How does patent enforcement affect subsequent innovation? I exploit patent infringement litigation in the United States to analyze the effect of patent enforcement on cumulative innovation. The results imply that subsequent innovation increase after a case is filed in a court. While there is a strong increase during the litigation period, the relative effect size decreases in the years following the closure of the case. Further results imply that signals about the value of the patent and reductions in asymmetric information are particular driver of the increase in follow-on innovation. Although there is a general positive effect, subsequent innovation show a low degree of novelty and are close to the litigated patents in terms of technological proximity and general similarity.

Patent law requires the full, clear, and concise disclosure of an invention in exchange for the protection of the intellectual property. This paper presents a theoretical analysis of the strategic motives to limit knowledge disclosure in patents and how this affects follow-on innovation. Using USPTO patent examination data we use Office actions associated with insufficient disclosure to investigate whether and how the modification of a patent specification in the course of examination impacts follow-on innovation. We find that inventors “game the system” using strategic non-disclosure as a means to reduce follow-on innovation.

We utilize a new survey experiment to evaluate the existence and degree of financial constraints for R&D in the economy. The experiment does not only allow to deduct the presence of financial constraints, but also to evaluate their economic significance. Using data on German companies, we find that financial constraints for R&D exist but that their relevance might have been overestimated in the literature. Most R&D projects that have not been implemented because of financial constraints turn out to have low expected marginal rates of return. While this findings stands in some contrast to other studies, we also find several results that are in line with the literature: young firms are most constrained and the constraints occur at the intensive margin, i.e. our results do not suggest that non-innovative companies are deterred from innovation. Instead, highly innovative companies are restricted by the capital market.

We investigate the impact of management incentives on firm cartels. Although incentives for collusion are usually investigated from the firm perspective, it is the manager who acts on behalf of the owner and is running the firm. The structure of imposed contracts, that give managers an incentive to align their interest with those of the firm’s shareholders, could change the attractiveness of collusion for managers. Consequently, we analyze how manager remuneration schemes impact their incentives for collusion, cartel formation and stability. Exploiting a combination of firm, manager and cartel data allows us to identify the managers remuneration schemes and cartels within the United States. Our analysis shows that a higher degree of manager’s long-term incentives leads to (i) a higher probability of a firm’s cartel participation, (ii) a higher probability of forming a cartel and (iii) no effect on the termination of a cartel. Consequently, we find that incentives of managers indeed affect collusion.

We analyze the impact of subsidies on R&D expenditures in the financial crisis and beyond. The financial crisis has led to considerable turmoil in financing and, as a result, to restrictions of firms' access to external financing. Utilizing this fact, we identify and analyze financing constraints in two ways. First, firm financing constraints are determined via their credit rating and second, restrictions from the supply side are identified via the firm’s main banks capital reserves. The results of our empirical test imply that R&D investments of non-subsidized firms decrease during the crisis. This effect is particularly pronounced for firms that are affected by financing constraints on the firm or bank side. Finally, our results imply that subsidies can at least partially compensate for these negative effects.

I investigate the relation between hiring external consultants and firm innovation in emerging markets. Results for a sample of firms from 32 emerging market economies imply that firms that hire external consultants more likely are large, old, resource-rich, technological oriented and operate on international markets. These firm types are also more inclined to seek advice from local consulting firms and demand a higher consulting intensity. The analysis of the reasons not to hire external consultants imply that the majority of firms have no need for it. A non-negligible share also abstains from hiring consultants due to a lack of financing and non-availability or non-awareness. When further investigating the impact of hiring consultants on firm innovation behavior, I find that firms receiving advice are more likely carrying out an innovation. Determining the impact of the consulting intensity, I show that the relation between the number of interactions with external consultants and innovation is inversely U-shaped. This implies that more is not always better.

We exploit the implementation of a new workplace technology as a source of variation in employee outcomes. Utilizing detailed worker-level data for Germany, we show that the strongest impacts of new technologies arise in the first year of its implementation for overtime, training and perceived productivity. These effects diminish after the introduction period. Finally, we show that changes in worker outcomes depend on the nature of the technology as well as occupational choices. Thus, we find that technologies are particularly affecting workers if their introduction is related to increases in workload and mental stress. In addition, workers in high-paying occupations are affected in all of the worker outcomes examined. Among employees in low- and mid-paying occupations, in contrast, there are only particularly strong impacts on overtime and training. The impact on worker outcomes therefore primarily occurs when the new technology shapes the work environment of the exposed worker.

This paper tests for the sensitivity of R&D to financing constraints conditional on restrictions in external financing. Financing constraints of firms are identified by an exogenously calculated rating index. Restrictions in external financing are determined by (i) the specific time period (crisis vs. non-crisis) and (ii) the balance sheet strength of the firm’s main bank in terms of bank capital. Results of difference-indifferences estimations utilizing three time periods: 2002-2006 (pre-crisis) 2007-2009 (crisis) and 2010-2012 (post-crisis) support the theoretical prediction that financing constraints affect R&D. Moreover, we find that the effect of firm financing constraints is more intense (i) in times of stress on financial markets and (ii) when the firm faces restrictions in external financing. Additionally, our results indicate that on average the effect does not persist over time.