Master-at-Arms

The Master-at-Arms (MA) rating is responsible for law enforcement and force protection within the United States Navy. It is equivalent to the Army and Marine Corps Military Police, Air Force Security Forces, and the Coast Guard's Maritime Law Enforcement Specialists. As one of the Navy's oldest ratings, it has been recognized since the service's inception.

Rating

Navy ratings are general enlisted occupations, used since the 18th century, that denote a Sailor’s specific skills and abilities. Each rating has a unique specialty badge worn on the left sleeve of enlisted dress uniforms. These ratings are the naval equivalent of Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) codes used by the Army and Marine Corps, the rating system used by the Coast Guard, and Air Force Specialty Codes (AFSC) used by the Air Force and Space Force.

Rating Badge

The Master-at-Arms rating has utilized two distinct badges throughout its history. The original MA rating mark was an upright star (two points down) until the rating was disestablished in 1921. On May 20, 1958, the upright star reemerged as a nod to the historical MA duty of maintaining good order and discipline aboard ships. Following the rating’s formal reestablishment in 1973, the current mark was created: a police shield with an internal star, emblematic of its modern role as a law enforcement specialist.

The term “Master-at-Arms” is not a modern innovation. Naval records indicate that these "sheriffs of the sea" were maintaining order as early as the reign of King Charles I of England (1625–1649). At that time, they were charged with keeping swords, pistols, carbines, and muskets in good working order, as well as ensuring that bandoliers were filled with fresh powder before combat.

In addition to serving as "chiefs of police" at sea, these "ship’s corporals"—as they were known in the British Royal Navy—were required to be experts in close-quarters combat and capable of training seamen in hand-to-hand fighting. In the days of sail, the Masters-at-Arms were truly "masters" of weaponry.

The colonial navy of the 1775 era offered only a few different jobs above the able seaman level. These included boatswain's mate, quartermaster, gunner's mate, master-at-arms, cook, armorer, ship’s corporal, sailmaker's mate, cooper, coxswain, carpenter's yeoman, and yeoman of the gun room. These were titles of the jobs that individuals were actually performing and thus became the basis for petty officers and ratings. Also, there were the ordinary seamen who were related to our apprentices of today.

The Master-at-Arms rating officially began after the American Revolutionary War, when the Naval Act of July 1, 1797, was enacted. It called for every ship to have, among other job positions, a master-at-arms. Because of this Congressional act, the Master-at-Arms rating is recognized as one of the "oldest" ratings still existing in today's modern U.S. Navy, which includes boatswain's mate, gunner's mate, quartermaster, and yeoman.

From 1885 to 1893, a Master-at-Arms was a petty officer 1st class, who wore a rating badge consisting of three stripes forming an arc over the three chevrons, and a star specialty mark with an eagle perched on the arc. A ship's corporal wore a standard rating badge for a petty officer 2nd class with the star as the specialty mark.

Disestablishment

The Master-at-Arms rating was formally disestablished in accordance with BNCL 9–21 March 24, 1921, and made effective 1 July 1921. Its duties were assigned to other ratings collateral duties. 

World War II

• In 1942, the Navy created the Specialist (S) Shore Patrol and Security rating to handle shore patrol and basic security duties on ships and ashore.

Post War

• In 1948, the  Specialist (S) rating was renamed Shore Patrolman and it absorbed some MA functions 

• In 1953, the rating was again disestablished by the Secretary of the Navy.

From 1953-1972, the Navy relied on temporary shore patrol teams and collateral-duty security personnel to handle security and law enforcement problems and the maintenance of good order and discipline. There was little to no training of the personnel, and there was little guidance on how to handle incidents. Each command did things differently. This led to a slow erosion of good order and discipline. 

MACM: My Navy career began at this point.

