My dissertation, Krinostic Injustice, identifies a new type of epistemic injustice in which a hearer does not question a speaker’s account of a sequence of basic events but calls into question that speaker’s characterization of their experience. Krinostic injustice wrongs an agent in their capacity as a competent judge of their experience (in Ancient Greek, the verb κρῑ́νω means “to decide” or “to judge”). I argue that this form of epistemic injustice manifests in sexual assault trials, while keeping in mind its application to other contexts.
Jürgen Habermas, “How is legitimacy made possible via legality?”, trans. Linh Mac, Revus [Online first], 50 | 2023. DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/revus.9668 (German to English Translation)
“Descriptions, Articulations, and the Development of New Moral Concepts”, Syndicate Philosophy (forthcoming)
Invited contribution to Syndicate Philosophy book symposium on Matthew Congdon's Moral Articulation: On the Development of New Moral Concepts
A paper on characterization
Draft available on request
A paper on self-deception
Draft available on request
A paper on Kant’s Position on the Right to Revolution
Draft available on request
* Papers currently out for review are not listed here.
Commentary on Jürgen Habermas, “How is legitimacy made possible via legality?”, trans. Linh Mac, Revus [Online first], 50 | 2023. DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/revus.9668