Recherche /Research

Research

Mes domaines de recherche portent en économie du travail (discrimination sur le marché du travail, travail indépendant, satisfaction au travail), en économie du personnel (incitations et systèmes de rémunération, équipes de travail, tournois, etc. ), en économie de l'éducation (réussite scolaire, compétences sociales et traits de personnalité), et en économie publique (offre de travail et fiscalité, évasion fiscale, fourniture de biens publics et de ressources communes).

Méthodologiquement, j'utilise des outils quantitatifs de micro-économétrie appliquée à des données d'observation (WVS, ISSP, ECHP, Ined-TeO...), des données expérimentales, (expériences en laboratoire et sur le terrain, etc.) et des modèles théoriques comportementaux afn d'étudier les décisions et comportements humains dans divers domaines (économie du travail, économie du personnel, économie publique, économie de l'éducation, etc.).

Ces modèles comportementaux visent à enrichir les modèles théoriques néoclassiques en incorporant des dimensions sociales (préférences sociales et antisociales), des dimensions émotionnelles ou morales (approches kantiennes versus utilitaristes) et des dimensions psychologiques (notamment le rôle des biais cognitifs, que Keynes a appelés 'esprits animaux'). Cela permet de mieux comprendre les décisions individuelles et collectives, et ainsi d'évaluer plus précisément l'impact des politiques publiques. 

My fields of research include labor economics (discrimination in the labor market, self-employment, work satisfaction), personnel economics (incentives and remuneration schemes, work teams, tournaments), education economics (educational achievement, soft skills and personality traits), public economics (labor supply and taxation, tax evasion, the provision of public goods and common pools). 

Methodologically, I use quantitative tools (micro-econometrics applied to observational data (WVS, ISSP, ECHP, Ined-TeO....), experimental data, lab and field experiments, etc.) and behavioral theoretical models to investigate human decisions and behaviors in various fields (labour economics, personnel economics, public economics, education economics, etc.). 

These behavioral models aim to enrich neoclassical theoretical models by incorporating social dimensions (social and antisocial preferences), emotional or moral dimensions (Kantian versus utilitarian approaches) and psychological dimensions (notably the role of cognitive biases, which Keynes referred to as 'animal spirits'). This helps to better understand both individual and collective decisions and thus better assess the impact of public policies. Early indications of a behavioral approach were already present in Adam Smith's 'The Theory of Moral Sentiments,' published in 1759.

Publications :

Personnel Economics : Remuneration schemes, Incentives and work effort

A part of my research falls under personnel economics, a sub-discipline of labor economics that has evolved since the 1990s, following the pioneering works of Lazear, Rosen, and Holmström. This field aims to open the "black box" of the firm to study managerial practices (e.g., recruitment policies, training, compensation, labor organization) and analyze their evolutions. Some of my work focuses on the effectiveness and efficiency of various incentive systems within companies. Here are some examples of work in this field:

Charness G. David Masclet, Marie Claire Villeval. (2014) The Dark Side of Competition for Status. Management Science, I, 60 (1), pp. 38-55.

Clark A., D. Masclet and M-C. Villeval (2010), "Effort and Comparison Income: Evidence from the ISSP data and experimental data" Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol 63, No3

Clark A. D. Masclet and M-C. Villeval (2005) « Effort, Income and Rank » Revue Economique, vol57, n3, pp. 635-645

Personnel economics : team work and peer pressure

Some of my work focuses on team organization and the well-known free rider problem within work teams. In particular, I am interested in centralized mechanisms (tournaments, target scheme) or decentralized mechanisms (peer pressure, communication, leadership) to mitigate the free rider problem.

Lebourges M. et D. Masclet " (2024) Centralized versus Decentralized Incentives in teams : Experimental Evidence, Revue Economique

Masclet D. « Les conditions d’efficacité de la pression des pairs », (2016) Studia Oeconomica Posnaniensia vol.4, numero 3

Dickinson D. and D. Masclet (2015) "Emotions, Venting and Punishment in Public Good Experiments" Journal of Public Economics, 122,55-67

Dickinson D. D. Masclet and MC Villeval (2015) "Norm Enforcement in Social Dilemmas An Experiment with Police Commissioners" Journal of Public Economics, 126,74-85

Joffily M. D. Masclet C. Noussair et M-C. Villeval "(2014). Emotions, sanctions and cooperation. Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, 80 (4), pp. 1002-1027.