In 1970, Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr.  (a four-star admiral) became the youngest to become Chief of Naval Operations at age 49. The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) is the U.S. Navy's senior uniformed officer, a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and advisor to the President, National Security Council, and Secretary of Defense. The CNO is responsible for the Navy's readiness, efficiency, and strategic direction. Immediately after taking office, Zumwalt began issuing his infamous Z-grams (similar to the President's Executive Orders).  

Z‑grams were a series of rapid, fleet‑wide policy messages designed to modernize the Navy, improve Sailor quality of life, and reduce racial and gender discrimination and thus increase recruitment and retention. However, they, plus the inadequacy of the security and law enforcement forces, led to a wave of unrest that led to what Congress named a "perfect storm:"

• • A "Z-Gram" Backlash: Admiral Zumwalt’s reforms to allow longer hair, beer in barracks, and racial councils were seen by older "middle management" (Chiefs and junior officers) as "permissiveness," leading to a breakdown in traditional discipline. This made it difficult to maintain good order and discipline.

  • Recruitment Shifts: As the draft ended, the Navy lowered entrance standards to meet quotas, bringing in many urban youth who were politically active in the Black Power movement and less willing to accept authority.

  • Unconventional Method: Some senior personnel resented Z-grams that bypassed traditional chain of command structures.

  • Overwhelming: The sheer volume (121 of them in less than 4 years) and speed of the changes they made, made it hard for sailors and their leaders to keep up.

  • Retention: Re-enlistment rates for first-term Black sailors rose from 11% in 1970 to over 20% by 1974.

  • Representation: By the late 1970s, the "Officer Candidate School" saw a 500% increase in minority enrollment compared to 1969.

  • Discipline/Readiness: Critics argued that the focus on personnel issues led to neglect in other areas, creating "hollow" readiness. 

MACM: I was a young Electronics Technician during Zumwalt’s tenure. I have to admit that I didn't think about the changes, whether they were good or bad. I just did my job. 

In 1972, all the years of neglecting security and good order and discipline finally came to a head and the Navy had to face the consequences.

USS Kitty Hawk (CV-63) Riot

The USS Kitty Hawk riot (October 12–13, 1972) was a massive racial conflict that broke out aboard the aircraft carrier while it was stationed in the Gulf of Tonkin during the Vietnam War. It remains one of the most significant and violent racial incidents in the history of the United States Navy.

The Spark

The riot was the result of long-simmering racial tensions. At the time, Black sailors made up less than 7% of the crew and were often relegated to menial labor and "dirty" jobs (such as the mess deck or flight deck) and felt they were denied promotions to more technical roles.

• Prelude in Subic Bay: A few days prior, while on shore leave in the Philippines, several fights broke out between white and Black sailors at local clubs. When the ship returned to sea, the atmosphere was volatile.

• The Immediate Trigger: On the evening of October 12, a dispute occurred on the mess deck over a Black sailor requesting a second sandwich. After a white mess cook refused, a shouting match ensued that quickly escalated into physical violence.

The Riot

The violence lasted for approximately 15 hours, moving through the ship’s narrow passageways and berthing areas.

• • Escalation: Groups of Black sailors, believing they were under attack or being unfairly targeted by the ship’s Marine detachment, armed themselves with makeshift weapons like wrenches, chains, and broom handles.

  • Injuries: At least 47 sailors were injured (some sources cite up to 60), including three who were seriously hurt and had to be evacuated for medical treatment. The majority of those injured were white sailors.

  • The XO's Intervention: Commander Benjamin Cloud, the ship’s Executive Officer (who was Black), famously attempted to de-escalate the situation. He addressed a large group of angry sailors in the forecastle, appealing to them as "one Black man to another" to stop the violence before they were killed.

The Aftermath and Controversy

The legal and social fallout of the riot was swift but remains controversial due to its perceived one-sidedness:

• • One-Sided Charges: In total, 25 sailors—all of whom were Black—were charged with rioting and assault. No white sailors were charged, despite reports of provocation and participation in the brawls.

