Bank Credit Supply and Firm Innovation Behavior in the Financial Crisis (with Kornelius Kraft), Journal of Banking and Finance, 2020, 121, 105961.

External Financing Constraints and Firm Innovation (with Kornelius Kraft), Journal of Industrial Economics, 2019, 67(1), 91-126.

The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Capital Investments in Innovative Firms (with Kornelius Kraft), Industrial and Corporate Change, 2019, 28(5), 1079-1099.

External Consultants and Innovation, Academy of Management Proceedings, 2020, 1, 13491.

Is it a good idea to publish during your PhD? Yes, but ..., Nature Behavioural and Social Sciences Community Blog, October 2019.

Digital divide, Knowledge and Innovations, Journal of Information, Information Technology, and Organizations, Vol. 8, 2013, pp. 1-24.

Patent Enforcement and Innovation (Preliminary version available upon request, revision in progress)

Does patent enforcement foster or impede innovation? While one of the main functions of the patent system is to foster innovation, the actual impact of the enforcement of patent rights on innovation is still under debate. I exploit patent infringement litigation in the United States to identify the effect of patent enforcement on cumulative innovation. The results imply that citations by subsequent patents increase after a case is filed in a court. While citations increase during the litigation period, the relative effect size decreases in the years following the closure of the case. The degree of the increase of subsequent citations is higher for technologies that are characterized by a higher degree of novelty, narrower protection and higher information transmission through the case. Consequently, signals about the value of the technology and reductions in asymmetric information seem to be particular drivers of the increase in citations. Although there is a general positive effect, subsequent citing patents have a low degree of novelty and are close to the litigated patents in terms of technological proximity and general similarity.

Do Managerial Incentives Facilitate Collusion? (with Anja Rösner) (Preliminary version available upon request, revision in progress)

This paper investigates the impact of management incentives on firm cartels. It is usually the manager which acts on behalf of the owner and is running the firm. To mitigate the agency problem, the owner puts corporate governance mechanism in place, which incentivize managers to align their interest with that of the firm’s shareholders. While this is beneficial for the firm performance in the first place, the set of contracts might make collusion more attractive for managers. Consequently, we analyze how manager remuneration schemes impact their incentives for collusion, cartel formation and stability. Exploiting different data sources allows us to identify the managers remuneration schemes and cartels within the United States. Combining these information leads to the following findings: Higher long-term incentives of managers indeed affect collusion. Our analysis shows that a higher degree of manager's long-term incentives leads to (i) a higher probability of a firm's cartel participation, (ii) a higher probability of forming a cartel and (iii) no effect on the termination of a cartel.

The Impact of a New Workplace Technology on Employees (with Alexander Lammers)

We investigate the impact of the implementation of a new workplace technology on worker outcomes. While the effects of new technologies on firm outcomes are widely discussed, the impact on workers remains debated. To investigate this relation, we exploit the implementation of a new workplace technology as a source of variation in employee outcomes. Utilizing detailed worker-level data for Germany, we show that the strongest impacts of new technologies takes place in the first year of the implementation for overtime, training and perceived productivity. In addition, we show that the positive effects of a new technology vanish after the introduction period. Finally, changes in worker outcomes are dependent on the nature of the introduced technology. Positive effects on real worker outcomes therefore primarily occur when workers also tend to perceive it.

External Expertise and Firm Innovation (R&R, revision in progress)

This paper analyzes the impact of external expertise on innovation behavior of firms. I exploit information on the hiring of external consultants by firms to determine the effect of the external experts' impact on innovation. Results for a sample of firms from 32 countries imply that hiring external consultants indeed leads to a higher probability to carry out product and process innovation, but also innovation in management or marketing. These effects are largely dependent on the intensity and type of inflowing external expertise. Accordingly, the impact of the number of visits by external consultants on innovation is found to be inversely U-shaped. In addition, improving business or project skills, provide the largest benefits for innovation.

R&D Investments under Financing Constraints (with Kornelius Kraft) (Working paper version, revised version available upon request)

This paper tests for the sensitivity of R&D to financing constraints conditional on restrictions in external financing. Financing constraints of firms are identified by an exogenously calculated rating index. Restrictions in external financing are determined by (i) the specific time period (crisis vs. non-crisis) and (ii) the balance sheet strength of the firm’s main bank in terms of bank capital. Results of difference-indifferences estimations utilizing three time periods: 2002-2006 (pre-crisis) 2007-2009 (crisis) and 2010-2012 (post-crisis) support the theoretical prediction that financing constraints affect R&D. Moreover, we find that the effect of firm financing constraints is more intense (i) in times of stress on financial markets and (ii) when the firm faces restrictions in external financing. Additionally, our results indicate that on average the effect does not persist over time.

Risk and Collusion (with Anja Rösner)

This paper investigates how risk-taking incentives of managers affect collusive behavior of firms. Firms are run by managers, who act on behalf of the principal owner. Consequently, the manager's incentives play an important role in firm decisions. By linking executive pay to firm performance, the owner ensures that the manager is interested in maximizing the firm value. Exploiting this fact, we show empirically that managers are more likely engaging into collusion if they have higher incentives to take risks due to their compensation scheme. However, we do not only show that compensation schemes, but also personal characteristics are determining collusive behavior. First, we find that the manager's gender independently exerts no influence on collusion. Second, with increasing incentives to take risk, female managers are more likely engaging in collusion compared to their male counterparts. Consequently, our results lead to important implications for corporate governance, but also for competition authorities concerning the detection of cartels.

Selected work in progress

Information Disclosure and Subsequent Innovation

Spillovers from Public Research

Financing of Innovation