Figuières C., D. Masclet and M. Willinger "Weak Moral Motivation Leads to the Decline of Voluntary Contribution: A Theoretical Approach" (2013) Journal of Pubic Economic Theory vol. 15(5), pages 745-772

Figuières C., D. Masclet and M. Willinger (2012)" Vanishing Leadership and Declining Reciprocity in a Sequential Contribution Experiment" Economic Inquiry 50, 3, 567-584

Masclet David, Charles Noussair and Marie-Claire Villeval" Threat in Public Good Mechanisms" (2012) Economic Inquiry, 51, 2, 1421–1441

Denant Boemont L. ;Masclet D. And C. Noussair, (2011)"Announcement, Observation, and Honesty in the Voluntary Contributions Game" Pacific Economic Review Vol. 16, issue 2, pp 207-228.

Masclet D. and Marie-Claire Villeval (2008) "Punishment and Inequality: a Public Good Experiment"(2008) with Marie-Claire Villeval Social Choice and Welfare vol 31, number 3

Masclet D., C. Noussair and L. Denant Boemont (2007)"Punishment, Counterpunishment and Sanction Enforcement in a Social Dilemma Experiment" Economic Theory vol 33, no1, 145-167

Masclet D. (2003)" Ostracism in Work Teams: A Public Good Experiment", International Journal of Manpower vol. 24, iss. 7, pp. 867-887(21).

Masclet D., C. Noussair, S. Tucker and M-C. Villeval, (2003) " Monetary and non Monetary Punishment in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism ", American Economic Review 93(1), pp 366-380.

Personnel economics : conflicts and unethical activities within firms

My work also investigate conflicts and unethical activities within companies. Specifically, it involves studying the determinants of conflicts and unethical activities, as well as the mechanisms to resolve them (communication, competition...). From a theoretical perspective, my work also explores the introduction of a Kantian ideal into the utility function of economic agents.

David Dickinson and David Masclet "Incorporating Conditional Morality into Economic Decisions" forthcoming in Theory and Decision 

Benoit Le Maux David Masclet and Sarah Necker Monetary Incentives and the Contagion of Unethical Behavior forthcoming in the Journal of the Economic Science Association

David Dickinson and David Masclet (2023) "Unethical Decision Making and Sleep Restriction: Experimental Evidence",Games and Economic Behavior 141 (2023) 484–502

Di Falco S., B. Magdalou, D. Masclet, M.C. Villeval and M. Willinger (2020), "Can Shorter Transfer Chains and Transparency Reduce Embezzlement?", Review of Behavioral Economics: Vol. 7: No. 2, pp 103-143.

Dickinson D., D. Masclet (2019) “Using ethical dilemmas to predict antisocial choices with real payoff consequences: An experimental study” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization Volume 166, October 2019, Pages 195-215

Abbink K, D. Masclet, D. Mirza (2018) Inequality and inter-group conflicts: experimental evidence Social Choice and Welfare, Volume 50, Issue 3, pp 387–423

Masclet D. and C. Puppe (2015) “Experiments on conflicts and conflict resolution, Social Choice and Welfare Numéro 47 issue 3

Lei V. D. Masclet and Filip Vesely (2014) “Competition vs. Communication: An Experimental Study on Restoring Trust (2014) Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Elsevier, 10.1016

Labor Economics : Discrimination

In my research, I have extensively explored the issue of labor market discrimination. To measure wage discrimination, I have used survey data, while experimental data has been employed to assess hiring discrimination and understand the nature of this discrimination.

In an article published in Education Economics, we use data from the "Trajectories and Origins" survey conducted by INED and INSEE to examine with the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition method, the impact of ethnic origins on different labor outcomes.In another article published in the European Economic Review, we  investigate the effect of in group favoritism on hiring and wage decisions and its impact on effort choices. Our findings also highlight the negative externalities of intra-group favoritism, particularly in terms of conflict occurrence. In an article published in the Revue Française d'Économie, we provide a comparative analysis of different empirical methods for measuring discrimination and its nature, distinguishing between statistical discrimination (Arrow, 1973) and taste-based discrimination (Becker, 1957). In another article published in the European Economic Review, we investigate policies aimed at combating discrimination, specifically affirmative action policies (e.g., Rodgers and Spriggs, 1996; Holzer and Neumark, 1999). Our study confirms that the introduction of a quota system significantly reduces the recruitment gap between men and women and does not negatively affect firm performance.

