PhD Student in Economics

Abstract: Do public signals of sovereign distress shape legislative behavior? This paper examines how adverse sovereign rating announcements by Credit Rating Agencies are associated with the pace of lawmaking. Comparing the weeks before and after these announcements, the analysis shows that adverse rating events are followed by shorter legislative approval times. The estimated reduction amounts to 7.5 weeks, corresponding to approximately 31 percent of the mean approval time before the event. This acceleration is accompanied by fewer rounds of legislative consideration and a higher frequency of approval at the first vote, while the composition of enacted acts by type and the policy topics of the laws remain broadly stable. Complementary analyses examine higher sovereign borrowing costs as one potential mechanism underlying these patterns.

Abstract: Public decision makers often repeatedly interact with the same specialized agents. These interactions may generate relationship–specific capital which can affect information transmission and, ultimately, outcomes. We study this mechanism in appellate adjudication, using all judgments issued by the Italian Supreme Court of Cassation from 2017 to 2022. We reconstruct the interaction history between each lawyer and judge panel and find that a one-standard-deviation increase in cumulative number of matches is associated with a 5–7% higher probability of victory relative to the mean. Survey evidence, fielded of lawyers admitted to practice before the Court, points to panel–specific learning as the most plausible mechanism, with ambiguous normative implications for equal access to public decision makers.

Presented at: SISP Conference 2026 (Trento, Italy - forthcoming); 2025 Law, Markets, and Public Policy Workshop (Acciaroli, Italy); University of Naples Federico II (Italy).

Abstract: This paper investigates how coalition parties balance the dual imperatives of governing together and competing for votes, focusing on two central instruments of parliamentary behavior: voting and speech. Drawing on a novel dataset covering all parliamentary votes and speeches in Italy’s XVIII legislature (2018–2022), we show that coalition partners display higher voting alignment but greater rhetorical divergence when governing together compared to when they are at the opposition. By analyzing both votes and speeches, the paper provides evidence that parties use these instruments to signal unity to coalition partners while maintaining distinct political identities before voters. This approach advances research that has typically analyzed one instrument in isolation. The findings underscore the importance of integrating communicative and legislative behavior to understand the dynamics of coalition governance and party competition.

Presented at: 82nd Annual Midwest Political Science Association Conference (Chicago, IL); 2024 Workshop on “Text-as-Data” in Economics (University of Liverpool, UK); University of Naples Federico II (Italy).