Abstract:
This paper studies the affordability–availability trade-off in California’s disaster insurance market. Homeowners insurers face repricing regulations intended to maintain affordable premiums as disaster risk increases, but restrictions on price adjustment can reduce insurer profitability and contribute to non-renewals, particularly in high-risk areas. Using ZIP-code-level data on policies, premiums, and insurance characteristics together with firm-level profitability measures, I develop a structural model of household insurance demand and insurer pricing to estimate the key demand and supply parameters governing this market. On the demand side, a mixed logit framework in which mortgage requirements raise households’ value of insurance and price sensitivity varies with income, captures substitution between private insurance, the public option, and remaining uninsured. On the supply side, insurers compete à la Bertrand subject to repricing frictions generated by the rate-filing approval process. Identification exploits an exogenous increase in rate-filing approval delays beginning in 2020 and the resulting variation in insurers' ability to adjust premiums. I use the estimated model to study the affordability–availability trade-off under counterfactual policies including price caps and restrictions on non-renewals.
Abstract:
This paper investigates how increased market competition influences ethical behavior of suppliers under different pricing regimes. In particular, it contrasts this effect for two types of market structures: (i) flexible-price markets and (ii) fixed-price markets. Deriving from a theoretical study by Dewatripont and Tirole (2024), it develops a model suitable for lab implementation, generating testable hypotheses to compare the effect of competition intensity on supplier ethics across market types. The experimental design aims to test these hypotheses using choice data from a controlled lab experiment by varying the intensity of competition and market structure across treatments. The paper further presents a structural estimation algorithm to estimate moral cost parameters for policy counterfactuals. The results have implications for policy-making and can inform debates on balancing market forces with ethical considerations.