Dickinson D., D. Masclet and E. Peterle (2018) “Discrimination as favoritism: The private benefits and social costs of in-group favoritism in an experimental labor market » European Economic Review, Volume 104, 220-236

Langevin G., D. Masclet, F. Moizeau & E. Peterle (2017) « Ethnic gaps in educational attainment and labor-market outcomes: evidence from France » Education Economics, Volume 25, 2017 - Issue 1

Beaurain G., D. Masclet (2016) Does affirmative action reduce gender discrimination and enhance efficiency? New experimental evidence European Economic Review vol 90 Pages 350-362

Masclet D. Peterle E and S. Larribeau (2015) "Gender differences in Performance and Competitiveness : A new Experimental Evidence" Journal of Economic Psychology , 47,103-115.

Larribeau S., D. Masclet et E. Peterle "(2013) Une mesure expérimentale de la discrimination homme-femme à l'embauche", Revue d'Economie Politique 2013/3 (Vol. 123), pages 333 à 351

Larribeau S., D. Masclet et E. Peterle " (2013) Que nous apprend l’économie expérimentale sur les différences homme-femme sur le marché du travail ", (2013) Revue Française d'Economie 2013/2 (Volume XXVIII), pages 121 à 154

Labor Economics : self-employment

In some of my collaborative work, we have been interested in the determinants of occupational choices. Indeed, one does not choose one's profession by chance and occupation choices reflect to some extent individual and social preferences (taste for competition, aversion to effort or risk aversion preference for autonomy, taste for equity, etc.). For instance we investigate to what extent individuals with a stronger preference for autonomy or less aversion to risk are more inclined to choose self-employment over salary employment. We also investigate intergenerational correlations in occupation. In other studies, we have focused on the satisfaction of self-employed workers using data from the BHPS (British Household Panel Survey) and French data from the ECHP (European Community Household Panel). Our results indicate that self-employed workers are, on average, more satisfied than employees regarding their income and working conditions but much less satisfied with their job security.

Colombier N. and D. Masclet (2008) "Self-Employment and Intergenerational Transition of Human Capital" Small Business Economics vol 30, number 4.

Clark A. N. Colombier and D. Masclet (2008) "Never the Same After the First Time: The Satisfaction of the Second-Generation Self-Employed", International Journal of Manpower,vol.29, (7) pp591-609

Colombier N., L. Denant Boemont, Y. Loheac and D. Masclet (2007)"Risk Aversion: An Experiment with Self-Employed and Salaried Volume 9 No. 1 Workers " Applied Economic letters

Levy Garboua L., H. Maafi, D. Masclet and Antoine Terracol (2012)"Risk Aversion and Framing Effects" Experimental Economics 15, 1, 128-144

Colombier N., L. Denant Boemont, Y. Loheac and D. Masclet (2008) "Une étude expérimentale du degré individuel et collectif d'aversion au risque", Economie et Prévision vol 185 (4) p89-101,

Masclet D., N. Colombier, L. Denant-Boemont and Y. Louheac “Group and Individual Risk Preferences: A Lottery-Choice Experiment” (2009) “Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization vol. 70, pp. 470-484.

Colombier N. and D. Masclet (2007) “Comment devenir travailleur indépendant? L'importance du réseau social”, Economie et Statistiques no 405/406, p 1-20

Labor economics : taxation and labor supply

 In some of my work, I have focused on the effects of taxation on labor supply as well as on tax evasion.

C. Keser, D. Masclet and C. Montmarquette (2020) Labor Supply,Taxation, and the Use of Tax Revenues: A Real-Effort Experiment in Canada, France, and Germany Public Finance Review 2020, Vol. 48(6) 714-750

Johnson C., D. Masclet and C. Montmarquette (2010) "The effect of Perfect monitoring of matched income on tax compliance: An experimental investigation" National Tax Journal, 63 (1),110-1

Levy Garboua L., D. Masclet and C. Montmarquette (2009) "A Microfoundation for the Laffer Curve in a Real. Effort Experiment", Journal of Economic Psychology vol. 30, pp 147–161

Masclet D. and C. Montmarquette (2008) "Does the Context Matter in Labor Supply to Taxation?", Economie et Prévision numéro 182 p47-61.

