Events
Upcoming events
WORKSHOP: 2nd COMP Meeting in Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics (05 and 06/06/2024)
WORKSHOP:
2nd COMP Meeting in Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics
TIME AND PLACE:
June 6–7, 2024
Complutense University of Madrid
Room 30, Faculty of Philosophy, Plaza de Menéndez Pelayo
SCHEDULE:
June 6 (Thursday)
16:00–17:15: Sergi Oms (University of Barcelona), Marta Campdelacreu (University of Barcelona), Vanessa Triviño (Complutense University of Madrid):
“The Property-Inheritance Problem”
coffee break
17:45–19:00: Julio Robledo (Complutense University of Madrid):
“An Antirealist Metaphysics of Identity”
aperitif and dinner
June 7 (Friday)
10:00–11:15: Alejandro Fernández Cuesta (Complutense University of Madrid):
“In What Sense Are Quantum Logics “Quantic”? A Relevant Question in the Philosophy of Logic”
coffee break
11:45–13:00: Ismael Ordóñez (University of Santiago de Compostela): “Rethinking Indeterminacy in the Land of Sets”
lunch
14:45–16:00: Carlos Villacís (Complutense University of Madrid):
“The Application of Logic to Political Theory: An Approach to Liberalism within the Theory of Social Choice”
16:00–17:15: Dolores García (Complutense University of Madrid): “Antiexceptionalism about Logic: A Critical Assessment”
coffee break
17:45–19:00: Concha Martínez (University of Santiago de Compostela), Violeta Conde (University of Santiago de Compostela):
“Understanding Modality by Understanding Essences ”
Past events
Session of the Complutense Workshop of Analytical Philosophy (TCFA) (08/05/2024). Agustina Borzi (w/ Martina Zirattu)
Speaker: Agustina Borzi (IIF-SADAF-CONICET, UBA)
Date and time: 08/05/2024, 17h-19h
Place: Faculty of Philosophy, Building A, Room 25, UCM
Title: Substructural Weak Kleene logics
Abstract: In multiple-premise and multiple-conclusion settings, a metalinguistic comma ‘,’ is used for bunching formulae together. On most logical systems, the comma on the premise side matches the behavior of the object language conjunction, and on the conclusion side matches that of the disjunction. This is not the case of Paraconsistent Weak Kleene (PWK) nor for its paracomplete dual (WK3). On both, the comma on each side fails to behave as the expected binary connective, which suggests that there are two distinct ways of conjoining (disjoining) formulae: one can either use the object language conjunction (disjunction) or the comma to bunch premises (conclusions) together in PWK (WK3), resulting in a different set of validities in each case. The main objective of this talk is to restore the equivalence of the metalinguistic comma to that of the operations available in the language. With that aim, we give philosophical reasons as to why this is a desirable feature, and we define two logical systems, which we will call uPWK and uWK3, where formulas are bunched together in accordance with the truth-functions denoted by the Weak Kleene connectives. We show that both are substructural logics (non-monotonic, to be precise) and that they both meet the desideratum previously introduced. Finally, we present a sequent calculus for each of the logics discussed here.
Session of the Complutense Workshop of Analytical Philosophy (TCFA) (12/04/2024). Sabine Frittella
Speaker: Sabine Frittella (INSA Centre Val de Loire)
Date and time: 12/04/2024, 17h-19h
Place: Faculty of Philosophy, Building A, Room 25, UCM
Title: Probabilistic reasoning about incomplete and contradictory information
Abstract: Belnap-Dunn logic (BD) [1] was designed to reason about incomplete and contradictory information. It is a paracomplete and paraconsistent propositional logic, that is, BD is a propositional logic that satisfies the same axioms as classical propositional logic except for the principle of explosion and the law of excluded middle. In this talk, we will discuss probabilistic reasoning over BD. In the first part of the talk, we provide preliminaries on BD and probabilities over BD, and we present two-layered logics and how to use them to formalize probabilistic reasoning [2,3]. In the second part, we introduce belief functions (a generalization of probability measures) and discuss how to define and interpret them over BD [2,4].
[1] Belnap, N.D. (2019). How a Computer Should Think. In: Omori, H., Wansing, H. (eds) New Essays on Belnap-Dunn Logic. Synthese Library, vol 418. Springer, Cham.
[2] Marta Bílková, Sabine Frittella, Daniil Kozhemiachenko, Ondrej Majer, Sajad Nazari: Reasoning with belief functions over Belnap–Dunn logic, Annals of Pure and Applied Logic, 2023.
[3] Marta Bílková, Sabine Frittella, Daniil Kozhemiachenko, Ondrej Majer: Two-Layered Logics for Paraconsistent Probabilities. WoLLIC 2023: 101-117.
[4] Marta Bílková, Sabine Frittella, Daniil Kozhemiachenko, Ondrej Majer, Krishna Manoorkar: Describing and quantifying contradiction between pieces of evidence via Belnap Dunn logic and Dempster-Shafer theory. ISIPTA 2023: 37-47.
PhD course by Víctor Aranda and Elia Zardini (next session [03/04/24])
We are happy to announce that two of our members, Víctor Aranda and Elia Zardini, are going to deliver a PhD course on Graham Priest's book “Towards Non-Being”. The course starts on 14/02/24 and will take place every Wednesday since then at 17:00h in Building A. Sessions will have the format of a reading group. You can find more info here, feel welcome to join :).
