For updated research, please visit my profiles on Google Scholar and ResearchGate. 

Published Work

Perelló, L. and Navia, P. 2024. "Partisanship with Rightist and Leftist Parties in Central America: A Test of Four Hypotheses." International Journal of Public Opinion Research 36(2): 1-12. https://doi.org/10.1093/ijpor/edae008

Abstract: Although scholars have made substantial progress in the debate on party systems in Latin America, many questions about partisanship in the region remain unaddressed. This article explores how the determinants of partisanship identified in the literature navigate in Central America, a region commonly overlooked by scholars. We examine a decade of public opinion surveys by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) from 2008 to 2018 to explore the individual-level determinants of partisan attachments with sixty-six leftist and rightist parties in six Central American countries to test four hypotheses. While differences across countries exist, self-placement on the left-right ideological scale, engagement in societal organizations, and protest participation help portray partisan attachments.

Perelló, L. and Navia, P. 2023. "Conditional cash transfers and voting for incumbents under democratic backsliding: The case of Honduras’s Bono 10,000." Bulletin of Latin American Research 42(3): 456-472. https://doi.org/10.1111/blar.13463

Abstract: As democracies worldwide have backslid to competitive authoritarian regimes or full dictatorships, some autocrats have used clientelist policies to strengthen their positions of power. We contend that autocrats can weaponize conditional cash transfers (CCTs) to shore up electoral support under democratic backsliding. In this vein, we analyze the impact of Honduras’s Bono 10,000, a discretionary CCT, on the electoral support for the incumbent National Party and opposition blocs between 2013 and 2017, an era marked by the erosion of democracy. Using two survey waves from the AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), we empirically show how the CCT boosted the electoral support for the National Party. Our findings contribute to the growing literature on how autocrats rely on carrots—not just sticks—to consolidate power.

Perelló, L. and Navia, P. 2023. "Jumpstarting ideological alignments in clientelist party systems: Evidence from Honduras’s 2009 coup." Studies in Comparative International Development 58: 103-127. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12116-022-09379-4

Abstract: This article examines the disruptive effect of coups on party systems. Coups are junctures that can increase polarization and explain party system disruption—measured in the dynamics and determinants of inter-party competition. Until recently, scholars labeled Honduras’s party system as one of Latin America’s most institutionalized, albeit based on clientelist linkages. The 2009 coup against President Manuel Zelaya abruptly ended decades of two-party rule. We use presidential and legislative election results and the AmericasBarometer surveys to assess the coup’s impact on vote choice. The evidence shows that the coup jumpstarted an ideological alignment in a party system where clientelism had historically thrived.

Freeman, W. and Perelló, L. 2022. "The long game: The opposition wins in Honduras." Journal of Democracy 33(2): 118-132. muse.jhu.edu/article/852749

Abstract: Opposition parties in competitive authoritarian regimes rarely win elections by a landslide, especially where poverty, repressive security forces, and clientelism abound. Yet in November 2021, Honduras’s opposition defeated the incumbent National Party against the odds. This essay argues that the opposition succeeded by “playing the long game”: 1) building a mass-party organization, 2) continually participating in elections, and 3) forging unity through power-sharing. Paradoxically, the Honduran opposition’s lack of international support incentivized these choices and became a blessing in disguise. Whether Xiomara Castro will rebuild democracy remains uncertain, but her coalition’s route to power yields lessons for oppositions elsewhere.

Perelló, L. and Navia, P. 2022. "The disruption of an institutionalized and polarized party system: Discontent with democracy and the rise of Nayib Bukele in El Salvador." Politics 42(3): 267-288. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/02633957221077181 

Abstract: Studies on party system collapse or individual-party breakdowns view programmatic inconsistency or convergence as necessary for abrupt party system change. In theory, a new or fringe contender can suddenly emerge and disrupt the party system under such circumstances. We test that claim by examining Nayib Bukele’s 2019 presidential election victory in El Salvador. With data from the AmericasBarometer, we estimate probit models and predictive margins to examine the individual-level determinants of disruption in an institutionalised and ideologically polarised party system. The empirical results reveal that Bukele won amid salient ideological differences between traditional parties and that critical views towards democracy fueled his core support. Therefore, we conclude that a significant disruption in an institutionalised party system can occur notwithstanding robust ideological differences between leading contenders. Critical attitudes towards democracy can represent a driving force behind a party system’s disruption.

