Based on my dissertation, my book manuscript, titled Varieties of State-Building: Ecology, Technology, and Capacity in Latin America, asks two research questions: (1) What explains variation in states' projection of authority across time and space? and (2) what explains country-level state capacity? The answer hinges on subnational peripheral regions' socioeconomic and ecological profiles. 

Ecological features condition political development in numerous ways. Geographic patterns may give advantages to rebels during civil wars, while natural resource wealth is associated with underdevelopment and authoritarianism. Environments prone to infectious diseases, on the other hand, impact patterns of human settlement and colonization. Regions' ecologies also affect state-building, as ruling coalition prefer to project authority onto what I call ecologically suitable regions. States target regions with favorable ecologies—valuable commodities combined with advantageous geography—for state-building. Yet, their need to survive in office also compels rulers to, paradoxically, create pockets of state weakness to favor powerful landed elites, helping them secure autonomy in exchange for political support. Together, these factors lead to divergent, seemingly contradictory patterns in the projection of authority and bureaucratic development.

Top photo: Montanus, Arnoldus, 1625?-1683. Chili. [TIFF]. [London : John Ogilby, 1671]. Retrieved from https://maps.princeton.edu/catalog/princeton-df65vb30