Embedded Files
Working Papers
Working Papers
The Dynamics of Honor: Cultural Transmission of Reciprocity and Private Punishment
Abstract:Standard evolutionary arguments suggest that, barring reputational incentives, costly punishment strategies should be extinguished by material selection. This paper shows that reciprocity persists when transmitted as a belief-dependent preference. Using an overlapping generations model with incomplete information, imperfect empathy incentivizes parents to transmit materially inefficient traits to avoid psychological disutility. Under "aggressive reciprocity,'" the population can settle into a "full deterrence" equilibrium: the practice of violence disappears, yet the retaliatory trait persists. Second, under "defensive reciprocity,'" the honor trait can survive as a stable minority. These regimes rationalize, respectively, the historical demise of Honor Duels and the persistence of the Culture of Honor in the U.S. South.
Address:University of Milano-Bicocca,Department of Economics, Management and Statistics,Piazza dell'Ateneo Nuovo 1, 20126 Milano, Italy.
Page updated
Google Sites
Report abuse