The last decades have seen a resurgence of armed conflict globally, renewing the need for durable peace agreements. In this paper, I evaluate the economic effects of the peace agreement between the Colombian government and the largest guerrilla group in the country, the FARC, ending one of the lengthiest and most violent armed conflicts in recent history. Using a difference-in-difference strategy comparing municipalities that historically had FARC presence and those with presence of a similar, smaller guerrilla group, the ELN, before and after the start of a unilateral ceasefire by the FARC, I establish three sets of results. First, violence indicators significantly and sizeably decreased in historically FARC municipalities. Second, despite this substantial reduction in violence, I find precisely-estimated null effects across several economic indicators, suggesting no effect of the peace agreement on economic activity. In addition, I use a sharp discontinuity in eligibility to the government's flagship firm and job creation program for conflict-affected areas to evaluate the policy's impact, also finding precisely-estimated null effects on the same economic indicators. Third, I present evidence that suggests the reason why historically FARC municipalities could not reap the economic benefits from the reduction in violence is a lack of state capacity, caused both by their low initial levels of state capacity and the lack of state entry post-ceasefire. These results indicate that peace agreements require complementary investments in state capacity to yield an economic dividend.

Can digital payments systems help reduce extreme hunger? Humanitarian needs are at their highest since 1945, aid budgets are falling behind, and hunger is concentrating in fragile states where repression and aid diversion present major obstacles. In such contexts, partnering with governments is often neither feasible nor desirable, making private digital platforms a potentially useful means of delivering assistance. We experimentally evaluated digital payments to extremely poor, female-headed households in Afghanistan, as part of a partnership between community, nonprofit, and private organizations. The payments led to substantial improvements in food security and mental well-being. Despite beneficiaries' limited tech literacy, 99.75% used the payments, and stringent checks revealed no evidence of diversion. Before seeing our results, policymakers and experts are uncertain and skeptical about digital aid, consistent with the lack of prior evidence on digital payments for humanitarian response. Delivery costs are under 7 cents per dollar, which is 10 cents per dollar less than the World Food Programme's global figure for cash-based transfers. These savings can help reduce hunger without additional resources, demonstrating how hybrid partnerships utilizing digital platform technologies can help address grand challenges in difficult contexts.

While the number of people in need of humanitarian assistance has reached levels not seen since WWII, donors have slashed aid budgets. Amid rising voter opposition in donor countries, a key argument for maintaining aid is that it can advance national interests by serving as an instrument of soft power. One way aid can serve as an instrument of soft power is by shaping recipients’ values, attitudes, and behaviors. Using a randomized controlled trial (RCT) in Pakistan in which aid is randomised, I examine whether and how aid affects these outcomes. By cross-randomising an intervention providing information about the identity and values of the donor, I can disentangle whether it is the aid, the donor’s identity or its values that matter. 

Agricultural productivity in Sub-Saharan Africa is much lower than anywhere else worldwide and stagnating. One reason for this is farmers' lack of use of modern practices and inputs (e.g. fertiliser, improved seeds). What drives the low adoption of these technologies? We posit that this is (partly) driven by the difficulty of the search problem that farmers face. Not only is it challenging to identify what inputs work best in one's soils, but finding the correct combination and amount of inputs to use also makes the search space considerable. This is complicated by the fact that there are important heterogeneities in terms of soil quality across farmers, and most input recommendations (e.g. from governments or extension agents) are the same for all farmers. We create an intervention to address this problem. The solution is two-pronged. First, to reduce the search space farmers face, we provide them with input recommendations based on state-of-the-art soil testing. Second, we show them the importance of following these recommendations by teaching them to conduct structured experiments in their fields, which can show the effectiveness of different technologies/input combinations. We are conducting an RCT with 2700 maize-growing farmers in Eastern Uganda. We randomly provide either the input recommendations or training on how to conduct structured experiments, both or neither. We follow them over time to measure input adoption and effects on profits in the short- and medium-run.

Markets in developing countries are often portrayed as dysfunctional, with low competition and large numbers of unproductive firms. Yet, their inner workings remain a black box. Understanding how different market actors interact with each other and how these interactions affect participants’ pricing and search decisions is crucial. To understand how this sector operates, I surveyed over 1,300 fruit and vegetable sellers in 37 agricultural markets in Lusaka, 600+ farmers (suppliers), 1,100+ customers, and 20+ market chiefs. First, I find an interesting fact not discussed previously in the literature: Many sellers engage in explicit collusion with other sellers to sustain higher prices. Interestingly, this collusion is sustained by their social connections: Those who deviate risk being excluded from the tight social circles these sellers form over time. While traditional models of collusive behaviour focus on financial incentives to sustain cartels, this suggests that non-financial incentives can play a key role in maintaining this type of behaviour in developing countries. I also study other market players, how they interact with each other, and how they deal with the sellers' collusive agreements. 

Agriculture is a key sector in the Zambian economy that provides economic opportunities for approximately 80% of the population. However, Zambia still faces a range of demand and supply-side constraints, and this project aims to fill this knowledge gap. Constraints such as high costs of input, poor infrastructure, limited use of good agricultural practices, and lack of access to finance and markets are crucial in enabling the agricultural sector to grow. This article examines factors which affect productivity, as well as the underlying reasons which disincentivise farmers from investing in farming as a business. The article relies on existing research, qualitative and quantitative data collected through stakeholder consultations. The findings seek to contribute to improved decision-making by policymakers, thereby contributing to sustainable agricultural development in Zambia.