Publications and Works in Progress
Publications
”First Lead, Now No Bed? The Unintended Impacts of Lead Abatement Laws on Evictions” (2023)
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Volume 117, January 2023, 102751. Available Here
Abstract: Lead paint in old houses is the leading cause of lead poisoning in children under 6 today. To combat this problem, several states have passed lead abatement laws, forcing landlords to remove lead in the homes they rent if tenants have children under the age of 6. However, these laws have unintended consequences, causing landlords to evict tenants rather than abate lead. I use a difference-in-differences approach while employing various model specifications with various fixed effects and sets of controls to examine the impact of Ohio’s 2003 lead abatement law on eviction rates. Using newly collected data from the Eviction Lab at Princeton University, I find that the passage of Ohio’s lead abatement law sharply increased targeted evictions. Due to the law’s passage, the average census district in Ohio faced an increased eviction rate of roughly 0.457 points, corresponding to an additional 13.93 evictions a year. These impacts are highly statistically significant, sizeable, and economically meaningful, indicating that policy makers should incorporate distributional consequences when designing future lead abatement laws in order to avoid unintended consequences and ensure equitable outcomes.
Working Papers
”The Peace Dividend of Community Driven Development: Evidence From Myanmar” (2023) With Erica Field, Sudhanshu Sharma, and Yinhong Zhao
Abstract: Community driven development (CDD) has become a popular method of distributing aid throughout developing countries. Founded on two guiding principles, decentralization of aid distribution and empowerment through participation, CDD programs encourage community involvement in all steps of the development project. CDD programs are frequently used in conflict-prone areas because the improvement of community relationships may have the additional benefit of reduction in local conflicts. We test this hypothesis by evaluating the impact of Myanmar's national CDD program on conflict occurrence after the military coup in 2021. Using a geographic regression discontinuity design along administrative boundaries, we estimate that enrollment in Myanmar's NCDDP program causally reduced the number of non-state conflicts by 34.8\%. We then use multiple waves of a village-level survey to examine mechanisms, finding the conflict reduction was primarily due to improvement in local institutions brought by the NCDDP. Our work provides evidence of the peace dividend of CDD and shows improvements in institutional quality in both the short and long run.
Current Version Available by Request
”Solid Waste Accountability Platform (SWAP)” With Heather Huntington, Edmund Malesky, and Erik Wibbels
Abstract: Forthcoming
Pre-Analysis Plan Available Here. Currently Completing Endline Data Collection.
”Who’s Your Rep? The Impacts of Political Competition on Housing Price”
Abstract: Congressional and state representatives and their parties use their political power to send kickbacks to their districts, providing funding for public goods and targeted investment within their district. However, representatives do not have an equal ability to do this, as those with longer tenure, important committee posts, and in more competitive districts have the ability to send more kickbacks to their districts. I estimate the impact of one’s representative and district, at the state house, state senate, and congressional level, on housing prices using the 2010 redistricting to identify the impact of one’s representative on housing prices. I first develop a model of political competition and housing prices with testable implications to bring to the data. Using data from InfoUSA, containing roughly 130 million housing transactions per year, from 2006 to 2014, combined with data on state and federal representatives, I identify and examine the impact of one’s representative on housing prices using multiple methods, including location fixed effects, a regression discontinuity design, and an instrumental variables design. I find that ”packing” districts so that they are not competitive is not only used to dilute voting power, but dilute local wealth as well, that more powerful representatives use that power to increase the value of their constituents’ homes, and that representatives in the party in control of the respective house are able to use this power to send kickbacks to their constituents. Not only does partisan gerrymandering come at a social and political cost, but a great economic cost as well.
Current Version (In Presentation Form) Available Here
Works in Progress
”Gerrymandering, Earmarking, and Housing Prices”
"Concentrating Landlord Power and Evictions: Evidence from NC”
”Congestion and the Motorbike: The Case of Yangon, Myanmar”
"The Impact of the Migrant Crisis on Evictions: Evidence from NYC"