  • Naval Reforms: The incident (along with a similar sit-in on the USS Constellation weeks later) forced Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Elmo Zumwalt to double down on his "Z-grams"—directives aimed at dismantling institutional racism and improving life for minority sailors.

  • Congressional Scrutiny: The U.S. House of Representatives held a special subcommittee hearing on the breakdown of discipline in the Navy, which some critics used to argue that "permissiveness" and racial reforms had actually weakened the fleet.

Other Incidents

While the Kitty Hawk riot is the most famous, 1972 was a "year of fire" for the U.S. Navy. The fleet was under immense pressure from a grueling operational pace in Vietnam and deep-seated institutional racism, leading to several other major flare-ups within weeks of the Kitty Hawk incident.

USS Hassayampa (AO-145) – October 16, 1972

Just four days after the Kitty Hawk riot, violence erupted on this fleet oiler while it was docked at Subic Bay in the Philippines.

• • The Incident: A group of approximately 12 Black sailors refused to sail with the ship, demanding the return of money they claimed had been stolen from one of their wallets.

  • The Violence: When ship leadership failed to resolve the grievance quickly, the situation turned violent. A group of white sailors was set upon and beaten by Black sailors.

  • Outcome: Order was only restored after a Marine detachment was brought on board. Six Black sailors were eventually charged with assault and rioting.

USS Constellation (CVA-64) – November 3–4, 1972

This was perhaps the most organized and politically significant incident of the year. Unlike the Kitty Hawk, this was a mass mutiny and sit-in rather than a roving brawl.

• • The Cause: Black sailors had formed an organization called the "Black Fraction." They were protesting "calculated racism," specifically the disproportionate assignment of Black sailors to menial jobs and a rumor that the ship was planning to issue 250 administrative discharges specifically to Black crewmen to reduce personnel.

  • The Protest: Roughly 80–130 sailors staged a 24-hour sit-in on the mess deck while the ship was conducting training off the coast of Southern California. They refused orders to disperse, effectively halting ship operations.

  • Outcome: To avoid a bloody confrontation at sea, the Captain took the unprecedented step of putting the ship back into port at San Diego and offloading the dissident sailors. They eventually staged a shore-side "beach-in" at the pier, refusing to return to the ship.

USS Saratoga (CVA-60) – October 1972

While less documented than the others, the Saratoga narrowly avoided a major riot during this same period.

• • The Incident: A group of sailors refused to disperse after an order was given, amidst rising racial tension.

  • The Resolution: The Captain took the extreme measure of sounding "General Quarters" (the alarm for battle stations). This forced every sailor to return to their specific assigned posts for combat duty, which successfully broke up the gathering before it could turn into a physical riot.

USS Sumter (LST-1181) – October 1972

Around the same time, the tank landing ship USS Sumter reported a series of racial "scuffles" and a breakdown in discipline while deployed. While not as large-scale as the carrier riots, it contributed to the Department of Defense's realization that the problem was fleet-wide, not isolated to a few ships.

A Congressional subcommittee was appointed on November 13, 1972, by Chairman F. Edward Hébert, specifically to examine the Kitty Hawk incident alongside a similar protest/sit-down strike on the USS Constellation. Hearings, chaired by Rep. Floyd V. Hicks, began shortly after (late November–early December 1972, including sessions in San Diego), with testimony from Navy leadership (including Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, Chief of Naval Operations; Captain Marland Townsend, Kitty Hawk's commanding officer; and Executive Officer Commander Benjamin Cloud), crew members, and others.

Key Findings and Report

The final report, titled Report by the Special Subcommittee on Disciplinary Problems in the U.S. Navy (H.A.S.C. No. 92-81), was dated January 2, 1973. Key points included:

• • The subcommittee described the Kitty Hawk events as unprovoked assaults by a small group of Black sailors (many with below-average aptitude scores and short time aboard), armed with improvised weapons, who disobeyed orders and terrorized the crew.

  • The riot stemmed from ongoing racial tensions, grievances over perceived discrimination, unequal punishments, and menial assignments for Black sailors, exacerbated by the stresses of a long deployment.