Navia, P. Perelló, L. and Masek, V. 2022. "Demand without supply? Mass partisanship, ideological identification, and the puzzle of electoral representation in Guatemala." International Area Studies Review 25(2): 99-120. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/22338659211072939 

Abstract: The demand for an ideologically based party system is not always met with a supply. As a country where a large majority of adults identify on the ideological scale but whose weak political parties primarily function as short-lived personalist platforms, Guatemala represents an extreme case of a demand supply mismatch. Using six AmericasBarometer surveys from 2008 to 2018, we analyze the supply-side (partisanship) and demand-side (ideological identification) effect on voter turnout to identify whether the manifestation of this market failure applies evenly to voters across the ideological scale. We report a nuanced outcome: partisanship and identification on the right of the ideological scale increase turnout, but identification on the center or the left display no significant effect. The absence of parties that effectively represents left-wing or centrist voters—or that at least induce them to turn out to vote—points to a supply-side problem in Guatemala's political representation market.

Perelló, L. and Navia, P. 2022. "Changes in Support for Nicaragua’s Sandinista National Liberation Front During Democratic Backsliding." Politics 42(3): 426-442. https://doi.org/10.1177/0263395720961999

Abstract: This article examines changes in the determinants of support for Nicaragua’s Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), a party that has achieved dominant status during democratic backsliding. Using three waves of Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) surveys from 2006 to 2016, we present binary logit models to test four hypotheses on the evolution of support for the FSLN. Following the theory of how the elite’s cues and messages impact public opinion, we find substantial shifts in the determinants of support for the former guerrilla group as democratic backsliding deepened. We report that the FSLN turned into an ideologically pragmatic party after initially appealing to leftist supporters. Economic views also profoundly impact the party’s support – before and after voters elected it to the presidency in 2006.

Perelló, L. and Navia, P. 2021. "Abrupt and gradual realignments in developing democracies: The case of Costa Rica, 1958-2018." Journal of Politics in Latin America 13(1): 86-113. https://doi.org/10.1177/1866802X20967733

Abstract: Studies on party system change in Latin America commonly label similar processes as constituting dealignment or realignment. To clarify the boundaries between both concepts, we distinguish between abrupt and gradual realignments. While both imply change, they differ in the number of election cycles involved. Abrupt realignments occur in a single election cycle, while gradual realignments take place in two or more. We apply this conceptualisation to Costa Rica, Latin America’s longest-running democracy, and a country where the party system has decayed without collapsing. To better identify the type of change that has taken place, we use canton-level election data from 1958 to 2018 and public opinion surveys from 1978 to 2018. The evidence contests the notion of electoral dealignment. Instead, we show that the party system experienced an abrupt realignment in the 2002 election and gradual realignment in more recent election cycles.

Perelló, L. and Navia, P. 2020. "The rise of alternative presidential candidates in Chile, 2009-2017." Revista Latinoamericana de Opinión Pública 9(2): 81-109. http://dx.doi.org/10.14201/rlop.23628

Abstract: This article explores the growing popularity of alternative presidential candidates — those from outside the two dominant coalitions — in Chile from 2009 to 2017. Following a theoretical discussion that focuses on the causes of voter discontent with the political establishment, we formulate four hypotheses. We view support for alternative presidential candidates as a function of ideological detachment, declining political engagement, the economic vote, and socio-demographic shifts in the electorate. We use three pre-electoral Centro de Estudios Públicos surveys to present probit models and predicted probabilities. Our findings suggest that a distinct segment of Chilean voters is behind the rise of alternative presidential candidates. Younger and more educated voters who identify less with the traditional left-right ideological scale and political parties and suffer from economic anxiety—viewing the economy as performing well nationally while remaining pessimistic about their financial prospects—comprise this subgroup.

