Research

Working Papers

Electoral Integrity & Local Development: Experimental Evidence From Colombia

• Draft available upon request.

Abstract: Does electoral integrity improve local development? Prevailing theories of democracy suggest that well-functioning elections allow citizens to select good politicians (selection channel) and incentivize their effort (accountability channel). Despite the intuitive logic of these arguments, there is limited empirical evidence supporting them. We address this gap by leveraging unique experimental variation in electoral integrity from a randomized intervention conducted during Colombia’s 2019 mayoral elections, which reduced electoral irregularities. We document four findings. First, treated municipalities experienced increased access to local public services over the subsequent four years. Second, mayors in treated municipalities became more efficient and less wasteful, as measured by procurement outcomes and corruption-related judicial processes. Third, we develop a novel framework to quantify the contribution of the selection channel and find it plays a substantial role in the overall effect. Finally, we find that alternative explanations—such as increased citizen demand—are unlikely to account for the results.These findings underscore the developmental value of transparent elections.

Job Retention at Scale - Joint with Alexander Hijzen 

• Draft available upon request.

Abstract: We study the effectiveness of job retention (JR) schemes at scale, by focusing on their unprecedented use in Spain during the COVID-19 pandemic. We develop a novel strategy to estimate their causal effects based on a rule determining program generosity. Given the large scale use of the scheme (almost 25% of the employed at its peak) we argue that it might have a first-order general equilibrium effect by preventing congestion externalities in the labor market. We document the existence of these externalities and estimate the overall effects of JR support using a simple model. We find that it had modest deadweight effects, and thus managed to prevent employment destruction in a cost-effective way. Moreover, we find evidence of strong general equilibrium effects, which increase its effectiveness by at least 50%. Finally, we find no evidence that it prevented reallocation to more productive firms.

State Capacity and Spillovers Across Enforcement Activities: Evidence from Brazil

Abstract: This paper provides evidence about enforcement spillovers across enforcement activities. It shows that public audits, aimed at detecting and sanctioning corruption by public servants, increase tax compliance in Brazil. As a source of identification, it uses the geographic and time variation induced by a large-scale random audit program conducted by Brazilian federal government on municipal governments throughout the 2003-2015 period. I begin by showing that municipalities receiving an audit in the past experience an increase in federal, but not municipal tax collection. I show evidence that these effects operate through a state capacity signaling channel, whereby audits and the subsequent penal actions, act as signals both of the capacity and the willingness of the federal government to enforce the law in general, which induces citizens to increase tax compliance. Consistent with this interpretation I show that local information about the audits, such as the one conveyed through local media or to neighboring municipalities, is key in determining the magnitude of these spillover effects across types of enforcement.

Publications

All Eyes on Them: A Field Experiment on Citizen Oversight and Electoral Integrity - Joint with Natalia Garbiras-Diaz

• American Economic Review, Vol. 112, n.8, August 2022. 

Abstract: Can Information and Communication Technologies help citizens monitor their elections? We analyze a large-scale field experiment designed to answer this question in Colombia. We leveraged Facebook advertisements sent to over 4 million potential voters to encourage citizen reporting of irregularities, and varied whether candidates were informed about the campaign in a subset of municipalities. Total reports, as well as evidence-backed ones, experienced a large increase. Across a wide array of measures, electoral irregularities decreased. Finally, the reporting campaign reduced the vote share of candidates dependent on irregularities. This light-touch intervention is more cost-effective than monitoring efforts traditionally used by policymakers.

Coverage: VoxDev, Innovations for Poverty Action (IPA).

Data and replication package: ICPSR

The Effectiveness of Job Retention Schemes During Economic Crises - Joint with Alexander Hijzen and Egbert Jongen

• Prepared for The Handbook of Labour Markets in Transition. Forthcoming. Editors: Carcillo, Stéphane and Stefano Scarpetta.

Abstract: Job retention schemes played a key role in preserving job-matches during the global financial crisis and, to a larger degree, during the COVID-19 crisis, covering at some point 20% of all employees in the OECD during the latter. The generosity of the support seems to have played a key role in this. Empirical studies on the global financial crisis suggest that the schemes were quite effective in

preserving matches, especially in the first year, but may have reduced productivity growth when used for a long time in some countries. Firm-level studies for the COVID-19 crisis suggest that short-time work schemes were more cost-effective in saving jobs than wage subsidy schemes, possibly because they tended to be better targeted in practice. However, it is important to note that firm level studies do not capture potentially important macro-effects of these schemes, e.g. via consumption. To be better prepared for future crises, this chapter suggests that countries prioritize an administrative system for job retention schemes that can be scaled up quickly and consider a

system of experience rating for the co-financing by firms.

Minimum Wages in a Dual Labour Market: Evidence from the 2019 Minimum-Wage Hike in Spain - Joint with Alexander Hijzen and Ana Sofia Pessoa

• Labour Economics, Vol. 98, February 2026.

Abstract: This paper provides an assessment of the 2019 minimum-wage hike in Spain, which increased the minimum wage by 22 % and directly concerned 7 % of dependent employees. We make use of two complementary approaches, one that follows incumbent workers over time and hence does not take account of any possible effects on new hires, and one that tracks employment in wage bins over time and takes account of both separations and new hires. The results are as follows. First, the minimum wage hike significantly increased the wages of directly affected workers, with small positive wage spillovers on workers with initial wages just about the new minimum wage. Second, the increase in wages comes at the expense of a reduction in low-wage employment. While employment increases just above the minimum wage, it is not sufficient to offset the decline in employment below it. Third, the reduction in employment is mainly driven by a reduction in hires of workers on open-ended contracts and to a smaller extent job losses among workers on fixed-term contracts. This illustrates that limiting the study of minimum wage hikes to stayers can dampen the estimated impact on employment.

Coverage: TUAC.

Work in Progress

• “The Effects of Digital Media Literacy Education in Finland” joint with Horacio Larregy (ITAM) and Jaakko Merilainen (Stockholm School of Economics), funded by a Junior Resercher ANR grant and a Yrjö Jahnsson Foundation Grant.

• "Evaluating the Impact of Title IX Regulations on Campus Sexual Harassment and Student Community Safety" joint with Michele Rosenberg (Essex University), funded by a grant from Arnold Ventures.

• “AI Literacy and Justice: A Field Experiment” joint with Natalia Garbiras-Diaz (HBS), funded by a Junior Resercher ANR grant.

Resting Papers

How Close is Too Close When it Comes to Public Auditing? Evidence from Colombian Municipalities