PhD Candidate
2026-2027 Economics Job Market

Abstract: Formal rules shape the functioning of political institutions, but so do the incentives of the political actors operating within them. Economic and financial conditions can alter these incentives, for instance by changing the costs of delaying policy decisions. In particular, public signals of sovereign distress may increase the perceived costs of postponement and change policymakers’ willingness to conclude the legislative process, with potential consequences for the policies ultimately enacted. This paper examines this relationship by combining Italian parliamentary data with adverse sovereign rating announcements. Comparing legislative outcomes in the weeks before and after these announcements, laws completed in post-announcement weeks have recorded approval durations approximately 7.5 weeks shorter, equivalent to 31 percent of the pre-event mean. Shorter durations are accompanied by fewer chamber passages. Complementary analyses document higher sovereign yield spreads around the same episodes and examine borrowing costs as a potential source of increased pressure to avoid delay.

Abstract: Public decision makers often repeatedly interact with the same specialized agents. These interactions may generate relationship–specific capital which can affect information transmission and, ultimately, outcomes. We study this mechanism in appellate adjudication, using all judgments issued by the Italian Supreme Court of Cassation from 2017 to 2022. We reconstruct the interaction history between each lawyer and judge panel and find that a one-standard-deviation increase in cumulative number of matches is associated with a 5–7% higher probability of victory relative to the mean. Survey evidence, fielded of lawyers admitted to practice before the Court, points to panel–specific learning as the most plausible mechanism, with ambiguous normative implications for equal access to public decision makers.

Presented at: SIE RSA 2026 (Cagliari, Italy - forthcoming); SISP Conference 2026 (Trento, Italy); 2025 Law, Markets, and Public Policy Workshop (Acciaroli, Italy); University of Naples Federico II (Italy).

Abstract: This paper investigates how coalition parties balance the dual imperatives of governing together and competing for votes, focusing on two central instruments of parliamentary behavior: voting and speech. Drawing on a novel dataset covering all parliamentary votes and speeches in Italy’s XVIII legislature (2018–2022), we show that coalition partners display higher voting alignment but greater rhetorical divergence when governing together compared to when they are at the opposition. By analyzing both votes and speeches, the paper provides evidence that parties use these instruments to signal unity to coalition partners while maintaining distinct political identities before voters. This approach advances research that has typically analyzed one instrument in isolation. The findings underscore the importance of integrating communicative and legislative behavior to understand the dynamics of coalition governance and party competition.

Presented at: 82nd Annual Midwest Political Science Association Conference (Chicago, IL); 2024 Workshop on “Text-as-Data” in Economics (University of Liverpool, UK); University of Naples Federico II (Italy).