Research
Mechanism Design with Non-Expected Utility
Optimal Security Design for Risk-Averse Investors (joint with Alex Gershkov, Benny Moldovanu and Philipp Strack)
Revise and Resubmit at American Economic Review
Optimal Insurance: Dual Utility, Random Losses and Adverse Selection (joint with Alex Gershkov, Benny Moldovanu and Philipp Strack) (SSRN)
American Economic Review, 2023, 113 (10): 2581-2614
Optimal Auctions: Non-Expected Utility and Constant Risk Aversion (joint with Alex Gershkov, Benny Moldovanu and Philipp Strack) (SSRN)
Review of Economic Studies , 2022, 89(5), 2630-2662
Mechanism Design with Endogenous Types
A Theory of Auctions with Endogenous Valuations (joint with Alex Gershkov, Benny Moldovanu and Philipp Strack) (SSRN)
Journal of Political Economy, 2021, 129(4) , 1011-1051
(This paper combines material from Gershkov, Moldovanu and Strack (2018) and from Zhang (2017) )
Optimal Remedies for Patent Infringement (joint with Keith N. Hylton) (SSRN)
International Review of Law and Economics, 2017, 52, 44-57
Contest Theory
Theoretical Economics, 2024, 19, 95–129
Differential Treatment and the Winner's Effort in Contests with Incomplete Information (joint with Cédric Wasser ) (SSRN)
Games and Economic Behavior, 2023, 138, 90-111
Other Topics
When the Principal Knows Better than the Agent: Subjective Evaluations as an Optimal Disclosure Mechanism (SSRN) (Online Supplemental Material)
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 2019, 28(4), 631-655.