  • It found no precipitating cause tied to systemic racism as justification for the violence but attributed broader Navy issues that created an environment of permissiveness, such as recent “liberalization” policies ordered by Admiral Zumwalt that were meant to improve race relations and recruitment.

  • In 1972, Black sailors made up roughly 7% of the crew (about 300 out of 4,500 personnel). However, they were disproportionately represented in lower-paygrade "undesignated" roles.

  • Data presented to the Committee showed that Black sailors were receiving NJPs at a rate twice as high as their white counterparts for similar offenses during the early 1970s.

  • The subcommittee noted that a high percentage of those involved in the riots were "Group IV" recruits (the lowest acceptable mental category at the time). In 1972, the Navy had increased its intake of Group IV recruits to 18% to meet all-volunteer force quotas, up from much lower levels during the draft.

  • The report eventually blamed a "small group of skilled Black agitators" for the incident.

  • Recommendations focused on tighter discipline, screening recruits, and addressing potential service-wide problems.

  • The findings of the committee concluded that there was no formal training for the Master-at-Arms force on the ships, the U.S. Marine Detachment was not effectively utilized by the chief master-at-arms of the ships, and a separate rating should be established to perform law enforcement duties similar to the other military services.

The report and hearings drew criticism for relying heavily on white officers' testimony and for language reflecting biases of the era (e.g., questioning the suitability of certain recruits). Admiral Zumwalt countered that failures to fully implement anti-discrimination programs contributed to tensions. 

The inquiry highlighted racial challenges in the Navy during the transition from draft to all-volunteer force and the winding down of the Vietnam War. The full report is available through the Naval History and Heritage Command.

As a result of the findings of the Congressional Hearing, the Master-at-Arms (MA) rating was re-established on August 1, 1973, was primarily precipitated by the need to consolidate and professionalize security roles that were previously handled as collateral duties or limited to senior enlisted pay grades. 

According to the Naval History and Heritage Command, the Master-at-Arms rating was officially established in 1797, disestablished in 1921, and reestablished by the Chief of Naval Personnel on 1 August 1973 in BUPERSNOTE 1440 Change 1.  This made the date "1 August 1973" the official birthday of the modern U.S. Navy Master-at-Arms. 

Procurement

The reestablished rating would only receive sailors who wanted to "cross-rate" (a rating conversion in the U.S. Navy) and submitted a conversion package to BUPERS after concurrence from NCIS. This conversion package was unique in that it required a letter of endorsement from rated master-at-arms in the community who observed the sailor first-hand in the performance of their assigned NSF (Naval Security Forces) duties. Along with the pre-requisites required at the time, these sailors must have been frocked as a second class petty officer or above. 

Note: Frocking is the practice of a commissioned or non-commissioned officer selected for promotion being allowed to wear the insignia of the higher grade before the official date of promotion. 

MACM: I was a ET2 stationed in Iceland in 1974-1978, just doing my job but not enjoying it. I was teaching classes in Judo and Taekwondo and was becoming interested in law enforcement. In 1975, one of my students in a Koga Method police tactics class was MAC Oglesby. While talking with him one night, I mentioned my interest in law enforcement and he suggested I convert to MA. That started me thinking about it and searching for information on it. I applied to convert but it was rejected because I had a 6 year obligation as an ET and had received advanced school an enlistment bonus. Then, the Navy turned all electronics maintenance over to Icelandic civilians, so I requested and received  a transfer to base security. I finished an Associate degree in Administration of Justice and completed many Army law enforcement correspondence courses, and, in 1977 I applied for conversion to MA again. I was accepted, took and passed the MA1 exam and in the spring of 1978 transferred to MA “A’: school at Fort McClellan in Anniston, Alabama. That was the start of my career as an MA.   

