Reading group on the metaphysics of science (2021–2022)

Discussed papers:

• Steven French (2018). Realism and Metaphysics. In The Routledge Handbook of Scientific Realism, J. Saatsi (ed.), 394–406. New York: Routledge.

• Décio Krause (Forthcoming). Aspects of quantum indiscernibility and quasi-set theory.

• Jonas R. B. Arenhart and Raoni W. Arroyo (Forthcoming). Prolegomena to a non-individual metaphysics for quantum mechanics.

• Otávio Bueno (2014). Why Identity is Fundamental. American Philosophical Quarterly 51 (4):325–332.

• Steven French (2011). Metaphysical underdetermination: why worry? Synthese 180, 205–221.

• Amanda Bryant (2020a). Keep the chickens cooped: the epistemic inadequacy of free range metaphysics. Synthese 197 (5): 1867–1887.

• Matteo Morganti and Tuomas Tahko (2017). Moderately naturalistic metaphysics. Synthese 194 (7): 2557–2580.

• Amanda Bryant (2020b). Epistemic infrastructure for a Scientific Metaphysics. Grazer Philosophische Studien: 1–23.

• Bradley Monton (2008). Prolegomena to any Future Physics-Based Metaphysics. In Jonathan L. Kvanvig (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion Volume III. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

• Alyssa Ney (2012). Neo-positivist metaphysics. Philosophical Studies 160 (1):53–78.

• Anjan Chakravartty (2013). On the Prospects of Naturalized Metaphysics. In Don Ross, James Ladyman & Harold Kincaid (eds.), Scientific Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 27–50.

• Kerry McKenzie (2020). A Curse on Both Houses: Naturalistic Versus A Priori Metaphysics and the Problem of Progress. Res Philosophica 97 (1):1–29.

• Laura Ruetsche (2015). The Shaky Game +25, or: on locavoracity. Synthese 192 (11):3425–3442.