Bibliografía

Bibliografía Obligatoria: 

• Cerdá, E., J. Pérez & J. L. Jimeno (2004). Teoría de juegos. Pearson Educación. (Marcado)

• Varian, H. R. (1992). Análisis Microeconómico, (3ra ed.). Editorial Antoni Bosch. 

Bibliografía Preliminar (antes de empezar):

• Banerjee, S. (2015). Intermediate Microeconomics: A tool building approach. Editorial Routledge.

• Varian, H. R. (2010). Microeconomía intermedia: Un enfoque moderno (8a ed.). Antoni Bosch, editor.

Bibliografía Complementaria General:

• Jehle, G. A. & Reny P.(2011). Advanced Microeconomic Theory, (3rd edition). Addison-Wesley.

• Mas-Colell, A., Whinston, M. D., & Green, J. R. (1995). Microeconomic theory (Vol. 1). New York: Oxford university press.

Bibliografía Complementaria CT: 

• Barten A., & Böhm V. (1982). ‘Consumer Theory’, in K. Arrow and M. Intrilligator (eds.), Handbook of Mathematical Economics. Amsterdam: North Holland, 2: 382–429.

• Debreu, G. (1954). ‘Representation of a Preference Ordering by a Numerical Function’, in R.M. Thrall et al. (eds.), Decision Processes. New York: John Wiley, 159–165.

• Debreu, G. (1959). Theory of Value. New York: John Wiley.

• Hicks, J. (1939). Value and Capital. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

• Houthakker, H. (1950). ‘Revealed Preference and the Utility Function’, Economica, 17(66): 159–174.

• Pareto, V. (1896). Cours d’economie politique. Lausanne: Rouge.

• Richter, M. (1966). ‘Revealed Preference Theory’, Econometrica, 34(3): 635–645.

• Slutsky (1915). ‘Sulla Teoria del Bilancio del Consumatore’. Giornale degli Economisti, 51: 1-26.

Bibliografía Complementaria GE:

• Arrow, K., & Debreu, G. (1954). ‘Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy’. Econometrica, 22(3), 265-290.

• Aumann, R. J. (1964). ‘Markets with a Continuum of Traders’. Econometrica, 32(1/2), 39. 

• Debreu, G., & H. Scarf (1963). ‘A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy’. International Economic Review, 4: 235–246.

• McKenzie, L. (1954). ‘On Equilibrium in Graham’s Model of World Trade and Other Competitive Systems’, Econometrica, 22: 147–161.

• Royden, H. L. (1963).  ‘Function algebras’. Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society,  69(3), 281-298.

Bibliografía Complementaria GT:

• Akerlof, G. A. (1970). ‘The market for "lemons'': Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism'. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84(3), 488-500.

• Barro, R. J., & Gordon, D. B. (1983). ‘Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy'. Journal of monetary economics, 12(1), 101-121.

• Cardenas, J. C. & Carpenter, J. (2008). Behavioural Development Economics: Lessons from Field Labs in the Developing World, The Journal of Development Studies, 44(3), 311-338, doi: 10.1080/00220380701848327

• Cho, I.-K., & Kreps, D. M. (1987). Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102(2), 179. doi:10.2307/1885060

• Friedman, J. W. (1971). A non-cooperative equilibrium for supergames. The Review of Economic Studies, 38(1), 1-12. 

• Gibbons, R. (2003). Un primer curso de teoría de juegos. Editorial Antoni Bosch.

• Harsanyi, J. C. (1967). ‘Games with incomplete information played by “Bayesian” players, the basic model'. Management science, 14(3), 159-182.

• Heymann, D., F. Navajas & I. Warnes (1991). Conflicto distributivo y déficit fiscal. Algunos juegos inflacionarios. El trimestre económico, 229 (1), pp. 101-137.

• Kreps, D. M., & Wilson, R. (1982). Sequential equilibria. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 863-894.

• Nash, J. F. (1950). ‘Equilibrium points in n-person games'. Proceedings of the national academy of sciences, 36(1), 48-49.

• Rousseau, J. J. (1755[1999]). ‘Discurso sobre el origen de la desigualdad'. Historia de la Filosofía, 4. 

• Spence, M. (1978). ‘Job Market Signaling'. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87(3), 355‐374.

• myerson1999 - Nash eq and the history of economic thought 

Bibliografía Complementaria T:

• Arrow, K. (1970). ‘The Theory of Risk Aversion’, in K. Arrow (ed.), Essays in the Theory of Risk Bearing. Chicago: Markham, 90–109.

• Grossman, S. J., and O. D. Hart (1983). ‘An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem’, Econometrica, 51: 7–45. 

• Holmstrom, B. (1979). ‘Moral Hazard and Observability’, Bell Journal of Economics, 10: 74–91. 

• Holmstrom, B.  (1982). ‘Moral Hazard in Teams’, Bell Journal of Economics, 13: 324–340. 

• Pratt, J. (1964). ‘Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large’, Econometrica, 32: 122–136. 

• Rothschild, M., and J. E. Stiglitz (1976). ‘Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay in the Economics of Imperfect Information’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 80: 629–649. 

• Tarski, A. (1955). ‘A Lattice-Theoretical Fixpoint Theorem and its Applications’, Pacific Journal of Mathematics, 5: 285–309. 

• Von Neumann, J., & Morgenstern O. (2007). Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (commemorative edition). Princeton: Princeton University Press. 

• Wilson, C. (1977). ‘A Model of Insurance Markets with Incomplete Information’, Journal of Economic Theory, 16: 167–207.