Publications:

Reform Windfall as Redistribution: A Survey Experiment on Redistributive Preferences in Contemporary China (joint work with Nora Yuqian Chen (Harvard), Yuchen Huang (University of Liège) and Zhexun Mo (CUNY and World Inequality Lab) - previously circulated as "Not my Money to Touch: Experimental Evidence on Redistributive Preferences under Market Transition in China" - European Journal of Political Economy)

China has experienced a remarkable rise in living standards over four decades of economic reforms, alongside a tremendous increase in inequalities. In this context, do Chinese people support redistribution of wealth gained through reform windfalls? To answer this question, we conducted an online survey experiment with a nationally representative sample from China (N = 2,000). The treatment group was shown examples of wealth acquired through typical reform-era pathways requiring minimal ability or effort. This exposure led to a 0.1 standard deviation decrease in their support for redistribution. We propose a “reform windfall as redistribution” mechanism to explain this reduction: the treated group perceives the reform era as inherently redistributive, providing opportunities to escape systemic inequalities tied to the political system, thereby reducing the perceived need for formal redistribution. This decline in support is not driven by changes in fairness perceptions, as respondents do not attribute the wealth acquisition scenarios to ability or effort, nor do they view them as distinctly fair or unfair. Furthermore, we find limited evidence of heterogeneity, with one exception: individuals reporting higher economic pressure show an even greater reduction in redistributive support when exposed to the treatment. We hypothesize that this occurs because unmet expectations for upward mobility exacerbate their reactions to the treatment scenarios.

Working Papers:

Red Herrings: A Model of Attention-Hijacking by Politicians (this version: August 2024 - Reject and Resubmit at Games and Economic Behavior)
Politicians often use “red herrings” to distract voters from scandals. When do they succeed and why? I develop a model in which a politician runs for re-election and potentially faces a scandal. Some politicians enjoy telling “tales” (stories that make headlines) while others use tales to distract voters from the scandal, creating a red herring. Multiple equilibria can arise: one with a norm of tale-telling in which red herrings succeed—red herring senders get re-elected—and another with a norm against tale-telling in which they fail. Increased media reporting of tales has an ambiguous effect: at low reporting levels, it facilitates red herrings but at high levels, it can discipline politicians. High reporting can guarantee equilibrium uniqueness and first-best screening of politicians.

- Presented at the 2023 Nottingham NICEP Conference and the 2023 CEPR Paris Symposium, accepted at the European Association of Young Economists (EAYE) 2024 meeting and at the 4th workshop of the Women in Political Economics Network, accepted at the 10th Comparative Formal Theory Conference
- Want to know more? Listen to the my interview in the VoxTalks Economics podcast

Non-Meritocrats or Choice-Reluctant Meritocrats? A Redistribution Experiment in China and France (joint work with Yuchen Huang (University of Liège) and Zhexun Mo (CUNY and World Inequality Lab) (this version: June 2025)

Recent experimental evidence suggests that meritocratic ideals are mainly a Western phenomenon. Intriguingly, the Chinese public does not appear to differentiate between merit- and luck-based inequalities, despite China’s historical emphasis on meritocratic institutions. We propose that this phenomenon could be due to the Chinese public’s greater reluctance to make an active choice in real-stake redistribution decisions. We run an incentivized redistribution experiment with elite university students in China and France where we vary the initial split of payoffs between two real-life workers to redistribute from. We show that Chinese respondents consistently and significantly choose more non-redistribution across different status quo scenarios. Additionally, if we exclude the individuals who engage in non-redistribution choices, Chinese respondents do differentiate between merit- and luck-based inequalities, and do not redistribute less than the French. Chinese respondents are as reactive as the French towards scenarios with noisy signals of merit, such as inequalities of opportunities. We argue that the reluctance to make an active choice signals diminished political agency to act upon redistribution decisions with real-life stakes, rather than apathy, inattention, having benefited from the status quo in Chinese society, or libertarian preferences among the Chinese. Notably, our findings show that the reluctance to make achoice is particularly pronounced among respondents of working-class or farming backgrounds, while it is absent among individuals whose families have closer ties to the private sector.

- Presented at the 2024 Nottingham NICEP Conference, accepted at the 2024 LSE-Bari GEOM Conference, presented (co-author) at the 2024 NEUDC Conference

Work in Progress:

Unpacking the Incumbency Effect: Electoral Advantage and Coalition Building in Government Formation (joint work with Manuel Bagues (Warwick) and Iacopo Monterosa (Collegio Carlo Alberto))

In parliamentary democracies, electoral success alone does not determine government formation—parties must also navigate complex coalition negotiations. Using data from European national elections (1945-2020) and Spanish municipal elections (1999-2019), we examine how incumbency affects both electoral performance and post-election bargaining. We find that incumbent parties enjoy an electoral advantage but face a disadvantage in government formation, being less likely to form governments than non-incumbents with similar vote shares. This bargaining penalty is particularly pronounced for long-term incumbents and parties lacking recent coalition experience. These findings suggest that proportional representation systems enable opposition parties to serve as an effective counterweight to incumbent power, creating de facto checks and balances against political entrenchment.

- Presented at the 2024 annual meeting of the Società Italiana di Economia Pubblica and at the 2024 Simposio de la Asociación Española de Economía

Femicides, Media Coverage, and Community Responses to Violence Against Women (joint work with Iacopo Monterosa (Collegio Carlo Alberto))

Prevention of Violence Against Women (VAW) is often hindered by harmful gender norms and widespread underreporting. Understanding how communities respond when violence becomes publicly visible is crucial for strengthening anti-violence policies. Exploiting the quasi-random timing of femicides across French cities, we investigate two key aspects of community response: (i) changes in local newspaper coverage of VAW and (ii) shifts in community mobilisation and help-seeking behaviour. We document that local newspapers expand their reporting of opinion pieces and articles on other VAW events following a femicide, raising awareness about gender-based violence more broadly. VAW articles become more factual and policy-oriented, though they also more frequently attribute motives to perpetrators. Femicides may act as local shocks, increasing the salience of VAW and fostering community reactions. Consistent with this, we find that femicides boost local anti-violence protests and increase reporting of rape and sexual harassment. These effects are similar across the political spectrum, and we find no evidence of backlash or polarization in the media or local response. These findings emphasize the role of local media in helping raise awareness and build broad support for measures aimed at reducing VAW.

- Accepted at the 10th Monash-Paris-Warwick-Zurich-CEPR Text-As-Data Workshop