I am a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Würzburg, at the Chairs of Labour and Organisational Economics (Steffen Altmann) and Data Science in Business and Economics (Fabian Kosse). I received my Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Mannheim in 2026.
As an applied microeconomist, I work in behavioral and public economics, with applications to labor markets and education.
My research combines experimental and empirical methods to study how norms, stereotypes, and beliefs shape individual and institutional responses to incentives and opportunities.
I draw on field, lab, and survey experiments linked with administrative data, often in collaboration with charities and educational institutions.
You can find my CV here.
Why Don’t Donors Deduct? Social Norms and the Limits of Tax Incentives (with Paul Ergün Hild) (SSRN) (Online Appendix)
Best Paper, IAREP/Elsevier Student Prize Award 2025
Many donors leave tax benefits unclaimed even when doing so requires minimal effort and yields meaningful financial rewards. Findings from our representative survey point to confusion about how to deduct donations and to misperceived social norms about the moral appropriateness of doing so as the main drivers of this gap. We study how to tackle these two sources of the deduction gap by providing concise information on how to deduct donations and a one-sentence norm cue in an online experiment (n = 483), a door-to-door field experiment with address-level randomization (n = 6,728), and a radio-based campaign spanning two Austrian federal states. We find that almost all donors deduct when donating through the anonymous online tool. By contrast, during face-to-face fundraising, where social-image concerns are salient, fewer than 1 in 100 donors choose to do so. Across settings, information on how to deduct donations alone leaves deduction behavior unchanged, whereas combining this information with the norm cue increases take-up in the door-to-door setting. Our findings show that financial incentives can falter when clashing with misperceived norms in social settings, unless paired with campaigns that reshape those norms.
Competing Against Stereotypes: Stereotyped Beliefs and Willingness to Compete (with Paul Ergün Hild) (SSRN)
Career choice, earnings, and other key economic outcomes have been linked to gender differences in willingness to compete. This paper examines how gender stereotypes shape these differences. We conduct a meta-study of prior work and demonstrate that the wide variation in gender competition gaps can be explained by stereotypes: Men enter competitions more in traditionally male-stereotyped domains, whereas in female-stereotyped domains, the gap is smaller or even reversed. Importantly, these differences are not explained by gender gaps in performance. To explore mechanisms, we collect belief data in an elicitation experiment. We find that stereotyped beliefs about gender performance differences explain more than half of the variation in competition gaps in the literature. Next, we experimentally manipulate stereotypes through framing and informational cues about others' beliefs. Although these interventions significantly shift beliefs, the effects do not translate into changes in competitive behavior. Our findings highlight the importance of stereotypes in shaping gender gaps in competitiveness while suggesting that shifting beliefs alone is unlikely to close these gaps without deeper or longer-term interventions.
Menu Design Meets Market Design: Strategic Simplicity vs. Choice Complexity (with Gian Caspari, Paul Ergün Hild, Manshu Khanna, and Vincent Meisner)
Strategic simplicity removes the incentive to misreport preferences, but it does not ensure that participants can identify what they prefer. We study this distinction in a laboratory experiment on serial dictatorship, where optimal play only requires choosing one’s favorite bundle of real-effort tasks. Participants make fifteen incentivized choices among bundles that vary in how many tasks they combine. They choose either from a large menu or through a series of binary choices. Having made all choices, they unexpectedly reconsider each assignment against a previously rejected alternative. We find that roughly one in six choices is reversed and almost one in five involves an objectively dominated bundle. Simplifying the choice architecture does not help. Binary decomposition even raises reversal rates among low-ability participants and further inflates their confidence about their choices.
Anticipated Discrimination, Gender Stereotypes, and Competitive Choices in Job Applications (with Roberto Caputo, Ethan O'Leary, and Anita Zednik) (Draft in preparation)
Beyond Sex: Gender Typicality and the Willingness to Compete (with Paul Ergün Hild) (Draft in preparation)
Tell Me Who Your Classmates Are: Gender Peer Composition, Performance, and the Path to STEM (Analysis in progress)
Social Image and Risky Choices (with Anita Zednik) (Data collection completed; analysis in progress)
Understanding “Debiasing”: Implicit Rewiring or Deliberate Adjustment? (with Cornelius Schneider) (Pilot stage)
Parents’ Beliefs, Peer Composition, and School Choice (Design stage)
Master Seminar in Experimental Economics (Master, University of Würzburg): Instructor (2026)
Introduction to Economics (Bachelor, University of Würzburg): Exercise sessions and selected lectures (2026)
Introductory Microeconomics (Bachelor, University of Mannheim): TA (2026, 2025, 2024, 2023)
Business Economics II (IO) (Master, University of Mannheim): TA (2022)
Principles of Economics (Bachelor, University of Graz): TA (2017, 2016, 2015)
michael.hilweg-waldeck[at]uni-wuerzburg.de