Navia, P., Perelló, L. and Masek, V. 2020. "The determinants of perception of corruption in Guatemala, 2006-2016." Public Integrity 22(5): 1-19. https://doi.org/10.1080/10999922.2019.1600964

Abstract: The September 2015 ousting and imprisonment of Guatemalan President Otto Pérez Molina and the subsequent election of television personality Jimmy Morales, who ran on an anticorruption platform, were interpreted as evidence of the salience of corruption as a popular concern in the country. Using the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) from 2006 to 2016, this article analyzes the evolution in the perception of corruption in Guatemala and its determinants to assess for changes after 2015. Perception of corruption remains a secondary concern for most Guatemalans and its determinants—age; education; rightwing ideology; and retrospective economic outlook—are stable overtime. The 2015 corruption scandal had a marginal impact on an already high perception of corruption. When perception of corruption is so widespread, the explanatory power of its determinants becomes less pronounced.

Navia, P. and Perelló, L. 2019. "One-night stands and long-term commitments: Presidential approval for Sebastián Piñera in Chile, 2009-2014." Revista de Ciencia Política 30(1): 49-73. http://dx.doi.org/10.4067/S0718-090X2019000100049

Abstract: In 2010, Sebastián Piñera (2010-2014) became the first rightwing President of Chile after the dictatorship. His approval fluctuated significantly, experiencing an overall downward decline. Under favorable economic conditions, declining presidential approval must be explained by things other than economic vote. Using logistic regression models and predicted probabilities based on presidential approval polls, we test four hypotheses on the determinants of approval for Piñera: a punishment vote against the Concertación, support tied to economic performance, issue-based support, and the cost of ruling. There is evidence in support of each of the four hypotheses. Although voting for Piñera might have been a one-night stand, economic vote determinants and, to a lesser extent, issue salience and the cost of ruling explain presidential approval under Piñera.

Cantillana, C., Contreras, G., Morales, M., Oliva, D. and Perelló, L. 2017. "Malestar con la representación democrática en América Latina. Características e implicancias." Política y Gobierno 24(2): 245-274. https://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1665-20372017000200245 

Abstract: Si bien existe una amplia literatura sobre la crisis de representación en América Latina, menos espacio se ha dado al proceso político que antecede a esta crisis. Es decir, la sensación de malestar con la representación democrática. Aquí operacionalizamos ese malestar como una combinación de desafección política, desconfianza en las instituciones políticas y desaprobación a los gobiernos. Concluimos que el malestar ciudadano con la democracia no responde sistemáticamente a la calidad de la democracia de los países ni al índice de desarrollo humano, sino a las variaciones de la desigualdad. A nivel individual, en tanto, el malestar se reproduce a mayor velocidad entre los jóvenes y los ciudadanos con menores recursos económicos.

Perelló, L. 2015. "One of these things is sort of like the other: presidential approval and support for government management of the economy in Chile, 2006-2013." Política. Revista de Ciencia Política 53(1): 117-164. https://anuariocdh.uchile.cl/index.php/RP/article/view/38153 

Abstract: The economic vote is one of the most accepted theories of political science. Studies on the subject have mainly focused on developed democracies, leaving aside the effects that economic performance holds in different settings. This paper provides further answers by examining the case of Chile. Since 2006, Chileans have experienced different economic settings, which include a recession and a period of ensuing growth. However, economic performance did not translate into support or disapproval for sitting presidents. On the contrary, Bachelet’s popularity skyrocketed in the midst of an economic crisis, while Piñera’s approval drastically fell when the economy was doing well. A similar outcome occurred for views on the government’s economic management. Hence, this paper puts forward the hypothesis that—controlling by socio demographic, political and economic variables—Chileans were limited in discerning between presidential approval and the responsibility for economic management between 2006 and 2013. To test this assumption, I use survey data from the Centro de Estudios Públicos (CEP) and run logistic regression models and predictive margins. Results show that sex, age, region of residence and economic outlook explain both types of assessments in a similar manner. There are, however, important differences within and between models, particularly for the variables socioeconomic status and political ideology.