Price Informativeness of Dual-Class Tokens - Draft available upon request
(with: David Florysiak, and Johnnatan Messias)
Abstract: Decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) increasingly adopt dual-class governance, in which voting rights are granted by non-transferable tokens that holders acquire by locking their tradable tokens, thus limiting their exit option to gain voice. While the literature finds a positive effect of this design on DAO growth, we ask whether it comes at a cost to price informativeness. We develop a theoretical model of price formation in DAO token markets where selling of informed voters is constrained by the lock. In the model, price informativeness falls with the locked share of voter holdings. Using the locked share reconstructed from voter-level on-chain transfers, we find that within a DAO, token prices carry less token-specific information in months in which voters have locked more of their holdings. For a given locked share, prices are less informative when the voters who lock are more constrained. Our findings point to a trade-off between governance commitment and price informativeness.
Presentations: European DAO Workshop 2025, BTech Conference at Aarhus University, Ph.D days at Aarhus University, seminar at the Department of Finance at the University of Zurich, and seminar in the Blockchain Center at the University of Zurich.
Upcoming presentations: Finance Seminar at Aarhus University, Finance Seminar at the University of Limassol
Agency Conflicts in Token-financed Ventures: From ICOs to Decentralized Governance - Draft available upon request
Abstract: Token-financed ventures move from founder-controlled token offerings to decentralized tokenholder governance. We argue that this decentralization changes the type of agency problem that governance has to suppress. On-chain transparency largely resolves the adverse selection that offering-stage signaling addresses, while moral hazard remains, since voting power can be bought and used against minority tokenholders. Protection against expropriation must therefore be in place before control is handed over. Blockchain makes this commitment possible, as mechanisms that signal quality at the offering stage, once encoded in smart contracts and made non-transferable, become binding constraints on ex post behavior. Integrating the token offering and decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) literatures through a systematic review of 176 studies, we identify four governance dimensions through which DAOs constrain agency frictions, namely governance structures, incentive alignment, (de)centralization, and monitoring. Across all four, credibility hinges on the non-transferability of governance tokens. Using novel data on token-class restructurings, we find that adopters of non-transferable governance already had more engaged and sophisticated electorates before switching, exactly where the framework predicts commitment to be least costly.
Presentations: 7th Blockchain ISC, 3rd Nordic-Iberian Doctoral Workshop on Business Economics, Ph.D days at Aarhus University, SBC DAO Workshop (DAO Stanford 2026), and seminar in the Blockchain Center at the University of Zurich
Exit Options in Decentralized Organizations: Liquidity versus Incentives
Abstract: How does exit liquidity distort the incentives of founders, investors, and users, and is the tiered liquidity observed in token launches efficient? I extend the liquidity-versus-incentives model of Aghion, Bolton, and Tirole (2004) to decentralized organizations, whose stakeholders differ in what they contribute and when they can sell. The model formalizes progressive decentralization: once an insider becomes liquid and stops monitoring, control passes to the community and to code. It derives optimal unlock schedules for each group and shows how community governance and smart-contract commitments determine how long insiders should stay locked. Empirically, I link tokenomics and vesting schedules to wallet-level governance data to document current practice and test whether observed unlock schedules match the efficient benchmark.
Upcoming presentations: Aarhus University
Ethereum Network Upgrades and Digital Asset Prices
Finans/Invest 390 (3), 22-28, June 2025
Awards: Finalist for the best master's thesis in finance in Denmark - Finansforeningen/CFA Society Denmark
Abstract: Ethereum blockchain is optimizing for ETH to become digital money by undergoing frequent upgrades to improve its fundamentals, which are market-moving events containing implementation risk, often dividing investors in crypto markets. Understanding these dynamics is crucial as digital assets become increasingly integrated with traditional finance. Employing an event study analysis, I find that investors react predominantly positively to upgrades that directly impact the efficiency of the blockchain, while those associated with the transition from proof-of-work to proof-of-stake are largely associated with negative average abnormal returns, likely reflecting perceived implementation risk. The findings highlight low market efficiency, driven by the novelty and technical complexity of the upgrades. Sector-specific analysis highlights the interconnectedness of crypto markets via market-wide spillovers.