Key Factors in Creation of the New MA Rating

The creation of the modern rating was driven by several key factors:

• • Growing Security Needs: By the early 1970s, the Navy faced increasing requirements for dedicated security, physical protection, and law enforcement that disparate units and temporary assignments could no longer sufficiently manage.

  • Formalization of "Shore Patrolman" Functions: Previously, specialized security duties were handled by "Specialists Shore Patrol and Security" (established in 1942) and later "Shore Patrolmen" (1948–1953). The 1973 re-establishment formalized these functions into a permanent, career-tracked rating.

  • Consolidation of Authority: The rating was initially designed to consolidate security leadership, originally opening only to senior sailors in pay grades E-6 and above. This ensured that the Navy’s military police force was composed of experienced personnel capable of enforcing regulations and managing complex security operations.

  • Standardized Training: Upon its re-establishment, the Navy began utilizing standardized law enforcement training, initially leveraging the Air Force's Law Enforcement course at Lackland Air Force Base to provide a consistent professional foundation for the new MAs. 

  • Mission:  The mission now was primarily centric to law enforcement and internal naval discipline. 

The early 1970s was a volatile transition period for Navy security. If you were in between 1970 and 1974, you likely experienced one of two completely different worlds depending on exactly which year you served. The timeline is split by a single decisive moment: August 1, 1973.

• • The "Old Guard" Era (1970 – Mid-1973)

Before August 1973, there was no permanent "Security" job. Security was handled by Shore Patrol (SP) and collateral-duty Masters-at-Arms.

• • • • Who were they? They were regular sailors (Boatswain's Mates, Gunners Mates, etc.) pulled temporarily from their real jobs. A ship's Captain would often pick the largest, most physically imposing sailors to maintain order.

      • Training (The "3-Day Wonder"): There was almost no standardized training.

        • • OJT: Most received On-the-Job Training (OJT) or a localized 2–3 day course.

          • Instruction Focused On: How to wear the "SP" armband, how to use a baton (nightstick), and basic orders to quell bar fights or drag drunken Sailors back to the ship.

      • Weapons: They rarely carried firearms unless guarding specific assets (like a brig or nuclear weapons). If they did, qualification was a quick trip to the range, often with a .45 pistol.

      • CMAA: Onboard ships, the "Chief Master-at-Arms (CMAA)" AKA “Sheriff" was not a rating, but a title given to a senior First Class or Chief Petty Officer responsible for assigning bunks and maintaining good order. They were disciplinarians, not trained police officers.

  • The "New Breed" Era (Late 1973 – 1975)

In response to rising drug use, race riots, and discipline issues in the fleet during the late Vietnam era, the Navy realized the "big guy with a club" approach wasn't working. They needed seasoned, well-trained professional petty officers to lead the way into the future.

On-the-Job Training (OJT)

Since the rating was initially composed of experienced sailors—only those in pay grades E-6 and above (with some E-5s) could join—a significant portion of their professional development happened in the field. 

• • Experience-Based Learning: Many early MAs recalled that much of what they practiced was learned through OJT, as the Navy was still defining the specific operational roles for the newly established force.

  • Consolidation of Duties: Early training focused on professionalizing tasks that had previously been collateral duties, such as running brigs, acting as shore patrol, berthing inspections, and managing shipboard security. 

Formal Schooling

Because the Navy lacked its own dedicated law enforcement schoolhouse in 1973, it utilized existing infrastructure from other branches:  Because the Navy’s training needs for the new rating were similar to existing programs in other branches

• Historical Location: Fort McClellan in Anniston, Alabama served as a critical secondary hub for Navy security personnel through 1999. If you attended training at Fort McClellan, you were likely there for the basic "A" school or one or more of three specific specialized "C" schools.

  • Master-at-Arms Class “A” school: Fort McClellan was a key location for early Navy MA training, with alumni sharing memories of attending Master-at-Arms Class “A” school there, particularly in the 1970s and 1980s. The training covered basic military law and law enforcement principles.

