PhD Student in Economics

Abstract: Do movements in the bond market influence policymakers' behavior? In principle, policymakers are expected to closely monitor bond markets, as sharp sell-offs raise sovereign bond yields and, consequently, the cost of government borrowing. Yet there is little empirical evidence that they systematically respond to pressures originating in financial markets. This paper provides the first causal evidence that rising sovereign borrowing costs affect policymakers' behavior. Using textual data from the Italian Chamber of Deputies, it shows that increases in sovereign bond yields reduce partisanship among Members of Parliament and make the tone of their parliamentary speeches more negative. Furthermore, legislative data show that higher borrowing costs systematically shorten the time required for laws to be approved. To identify exogenous variation in sovereign borrowing costs, the paper employs an instrumental variable strategy that exploits sovereign credit rating downgrades and negative outlook revisions issued by credit rating agencies.

Abstract: Public decision makers often repeatedly interact with the same specialized agents. These interactions may generate relationship–specific capital which can affect information transmission and, ultimately, outcomes. We study this mechanism in appellate adjudication, using all judgments issued by the Italian Supreme Court of Cassation from 2017 to 2022. We reconstruct the interaction history between each lawyer and judge panel and find that a one-standard-deviation increase in cumulative number of matches is associated with a 5–7% higher probability of victory relative to the mean. Survey evidence, fielded of lawyers admitted to practice before the Court, points to panel–specific learning as the most plausible mechanism, with ambiguous normative implications for equal access to public decision makers.

Presented at: SISP Conference 2026 (Trento, Italy - forthcoming); 2025 Law, Markets, and Public Policy Workshop (Acciaroli, Italy); University of Naples Federico II (Italy).

Abstract: This paper investigates how coalition parties balance the dual imperatives of governing together and competing for votes, focusing on two central instruments of parliamentary behavior: voting and speech. Drawing on a novel dataset covering all parliamentary votes and speeches in Italy’s XVIII legislature (2018–2022), we show that coalition partners display higher voting alignment but greater rhetorical divergence when governing together compared to when they are at the opposition. By analyzing both votes and speeches, the paper provides evidence that parties use these instruments to signal unity to coalition partners while maintaining distinct political identities before voters. This approach advances research that has typically analyzed one instrument in isolation. The findings underscore the importance of integrating communicative and legislative behavior to understand the dynamics of coalition governance and party competition.

Presented at: 82nd Annual Midwest Political Science Association Conference (Chicago, IL); 2024 Workshop on “Text-as-Data” in Economics (University of Liverpool, UK); University of Naples Federico II (Italy).