Work in Progress

I simultaneously work on a number of paper-projects:

Abstraction and Idealization in Molecular Biology

In explaning phenomena such as gene expression, molecular biology often refer to (molecular) mechanisms. Just like other models, mechanistic models also involve various abstractions and idealizations. Several authors have argued that key difference making factors in molecular mechanistic models are idealized in multiple ways and that this makes the mechanistic account of explanation untenable. I argue that such analysis rests on an impoverished understanding of what idealizations are and that the mechanistic account of explanation is not threatened by the examples presented by the critics.

Representational Role of Animal Models in Cancer Research

Detailing the practices of developing a variety of animal (mouse) models in cancer research I argue that researchers use models as representations of diseases on the basis of various similarity considerations. The similarity account of scientific representation has enjoyed much popularity but has also come under attack. This paper clarifies the role of similarity consideration in representational practices.

Scientific Understanding and Scientific Modeling

If models provide understanding of phenomena and if models are simplified and otherwise distorted accounts of real-world systems then scientific understanding cannot stem from true and accurate descriptions, or so the argument goes. Using the case of regulatory (metabolic) feedback loops I argue that although models are, indeed, distorted in one way or another, we can still make sense of the condition that understanding requires accurate descriptions by identifying the locus of truth, i.e. what the model as a whole tells us about given system.

The nature of theoretical scientific models: the abstract view

Theoretical models such as mathematical models are claimed by many to be abstract objects. Critics have raised several objections againt the abstract object view of models, focusing mostly on the metaphysics of abstract objects. I argue that the abstract objects view is much richer than the critics suggest and that the nature of theoretical models can be captured by cognitive science.