  • The Navy Corrections Academy (NEC 9575):  The most common reason for a Navy Master-at-Arms to be at Fort McClellan was for Corrections Specialist training. Fort McClellan was the home of the U.S. Army Military Police School, which hosted the Navy Corrections Academy. MAs were trained here to manage military brigs and detention facilities. This included prisoner transport, cell extraction, riot control, and correctional counseling. Navy personnel lived in the Army barracks and trained alongside Army MPs, but were taught by a Navy-led detachment.

  • Small Arms Marksmanship Instructor (SAMI): This was the Small Arms Instructor course. Because Fort McClellan had extensive range facilities (like Pelham Range), the Navy sent personnel there for high-level weapons proficiency. Graduates became the instructors responsible for qualifying other Sailors on the .45 pistol (later the M9), the M12 shotgun, and the M14/M16 rifles.

• • • • • • Special Reaction Team (SRT) Training: Fort McClellan was the "Center of Excellence" for military police tactics. MAs selected for elite units often attended the Army’s Special Reaction Team course there. This was "SWAT" training for the military. It covered building entry, room clearing, hostage negotiation, and precision marksmanship.

• Air Force Law Enforcement Course: Early MAs attended the Air Force’s Law Enforcement Specialist course to gain foundational skills. The first class of 11 sailors convened in September 1973 at Lackland Air Force Base in San Antonio, Texas. The training covered basic law enforcement principles, small arms proficiency, self-defense, physical restraint techniques, and military law and legal procedures. 

MACM: From 1989-1992, as a master chief, I was the Senior Enlisted Advisor at the law enforcement school at Naval Technical Training Center (NTTC) Lackland. We were based in an old Air Force barracks. The initial plans for the new law enforcement school were in the works just before I transferred to the USS Carl Vinson.

Shift to NCIS Management

In 1982, the Naval Investigative Service (NIS)—now known as NCIS—assumed responsibility for the Navy's Law Enforcement and Physical Security Program and the Navy's Information and Personnel Security Program. This effectively made NCIS the program manager for the Master-at-Arms community, responsible for program management, manning, training, and equipping. (Why NIS’s name was changed to NCIS is another story. Hint, it involved the 1991 Tail Hook Scandal.)

• • Program Management: NIS became the official program manager for the MA community, overseeing its training, equipping, and manning.

  • Professionalization: Under NIS management, training became more standardized to align with federal law enforcement standards. 

Operational Evolution

During the mid to late 1980s, the Navy began taking over more gate guard and perimeter security duties at naval installations, roles previously held by the U.S. Marine Corps. 

• • Expanded Role: While the MA rating remained small and focused on senior leadership, this period saw an increase in the integration of security force training for junior personnel (though these junior sailors were often not yet part of the formal MA rating).

  • Source for Special Operations: For a limited time during this era, the MA rating was the only dedicated source rating allowed to attend Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL (BUD/S) training. 

  • LDO/CWO: Limited duty officers (LDO) and Chief Warrant Officers (CWO) are Navy officers who were selected for commissioning from the enlisted rates based on skill and expertise. They are the primary manpower source for technically specific billets not best suited for traditional Unrestricted Line, Restricted Line, or Staff Corps career path officers. LDO/CWOofficers are permanent commissioned officers, with LDOs being superior to CWOs. LDOs are experts and leaders in the Navy enlisted rating from which they came. LDOs are considered more the officer and less the technician as compared to the CWO. LDOs will only be assigned to billets that are in their designator or rating and that are designated as LDO billets. They may not be assigned to billets designated for U.S. Navy unrestricted line officers. In 1980, the Navy opened the LDO/CWO program to E-6 thru E-9 master at arms personnel with the creation of the LDO (649X) and CWO (749X) Security designators. This created a path for hard chargers to become officers and reach even higher levels of achievement.

  •  U.S. Navy Security Forces: The MA rating is part of the U.S. Navy Security Forces, headquartered at Fleet Forces Command in Norfolk, VA.

