PhD Student in Economics

Abstract: Do movements in the bond market shape government behavior? In principle, policy makers should closely monitor bond markets, as major sell‑offs raise yields and increase the cost of servicing public debt. Nonetheless, there is little empirical evidence that governments systematically respond to bond market pressures. This paper provides the first causal evidence that rising public‑debt servicing costs influence government actions. It shows that rising yields trigger greater cohesion within the governing coalition, suggesting a political effort to reassure markets in the face of heightened fiscal pressure caused by more expensive public‑debt servicing. Using data on the Italian Chamber of Deputies, the study introduces a novel, high‑frequency measure of government cohesion based on textual analysis of coalition members' parliamentary speeches. To isolate exogenous variation in pressure stemming from increases in the cost of servicing public debt, the paper employs an instrumental‑variable strategy leveraging movements in foreign bond markets with correlated trends.

Abstract: This paper uses the universe of judgments issued by the Italian Supreme Court of Cassation between 2017 and 2022 to study whether repeated appearances of lawyers before the same judicial panel are associated with case outcomes. In specifications with case and lawyer fixed effects, a one-standard-deviation increase in the cumulative frequency of lawyer-panel matches is associated with a significantly higher probability of victory relative to the sample mean. Instrumental-variable estimates based on judge exits confirm this findings, with an increase in victory rate of about 9% relative to the mean. Survey evidence from lawyers admitted before the Court suggests that respondents view learning about the panel's approach to adjudication as a more plausible mechanism than favoritism, although the welfare implications remain contested.

Presented at: 2025 Law, Markets, and Public Policy Workshop (Acciaroli, Italy); University of Naples Federico II (Italy).

Abstract: This paper investigates how coalition parties balance the dual imperatives of governing together and competing for votes, focusing on two central instruments of parliamentary behavior: voting and speech. Drawing on a novel dataset covering all parliamentary votes and speeches in Italy’s XVIII legislature (2018–2022), we show that coalition partners display higher voting alignment but greater rhetorical divergence when governing together compared to when they are at the opposition. By analyzing both votes and speeches, the paper provides evidence that parties use these instruments to signal unity to coalition partners while maintaining distinct political identities before voters. This approach advances research that has typically analyzed one instrument in isolation. The findings underscore the importance of integrating communicative and legislative behavior to understand the dynamics of coalition governance and party competition.

Presented at: 82nd Annual Midwest Political Science Association Conference (Chicago, IL); 2024 Workshop on “Text-as-Data” in Economics (University of Liverpool, UK); University of Naples Federico II (Italy).