Marty Pham

Welcome to my personal page!

I am Man Duy (Marty) Pham, a Senior Lecturer in Finance at the University of Auckland Business School, New Zealand. My research lies at the intersection of corporate finance, sustainable finance, and financial accounting.

I also coordinate the Finance Seminar Series for the Department of Accounting and Finance. I welcome opportunities to connect with scholars who may be interested in presenting their research at our department.

I also serve as an Adjunct Faculty member in Finance at VinUniversity, Vietnam, and as a Visiting Scholar at International University, Vietnam National University Ho Chi Minh City.

Selected publications

The Real Effects of Protecting Biodiversity

(with Amir Akbari, Lilian Ng, and Jing Yu)

Review of Finance, 30(1), pp.193–230 (2026)

Data; Video

Protected areas are a central instrument in biodiversity conservation. However, their broader implications for corporate behavior and financial performance remain underexplored. This study examines how proximity to newly designated protected areas shapes establishment-level environmental, operational, and financial outcomes from 1990 to 2021. We find that nearby establishments significantly reduce toxic emissions, driven not by cleaner technologies but by production cutbacks and workforce contraction. Exploratory evidence suggests that heightened regulatory oversight may be one channel that constrains operations and is associated with lower profitability and market value. These results underscore the environmental benefits of conservation but also reveal the material costs imposed on affected firms. As global conservation initiatives expand, our findings show that biodiversity-related regulatory exposure constitutes a material financial risk that should be incorporated into policy design, corporate strategy, and capital allocation decisions.

Beware of False Prophets: Cybersecurity Risk and Strategic Voluntary Disclosure

(with Hong Vo)

The British Accounting Review, in press (2025)

This study examines the impact of cybersecurity risk on voluntary disclosure, with a specific focus on management forecasts. We find that managers in firms with higher ex-ante cyber risk issue more financial forecasts. This positive effect is largely due to increased information demand from market participants when confronted with elevated cybersecurity concerns. Further analyses reveal that management forecasts in response to cyber risk, while conveying more positive and long-term information, exhibit lower precision and accuracy. Overall, we interpret these findings as managers strategically using optimistic disclosures, even if the quality of these disclosures is subpar, to enhance market valuation when their firm is exposed to cybersecurity risk.

Government Ownership and the Public Information Content of Insider Trading: International Evidence

(with Md Zakir Hossain, Sirimon Treepongkaruna, and Jing Yu)

European Accounting Review, 34(3), pp. 1087-1116 (2025)

This paper investigates the political determinants of informed insider trading using an international sample of firms from 28 countries. We demonstrate that insider trading in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is statistically and economically more profitable and informative than in non-state-owned enterprises, indicating a unique political information advantage enjoyed by these insiders. Further analysis reveals that insider trading in government-owned firms becomes more profitable during periods of nationwide political uncertainty and when industry-specific government actions are implemented. Moreover, the aggregate insider trading in SOEs better predicts future stock market returns than that in non-SOEs. These results suggest that the political information advantage of SOE insiders is evident in both the idiosyncratic and macroeconomic information content of insider trading, consistent with the superior ability of these insiders to interpret the economic impact of the country-, industry-, and firm-specific government actions.

Navigating Investment Decisions with Social Connectedness: Implications for Venture Capital

(with Giang Nguyen, My Nguyen, and Anh Pham)

Journal of Banking & Finance, 155: 106979 (2023)

This study examines how the geographical structure of social networks shapes venture capital (VC) investment decisions. We find that VC firms invest more in portfolio companies in socially connected regions. The effect is more pronounced among independent, smaller, less reputable, and early–stage–focused VC firms, as well as those not located in a VC hub. We further document that social connectedness lowers the likelihood of a successful exit since it induces VC firms to undertake suboptimal investment decisions. Overall, our findings highlight the role of social connectedness in constituting the geographical differences in VC firms’ capital allocation and investment outcomes.

When A Gift Resembles A Trojan Horse: CEO Stock Gift and Stock Price Crash Risk

(with Ha Nguyen)

The British Accounting Review, 56(4): 101235 (2023)

This study presents a new interpretation of executives’ stock gifts as an agency cost of managerial bad news hoarding. In a sample of US firms, we document a higher stock price crash risk associated with CEO stock gifts. This evidence suggests that stock gifting could serve as an exit strategy for opportunistic managers to dispose of their unwanted shares and mitigate wealth losses when they can no longer withhold negative information about their firm. Further analyses confirm our proposition by showing that the association between stock gifts and crash risk is stronger for CEOs who are most concerned about their career and personal wealth, which are the two critical motives for managerial bad news hoarding. Finally, we find that more transparent information environments and external monitoring mechanisms, but not an internal governance system, can alleviate the agency problem embedded in CEO stock gifts.

Management Connectedness and Corporate Investment

(with Mahmoud Agha and Jing Yu)

Journal of Banking & Finance, 124: 106042 (2021)

In response to the mixed views about the appointment-based connectedness between the CEO and subordinate C-level executives, we systematically analyze the net effect of top management team (TMT) connectedness in the context of real corporate investment activities. We document a robust negative association between TMT connectedness and corporate investments, driven by the reduction in corporate R&D spending and acquisitions. Further tests reveal investment inefficiency in firms with closely connected managers, indicating a weak average governance effect of TMT connectedness. To explain such an effect, we find that connected executives tend to avoid risky investments and shirk investment responsibilities when facing little career concerns. Interestingly, the agency cost and coordination benefit of interconnected TMT are not mutually exclusive. The adverse investment effect of TMT connectedness is tempered in firms facing financial constraints and even reversed during the Global Financial Crisis, when financial constraints are most likely binding.

Get in touch at man.pham@auckland.ac.nz or manpham2910@gmail.com

My work address is R5101 - the Sir Owen G. Glenn Building (OGGB) - 12 Grafton Road, Auckland City, Auckland, New Zealand

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