PhD Student in Economics

Abstract: Do movements in the bond market shape government behavior? In principle, policymakers are expected to closely monitor bond markets, as sharp sell-offs increase sovereign bond yields and, consequently, the cost of servicing public debt. Yet there is little empirical evidence that governments systematically respond to pressures originating in financial markets. This paper provides the first causal evidence that rising public debt servicing costs affect government behavior. Specifically, it shows that increases in sovereign bond yields lead to greater convergence in the topics discussed in Parliament and to a more negative tone in parliamentary speeches. Using data from the Italian Chamber of Deputies, the study introduces a novel high-frequency measure of government stability based on the textual analysis of Members of Parliament's speeches. To identify exogenous variation in financial market pressure arising from increases in public debt servicing costs, the paper employs an instrumental variable strategy that exploits sovereign credit rating downgrades and negative outlook revisions issued by credit rating agencies.

Abstract: Do repeated judges-lawyers interactions have implications for case outcomes? This paper studies whether repeated appearances by lawyers before the same judicial panel predict outcomes in the Italian Supreme Court of Cassation, using the universe of judgments issued between 2017 and 2022. We reconstruct lawyer–panel histories and estimate specifications with case and lawyer fixed effects, which allow us to compare lawyers within the same case while controlling for persistent differences across lawyers. A one-standard-deviation increase in cumulative lawyer–panel matches is associated with a higher probability of victory for the lawyer, corresponding to an increase of between 5 to 7% relative to the sample mean. To interpret the findings, we fielded a survey of lawyers admitted to practice before the Court. Respondents view learning about a panel’s approach to adjudication as the most plausible mechanism, rather than favouritism or judicial bias, but remain divided on the welfare implications of repeated lawyer–judge interactions.

Presented at: SISP Conference 2026 (Trento, Italy - forthcoming); 2025 Law, Markets, and Public Policy Workshop (Acciaroli, Italy); University of Naples Federico II (Italy).

Abstract: This paper investigates how coalition parties balance the dual imperatives of governing together and competing for votes, focusing on two central instruments of parliamentary behavior: voting and speech. Drawing on a novel dataset covering all parliamentary votes and speeches in Italy’s XVIII legislature (2018–2022), we show that coalition partners display higher voting alignment but greater rhetorical divergence when governing together compared to when they are at the opposition. By analyzing both votes and speeches, the paper provides evidence that parties use these instruments to signal unity to coalition partners while maintaining distinct political identities before voters. This approach advances research that has typically analyzed one instrument in isolation. The findings underscore the importance of integrating communicative and legislative behavior to understand the dynamics of coalition governance and party competition.

Presented at: 82nd Annual Midwest Political Science Association Conference (Chicago, IL); 2024 Workshop on “Text-as-Data” in Economics (University of Liverpool, UK); University of Naples Federico II (Italy).