Working Papers

"Board Gender Diversity and Firm Performance: Evidence from Supply-Side Shocks in China" (with Yangming Bao)

Abstract: This paper identifies a positive causal effect of board gender diversity on firm performance by utilizing unique supply-side shocks in China. Specifically, we construct a novel instrumental variable for board gender diversity based on the Great Chinese Famine which exogenously increased the gender gap of the qualified directors of certain cohorts. We also exploit firm-level exposures to the supply shocks and find consistent results. Moreover, we eliminate the concerns of firm demand preferences as well as distinct qualities across cohorts. Finally, our results indicate that gender diversity is beneficial to firm performance through diligent monitoring.

"The More the Merrier? The Effect of Fertility Preference on Marriage Outcomes"

Abstract: This paper analyzes how fertility preference affects individuals' marriage outcomes. By using the selective Two-child Policy in China, which relaxed Han Chinese and only-children's birth quota and made them more attractive, I find that after the introduction of the policy, Han Chinese and only-children were more likely to marry same-type spouses to meet their fertility preference. Moreover, after introducing the policy Han Chinese and only-child men invested more in searching and signaling in the marriage market, and increased their marriage transfers.

"Who Are Better Monitors? Comparing styles of supervisory and independent directors"

Abstract: This paper compares the unobservable style effect between independent directors and supervisory directors on firm performance. Utilizing the unique Chinese board system with both independent and supervisory directors and a large panel data of 2,240 public firms from 2003 to 2017, this paper finds that both supervisory and independent style is crucial in determining variations of firm performance. Moreover, outside independent director style is more effective when information costs are low or when firms need more outside resources, while inside supervisor director style is more effective when there are no big internal changes. Finally, the results also suggest that increasing qualified supervisor representations are beneficial to firms.

Work in Progress

"Cooperation or Competition? Local Officials' Turnover and Economic Performance in China" (with Fangying Xu)

"The Effect of Returnee Managers on Firm Performance and Policies: Evidence from China" (with Thorsten Schank)