業績
未発表論文
2022, "Using Big Data and Machine Learning to Uncover How Players Choose Mixed Strategies", (joint with T. Hirasawa and A. Matsushita) Appendix
2018, "How to Cooperate under Misperception", (joint with I. Obara, A. Iwasaki and M. Yokoo)
2018, "The Belief-Based Approach to Private Monitoring", (joint with I. Obara, A. Iwasaki and M. Yokoo)
刊行済み論文
( Google Scholar Citation ページもご覧ください)2021, “Corrigendum to Crawford and Sobel (1982) “Strategic Information Transmission””, (with H. Kono), Econometrica, Vol 89, Issue 4, o1-o10. (July 2021) DOI: 10.3982/ECTA17617
2020, "Cooperation in Revision Games and Some Applications", (with Y. Kamada, paper in relation to R. K. Cho Prize in Economics), Global Economic Review, 49:4, 329-348, DOI:10.1080/1226508X.2020.1836783
2020, "Revision Games", (with Y. Kamada), Econometrica. Vol. 88, No. 4, 1599–1630. DOI: 10.3982/ECTA15272. Supplementary Information
2018, “Replicability of Experimental Data and Credibility of Economic Theory”, The Japanese Economic Review, Vol. 69, No. 1, 4-25. (March 2018) DOI: 10.1111/jere.12175
2014, “Labor Union Member Play an OLG Repeated Game” (joint with S. Obayashi), Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Vol. 111, Supplement 3, 10802–10809. (July 22, 2014).
2011, “Weakly Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring”, Econometrica, Vol. 73, No. 3. 877-892 (May).
2008, “Repeated Games”, in New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd edition, Palgrave Macmillan, (May 30, 2008).
2008, “Decentralized Trade, Random Utility and the Evolution of Social Welfare” (joint with R. Serrano and O. Volij), Journal of Economic Theory, Vol.140, .No. 1, 328-338, (May).
2006, “Less is More: An Observability Paradox in Repeated Games” (joint with I. Obara), International Journal of Game Theory, Vol.34, No. 4, 475-493.
2006, “Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies” (joint with I. Obara), Econometrica, Vol 74, No. 2, February, 499-519.
2003, “The Erosion and Sustainability of Norms and Morale” (2002 JEA-Nakahara Prize Lecture), Japanese Economic Review, Vol 54, No. 1, 29-48.
2003, “Randomization, Communication, and Efficiency in Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring”, Econometrica, Vol. 71, 345-353.
2002, “Introduction to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring”, Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 102, pp1-15.
1998, "Private Observation, Communication and Collusion", (Joint with Hitoshi Matsushima), Econometrica, Vol.66, No. 3, pp. 627-652.
1998, "Bandwagon Effects and Long Run Technology Choice", (Joint with Rafael Rob), Games and Economic Behavior, Vol.22, pp.30-60.
1997, "Evolutionary Game Theory in Economics", in Kreps, D. M. and K. F. Wallis (eds.), Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications, Vol. I, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
1995, "Evolution of Equilibria in the Long Run: A General Theory and Applications" (Joint with Rafael Rob), Journal of Economic Theory, Vol.65, No.2, pp. 383-414.
1993, "Learning, Mutation and Long Run Equilibria in Games", (Joint with George Mailath and Rafael Rob), Econometrica, Vol.61, No.1, pp. 29-56. Reprinted in Recent Developments in Game Theory, edited by E. Maskin (Northampton, MA: Edward Elger Pub, 1999).
1992, "The Use of Information in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring", Review of Economic Studies, Vol.59(3), No.200, pp. 581-593.
1992, "Repeated Games Played by Overlapping Generations of Players", Review of Economic Studies, Vol.59(1), No.198, pp. 81-92.
1992, "Social Norms and Community Enforcement", Review of Economic Studies, Vol.59(1), No.198, pp. 63-80.
1991, "Correlated Demand Shocks and Price Wars during Booms", Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 58(1), No. 193, pp.171-180.
1988, "Equivalent Equilibria", International Economic Review, Vol. 29, No. 3, pp. 401-417.