "The Bayesian brain" [additional background reading, focus on "What is predictive processing?"]
- Qs: What does Hohwy take the project facing the PP theorist to be? According to Swanson, in what ways was the PP approach anticipated by Kant? Explain the following key elements of the PP model of mind: prediction, priors, top-down processing, prediction error, baysian updating, hierarchical processing. What is binocular rivalry and why is it thought to support the PP model?
Feb 25. Predictive processing: Clark, part 1
- Clark, Surfing Uncertainty, complete Chap 1, Chap. 2 [2.12 can be skipped]
- Qs: What does it mean to say that, on the PP account, representations are ‘probability density functions’? How would you characterize what mental content is on the PP account? In what sense is PP Bayesian? What is the PP account of the hollow mask illusion? Explain the following elements of the PP model: top-down influence, signal uncertainty, attention, attentional enhancement, prospective confirmation. Give examples that illustrate these ideas. How does action enter into the PP account of perception and attention?
Mar 3: No Class -- Spring Break
Mar 10. Predictive processing: Clark, part 2
- Clark, Surfing Uncertainty, Chap. 3 [3.8, 3.10 can be skipped], Chap. 4 [4.7 can be skipped]
- Qs: Ch 3. Explain the Reich et al. findings (3.4). How do they provide support for PP? What do they suggest about our cognitive architecture (e.g., regarding modularity, encapsulation)? What is the PP account of hallucinations? Look at Clark’s account in 3.6. Do you think he’s right that we genuinely perceive the familiar song as clearer? What about his response to the slippery slope worry—do you find in convincing? What is the PP account of imagination and dreaming? How do these differ from ordinary perception (e.g., what is the impact of being disconnected from sensory input, how can dreaming improve our models if there’s no sensory error signal)? What’s the “cognitive package deal”? Ch 4. What is the PP account why you can’t tickle yourself? What might PP say about why we can activate our own reflexes (knee kicks, startle blinks)? On the PP account how is action (or motor control) “subjunctive”? What does “active inference” amount to and why is it significant? Explain the sense in which PP “erases” conceptual differences between perception and action. How does PP explain the place of reward/pleasure in its account of action (4.8)? What does this suggest about folk or Humean accounts of beliefs and desires? Clark takes action to be conceptually primary (133). What does this mean and why is it plausible (or not)?
Part 3. Challenging & Enriching Predictive Processing Accounts
Mar 17. Challenges to predictive processing: Cognitive architecture
- Nicholas Shea, "Perception versus action" (starts on pp. 48 of the Clark)
- Zoe Drayson, "Modularity and the predictive mind"
- Clark, Surfing Uncertainty, Chap. 6.3-6.4 [recommended]
- Joe Dewhurst, "Folk psychology and the baysian brain"
- Qs: According to Shea, does Clark overstate the way in which PP dissolves the distinction between perception and action? How do you think Clark would respond? Why are PP and modular approaches to the mind often thought to be at odds with each other? What is Drayson’s reply to the ‘continuity claim’? How might Carruthers respond to her? Explain Drayson’s reply to the ‘transitivity of influence’ thesis? Do you find it compelling? What is folk psychology a theory of according to Dewhurst (hint: this is complicated)? In what ways is folk psychology at odds with PP? Do you see this as a problem for PP accounts? What might it mean to say that folk psychology is a kind of cognitive scaffolding? Do you find that idea plausible?
Mar 24. Challenges to predictive processing: Attention, consciousness, and the mind-world relation
- Adrian Downey, "Radical sensorimotor enactivism and predictive processing"
- Pawel Gładziejewski, "Predictive coding and representationalism"
- Clark, Surfing Uncertainty, Chap 6.1-6.3, 6.7 [recommended]
- Hohwy, "New directions in predictive processing" [recommended: just published review of PP and its philosophical implications--potential fodder for term papers; ditto for the topically organized supplemental bibliography]
- Gary Marcus & Ernest Davis, "How robust are probabilistic models of higher-level cognition?" [recommened]
- Qs: Downey: What is RSE—how is it different from, say, what we saw from Noe? What does personal level sensorimotor knowledge amount to? What is an adverbial account of attention and do you find it plausible? What is the Affordance Competition Hypothesis? What is the “job description challenge” and why is it relevant to PP? Why does it matter whether PP is representational? What is the RSE account of subpersonal, personal and conscious levels of explanation?
Gładziejewski: What is a structural representation (give some examples)? What is the job description of cartographic maps and what is an “exploitable relation”? What does it mean to say a representation is detached and why does that matter? What is the structure that generative models are supposed to capture? On Gładziejewski proposal, how should we understand the proper function of generative model an how does this contrast with traditional thinking about the function of mental representations? What does error amount to on Gładziejewski’s proposal?
Mar 31. Challenges to predictive processing: Internalism, agency, and the dark room
- Michael Anderson, "Of bayes and bullets"
- Colin Klein, "What do predictive coders want?"
- Andy Clark, "Beyond Desire: Agency, Choice, and the Predictive Mind" [Recommended, recent reply to Klein]
- Matteo Colombo, "Social motivation in computational neuroscience: or, if brains are prediction machines, then the Humean theory of motivation is false" [recommended]
- Qs: Anderson: What is Anderson’s concern with Howhy’s depiction of the problem of perception? What are epistemic internalism and idealism and why is Anderson concerned that PP (might) lead to these things? What is Anderson’s alternative to the Howhy (and Clark) model(s)—e.g., what is a guidance theory of content?
Klein: What is the free energy principle and why is it significant? What does Klein see as the real issue underlying the Dark Room Problem? What are the three elements of the standard PP answer to the DRP? Why does Klein think these elements are unsatisfactory (i.e., what’s the dilemma)? What’s the problem with taking the free energy principle to be a (Galilean) idealization? How might Clark respond?
Part 4. Case Study: Animal Emotions
Apr 7. Animal emotions, part 1
- Frans de Waal, "What is an animal emotion?"
- Robert Roberts, "The sophistication of non-human emotion"
- Qs: What is de Waal’s argument from homology and how does it differ from arguments from analogy? What other arguments do you see de Waal making to support the claim that (non-human) animals have emotions? What does de Waal’s discussion suggest he take emotions to be? Does de Waal think animals can feel their emotions—explain?
Apr 14. Animal emotions, part 2
- Lisa Feldman Barrett, How Emotions are Made, Chap 5 (can skim 101-107), Chap 12 (can skim 270-277)
- Joseph LeDoux & Richard Brown, "A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness"
- Qs: What is Barrett’s general understanding of categorization and concepts? And how does this relate to our understanding of the world? What are goal-based concepts? Explain Fei Xu’s Wug experiment—what does it show (eg, about purely mental concepts)? What would emotion in animals require according to Barret? What about LeDoux & Brown? Can animals experience affect according to Barret? What about LeDoux & Brown? What evidence do we have for goal-based concepts in animals? What do you think is suggests about whether they (can) have these concepts?
April 19: Drafts Due at Noon
April 25: Final Papers Due at Noon