Is factual accuracy enough to establish trust, or does transparency about how we know things matter just as much?
This work shows how misrepresenting information sources undermines trust and informs principles for communicating evidence provenance in human and human-AI systems.
At the Institute of Communication and Cognition Sciences, I designed and implemented an online experiment (Qualtrics), recruited participants (Prolific), ran data collection, and analyzed the results.
Participants evaluated a collaborator (“Peter”) who made either a strong evidential claim (“I saw that X”) or a weak hearsay claim (“Somebody told me that X”). Both statements were accurate, but their claimed evidence was false.
A speaker was penalized more for overstating evidence (“I saw it”) than for understating it (“I heard it”).
This finding highlights that for human and human-AI information systems, trustworthiness depends not only on transparency about what is known, but also on how it is known.
Accepted for publication as part of the special issue “The Pragmatics of trusting (artificial) others” in Pragmatics and Society
Presented, alongside other venues, at Pragmasophia (2024)
I used a Cumulative Link Mixed Model to analyze changes in ordinal credibility ratings over time, accounting for both participant and story effects.