The September 11, 2001 attacks marked a major turning point for the Master-at-Arms rating. The Navy expanded the MA rating to meet growing demands for security, force protection, and antiterrorism around the world; the MA manning level quickly rose to over 12,000. Master-at-Arms personnel beefed up security at naval stations around the United States and around the world. They were deployed to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq to augment other United States military services.

MACM: I retired from the USS Carl Vinson, in 1995, before 9/11, so I missed out on the transformation of the Master-at-Arms rating into what we had been seeking for decades. As usual, it took a disaster for the Navy to reevaluate and change the way it did things.  

Master-at-Arms manning levels remained fairly constant through the early years; there were less than 1,500 in the whole Navy; security was not a big concern to Navy leadership. This changed in 2001, when security became a major concern of the Navy and the entire country.

Core Mission Areas

According to the Navy’s official MA career path guidance, modern MAs conduct scalable force protection and layered defense for Navy assets and infrastructure worldwide. Their mission includes:

• • Antiterrorism (AT)

  • Physical Security (PS)

  • Law Enforcement (LE)

  • Expeditionary and combat support operations

  • Base defense and strategic asset protection

  • Corrections and detainee operations

  • Special events and high‑risk security operations

These three pillars — AT, PS, and LE — form the backbone of the Navy’s Force Protection enterprise.

What MAs Do Day‑to‑Day

From the Navy’s official descriptions and recruiting materials:

Law Enforcement Duties

• • Patrol bases and installations

  • Conduct investigations and interviews

  • Enforce UCMJ, federal, and local regulations

  • Manage traffic enforcement and accident response

  • Provide crime prevention and community policing

Security & Force Protection

• • Guard gates, piers, aircraft, and high‑value units

  • Conduct vehicle and personnel screening

  • Operate access control and surveillance systems

  • Provide armed watchstanding and reaction force capability

Antiterrorism & Physical Security

• • Conduct threat assessments

  • Implement AT/FP plans

  • Secure critical infrastructure

  • Support NCIS and intelligence-driven operations

Expeditionary & Combat Support

MAs operate in integrated at‑sea, coastal, and landward environments, providing mobile and fixed defensive operations in support of commanders worldwide. This includes:

• • Harbor security

  • Maritime interdiction support

  • Embarked security teams

  • Expeditionary base defense

Specialized Roles

Modern MAs can qualify for advanced specialties such as:

• • Military Working Dogs (MWD): The Navy now maintains roughly 400-500 MWD teams (patrol, drug, or explosives) globally, a capability that was almost non-existent in the MA rating during the "Old Guard" era.

  • Expeditionary Security: Approximately 20-25% of the MA force is assigned to the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC), focusing on maritime security in contested waters rather than traditional base law enforcement.

  • Protective Services (PSU/VIP security)

  • Small Arms Instructor

  • AT/FP Specialist

  • Corrections Specialist

  • Harbor Security Boat Coxswain

  • Security Reaction Force (SRF/BRF)

These roles reflect the Navy’s shift toward a professionalized, technically trained security force.

Where They Operate

MAs serve:

• • On shore installations (CONUS and OCONUS)

  • On ships as security and AT/FP advisors

  • With expeditionary forces

  • In joint operations with other services and host nations

The rating is headquartered under U.S. Fleet Forces Command in Norfolk, VA.

Strategic Importance Today

The modern MA rating is essential because the Navy faces:

• • Global terrorism threats

  • Insider threat concerns

  • Cyber‑physical security integration

  • Expeditionary operations in contested environments

  • Increased need for professional law enforcement within the fleet

The MA community provides the Navy’s only dedicated, trained, and standardized security and policing capability.

MACM: We pioneers fought for years to get the Master-at-Arms rating for more responsibilities and greater recognition, and we are pleased to see it finally happened.

The modern Master‑at‑Arms is a full‑spectrum security professional — part police officer, part force‑protection specialist, part expeditionary defender — operating across the globe to protect sailors, ships, bases, and critical infrastructure.