Lévy-Garboua L., D. Masclet and C. Montmarquette (2006) "Taxation and Labor Supply: Experimental Evidence", Economie et Prévision vol 4-p5135-147

Masclet D. Montmarquette C and Viennot N. (2019) "Reducing Tax Evasion : An Experiment with Whistleblowers" Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics Volume 83, December 2019, 101459

 Public economics : public goods and common pools

Some of my works investigate collective action logics that are generally characterized by the existence of a conflict between individual and collective interests. Beyond team work, which can be seen as having a public good logic, my research has also covered other areas such as the environment and counter-terrorism, which also have a public good dimension. 

As early as 1740, David Hume described individuals' inclination to benefit from collective activities while contributing as little as possible to these activities. My research follows in the footsteps of Elinor Ostrom's work, who was awarded the 2009 Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel for her analysis of the economic governance of common pool resources, based notably on decentralized resource management by local actors themselves through the application of social norms and "institutional arrangements" such as peer pressure mechanisms. Elinor Ostrom highlighted that, for thousands of years, human societies have pragmatically invented cooperation institutions to prevent the overexploitation of limited resources, despite the absence of property rights or state intervention.

Elinor Ostrom's work thus paved the way for decentralized management of collective actions between centralized regulation by state power and private appropriation through the establishment of appropriate property rights. In line with Elinor Ostrom's work, my research has sought to study decentralized mechanisms aimed at improving voluntary contributions to financing public goods. Given their characteristics of non-exclusion (everyone can benefit from the public good) and non-rivalry (the consumption of the good by one individual has no effect on the quantity available of that good for other individuals), public goods suffer from the well-known free rider problem. No one is incentivized to finance the public good while each potential consumer has an individual interest in relying on the funding of other consumers. Therefore, the production of public goods is not optimal within the market framework as private provision would be inefficient (market failure). Hence, the role of the state is often justified by the need to produce public goods.

Bougherara D., L. Denant Boemont and D. Masclet (2011)"Cooperation and Framing Effects in Provision Point Mechanisms:Experimental Evidence" Ecological Economics, vol 70, p 1200-1210

Colombier N., D. Masclet, D. Mirza and C. Montmarquette (2011) "Global Security Policies against Terrorism and the Free Riding Problem" Journal of Public Economic Theory 13 (5), pp755-791

Bougherara D. L. Denant Boemont and D. Masclet (2008) “Sustainable Development: Creating Environmental Resources: An Experimental Study” Revue Economique vol. 59, numéro 3, pp685-692

Peer Pressure Mechanisms in Various Contexts (Social Banking or Online Platforms)

In some of my work, I have explored peer evaluation mechanisms in contexts other than work teams: peer pressure in peer lending as well as in e-reputation mechanisms.

Simon Cornee and D. Masclet (2022) Long-Term Relationships, Group Lending, and Peer Sanctioning in Microfinance: Experimental Evidence Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, vol. 100,101921.

Cornee S. D. Masclet and Gervais Thenet"Reciprocity, Reputation and Peer Lending on Micro-Credit Markets" with Simon Cornee (2012) Journal of Money Credit and Banking 44, 5, 957-980

Masclet D. and T. Penard (2007) “Why providing Feedback matters in a Ebay Transaction? An experimental Approach ? ”, Revue d’Economie Politique, vol. 117 numéro (3), p365-386.

Masclet D. and T. Penard “Do Reputation Feedback Systems Really Improve Trust”?" (2011), Applied Economics, 44, 35, 4553-4573

Lumeau, M., Masclet, D., & Pénard, T. (2015). Reputation and social (dis) approval in feedback mechanisms: An experimental study. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 112, 127-140. 

Lumeau, M., Masclet, D., & Pénard, T. (2010). Les conséquences de la manipulation de la réputation dans les systèmes d’évaluation en ligne : Une étude expérimentale. Revue économique, 61(6), 1123-1133.

 Methodological Research

In some research, I have focused on methodological questions and particulrly the value of using experimentation as a tool for evaluating the impact of public policies.

Gaigné C., Thierry Kamionka, Yannick L’Horty et David Masclet Microéconomie Appliquée. Avancées récentes en Microéconomie Appliquée (2023) à paraitre Revue Economique

Denant Boemont L., P Malgrange, P. D. Masclet et Claude Montmarquette « L'économie expérimentale comme outils d'aide à la décision”, (2008) Economie et Prévision numéro 182 p 1-5

David Masclet and Thérèse Rebière (2023) "Do Real Stakes Always Matter? Experimental Evidence on Social and Anti-Social Preferences”, Annals of Economics and Statistics. No. 152 (December 2023), pp.65-102