Abstract: I develop a general-equilibrium oligopsony model in which firms differ in their demand for worker ability, generating worker-specific monopsony power. Taking the model to matched employer–employee data for Italy and Germany reveals ability segregation that localizes competition: firms compete most intensely with similar firms targeting the same ability segment. In the calibrated model, monopsony power and welfare losses are largest for low- and highability workers, who face fewer effective employers. Output losses are modest relative to standard quantitative benchmarks. Labor-market power amplifies wage inequality because wider between-market wage dispersion outweighs compressed assortative matching and top wages. 

Presentations: EIEF Seminar, CESifo (poster), Warwick PhD Conference, Princeton and EUI student seminars, VisitINPS Annual Conference, Fall 2025 Midwest Macroeconomics Meeting, AIEL, Ridge Forum, SED 2024, 17th PEJ Annual Meeting, 58th Canadian Economics Association meeting, 2024 RCEA International Conference, GLO Berlin 2024

Abstract: We study the aggregate welfare and policy implications of nonlinear pricing in supply chains. Using the universe of firm-to-firm transactions in Chile, we document systematic quantity discounts and buyer-specific pricing schedules. We develop a general equilibrium model in which firms both charge and pay nonlinear prices. Under standard assumptions, optimal contracts take the form of buyer-group-specific two-part tariffs: marginal prices govern input allocation, while fixed fees redistribute surplus and affect entry. Quantitatively, nonlinear pricing lowers marginal input markups and raises allocative efficiency, but reduces firm entry. A welfare decomposition reveals a 24.8 percent intensive-margin gain, partly offset by a 17.1 percent extensive-margin loss. Overall, nonlinear pricing raises welfare by 3.5 percent relative to uniform pricing, from 87.7 to 90.7 percent of the efficient benchmark. The pricing regime also reshapes corrective policy. A policy optimized under uniform pricing relies primarily on output subsidies; when applied to an economy with nonlinear pricing, it overcorrects marginal distortions and reduces welfare. By contrast, the optimal policy under nonlinear pricing shifts sharply toward entry subsidies, reflecting the role of fixed fees in distorting firm creation. Price discrimination can therefore improve aggregate efficiency while fundamentally reshaping optimal policy design. 

Presentations: SED 2026, BSE Summer Forum, 24th IIOC Annual Conference, Fall 2025 Midwest Macroeconomics Meeting, Ridge Economic Forum, W.I.E.N. 2025, 18th PEJ Annual Meeting

Abstract: Italian productivity growth has slowed down since the mid-90s, turning negative in the 2000s. To explain this breakdown, this thesis explores the role of firm-level technology adoption. Using data from the universe of Italian incorporated companies, I document an increase in the correlation between productivity and firm-level profit-reducing distortions. Over time, more productive firms are increasingly subject to profit distortions. This implies that incentives to engage in productivity-enhancing activities have progressively declined, as correlated distortions reduce the returns of such activities. I present a reverse causality test supporting the hypothesis that the correlation productivity-distortions has a causal effect on firm growth by reducing incentives to innovate. To quantify the impact on aggregate productivity, I build a general equilibrium model calibrated to the Italian pre-productivity breakdown. I find that Italy’s aggregate productivity would have been 6% higher if the correlation productivity-distortions had remained at its 1997 level. Furthermore, firm life-cycle growth decreases by 8% relative to the baseline. I show that the key driving mechanism behind the trend is a steady increase in the correlation with cost-of-capital distortions, which started in 1995 and ended in 2015. The broader message is that an important component of a country’s aggregate productivity growth can be explained by trends in the elasticity of productivity distortion that hampers firms’ technology adoption.