Invited talk by Dolf Rami within our PhD course (13/03/24)
In the context of the PhD course on non-existent objects organised by Victor Aranda and Elia Zardini (see above), we had the pleasure of hosting a talk by Dolf Rami (Ruhr-University Bochum) on negation and existence. Here are some details of the event, that took place on 13/03/24 via Zoom:
Speaker: Dolf Rami (Ruhr-University Bochum)
Title: Negation and Existence.
Abstract: Discussions in analytic philosophy about negated singular existential sentences tend to focus mainly on negations that make use of the negation particle “not” applied to the existence predicate itself like in “Socrates does not exist”. However, there are other forms of negation of such sentences. And especially if our semantics allows use to evaluate some negated singular existential sentences as true if they contain a non- referring term and one assigns the same type of logical form to negated existential and ordinary atomic sentences, then certain problems arise that we aim to focus on.
Stoic logicians, on the other hand, where already aware that the use empty singular terms in apparently atomic sentences gives rise to certain scope distinctions with respect to negations of these sentences that (i) lead to non-equivalent sentences and (b) that cannot be represent in a basal version of predicate logic. There are different ways to capture these scope-distinctions: I will compare Quine’s solution to the Stoic solution and the one given Evans and Sainsbury. However, as Alexander of Aphrodisas pointed out in response to the Stoics these scope distinctions cannot be. Since the Stoics also treat existential sentences as structurally identical to apparent atomic sentences, the extension of the proposed scope distinction leads to a semantic contradiction. I will briefly discuss two possible orthodox solutions to this problem.
Furthermore, I will show that there are also linguistic reasons to hold the view that negation behaves with respect to apparently atomic *existential* sentences in a different way than in the case of apparently atomic ordinary sentences, if we allow the possibility of non-referring terms. Finally, I will sketch two different new solutions to this limited-scope-problem with respect to the negation of existential and ordinary atomic sentences.rspectives are outlined that are opened by switching focus from the invariants of ontological structures to the invariants of rules-governed and goal-directed structured activity.
Session of the Complutense Workshop of Analytical Philosophy (TCFA) (01/03/2024). Elena Dragalina
Speaker: Elena Dragalina (HSE University)
Date and time: 01/03/2024, 17h-19h
Place: Faculty of Philosophy, Building A, Room 25, UCM
Title: Classifying Logical Forms: Variety of Invariance in Formal and Regional Ontologies
Abstract: In the paper, I’ll try to reveal several paths of mediation between logical and phenomenological invariance principles in formal and regional ontologies. The talk will consist of two parts.
First, I’ll focus on Edmund Husserl's formal ontology which explores the domain of higher-order formal objects. These objects hypostasize region-independent forms of objects. Following Gil Sagi’s conception of form as a type of meaning which is more coarse-grained than an extension, i.e., form D (t) = {f (ext D (t)): f∈|D| D , f is a bijection} (Sagi 2021), I’ll suggest considering isomorphism types as model-theoretic analogues of categorical objects of Husserl’s formal ontology. This paper also offers an interpretation of abstract logics as higher-level classifications of logical forms. In contrast with Husserl’s thesis that logic as formal ontology “embraces the whole of formal mathematics”, I’ll address different measures for logicality in the domain of categorical objects.
Second, I'll revisit the classical debate on the synthetic (material) a priori in regional ontologies. I’ll try to emphasize the contribution that Ludwig Wittgenstein’s doctrine on internal relations makes to this debate. New perspectives are outlined that are opened by switching focus from the invariants of ontological structures to the invariants of rules-governed and goal-directed structured activity.
Session of the Complutense Workshop of Analytical Philosophy (TCFA) (23/02/2024). Otávio Bueno
Speaker: Otávio Bueno (University of Miami)
Date and time: 23/02/2024, 17h-19h
Place: Faculty of Philosophy, Building A, Room 25, UCM
Title: Dispensing with the Grounds of Logical Necessity
Abstract: Logical laws are typically conceived as being necessary. But in virtue of what is this the case? That is, what are the grounds of logical necessity? In this paper, I examine four different answers to this question in terms of: truth-conditions, invariance of truth-values under different interpretations, possible worlds, and brute facts. I ultimately find all of them wanting. I conclude that an alternative conception of logic that dispenses altogether with grounds of logical necessity provides a less troublesome alternative. I then indicate some of the central features of this conception.
Session of the Complutense Workshop of Analytical Philosophy (TCFA) (31/01/2023). Federico Pailos
Speaker: Federico Pailos
Date and time: 31/01/2023, 17h-19h
Place: Faculty of Philosophy, Building A, Room 25, UCM
Title: Suprastructural logics
Abstract: Over the last decades, considerable attention has been paid to substructural logics, that is, logical systems that forego at least one of the structural principles sanctioned by classical logic. However, little or no attention has been paid to the dual notion of a suprastructural logic, that is, a system that sanctions at least one structural principle that classical logic foregoes. In the present paper we explore this notion and present different types of systems where at least one classically invalid structural metainference holds. We introduce two families of contrastruc tural logics: Boolean logics and Strong-Kleene logics. Afterwards, we present some strictly suprastructural logics. We show that LP and K3 are strictly suprastruc tural from a global perspective. We then introduce some metainferential logics that are strictly suprastructural from a local perspective, and show that some of them are also supraclassical. This leads us to consider two different notions of suprastruc turality: one that focuses on metainferences and the other that focuses on closure properties.
Reading group session (20/12/2023)
Reading group session (15/11/2023)
Reading group session (25/10/2023)
