My research has focuses on three areas: belief control, rationality, and social epistemology.
My current focus is a monograph on the origin and progress of the notion of epistemic rationality. I argue that epistemic rationality is an innovation of the 17th century meant to provide a standard of adjudication for religious and moral judgments as well as capture the methodology of the new experimental natural philosophy--i.e., incipient modern science. The book is entitled, The Invention of Rationality.
Regarding belief control, I've published a number of articles on the views of historical authors on doxastic voluntarism: including Descartes, Locke, Mary Astell, Thomas Reid, Robert Holcot, Aquinas, and Augustine. I've published the Stanford Encyclopedia entry on doxastic voluntarism with Liz Jackson. I've also developed a number of empirical studies concerning the possibility of voluntary belief with Liz Jackson, forthcoming as "Doxastic Freedom: An Empirical Defense." These are a response to the so-called psychological argument against doxastic voluntarism.
Book:
Locke's Twilight of Probability: An Epistemology of Rational Assent (Routledge, 2022)
(preview) (introduction)
"Boespflug’s study stands as a thought-provoking contribution to Locke scholarship. By zeroing in on the centrality of assent, the book invites a critical reconsideration of Locke’s philosophical intentions. Additionally, Boespflug smoothly bridges Locke’s views with present-day developments in philosophy. The book’s engagement with contemporary debates is particularly praiseworthy: it skillfully avoids the pitfalls of anachronism while bringing Lockean ideas to bear upon current issues. If at times the arguments’ ambition invites further scrutiny – for example, regarding the claim that Locke’s [theory of rational probable assent] surpasses his theory of knowledge in importance – it is precisely this boldness that makes the work so intellectually stimulating. For these reasons, Locke’s Twilight of Probability should be of great interest not only to scholars of early modern philosophy but also to historically attuned scholars engaged in contemporary discussions on the epistemology of belief and testimony."
(Left: Merton College Fellows' garden (Oxford))
Dissertation:
"Voluntary Belief and Its Consequences in Locke and Descartes"
This project argues for novel views concerning both Locke and Descartes conceptions of doxastic control. For Descartes, I argue against the prevailing literature that every belief is choice. For Locke, we have essentially no direct control over our beliefs and are at the mercy of our evidence. I, additionally, argue that their conceptions of doxastic voluntarism have significant and interesting implications for their respective epistemologies.
Articles:
Faith in Experts: What the Social Epistemology of Science and Religion Reveals about their Conflict
Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion (forthcoming)
Why Every Belief is a Choice: Descartes' Doxastic Voluntarism Revisited
International Journal of Philosophical Studies 2023
Only Light and Evidence: Locke on the Will to Believe
History of Philosophy Quarterly 2021
Locke on Enthusiasm (with Robert Pasnau)
The Lockean Mind 2021 (eds. Gordon-Roth and Weinberg)
Thomistic Faith Naturalized? The Epistemic Significance of Aquinas' Appeal to Doxastic Instinct
Faith and Philosophy 2021
Why Reid was no Dogmatist
Synthese 2019
Locke on Testimony
British Journal for the History of Philosophy 2019
Locke's Principle of Proportionality
Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 2019
The Legacy of Reid's Common Sense in Analytic Epistemology
The Journal of Scottish Philosophy 2019
Robert Holcot on Doxastic Voluntarism and the Ethics of Belief
Res Philosophica 2018
Is Augustinian Faith Rational?
Religious Studies 2016