Works in progress

Self-serving redistributive preferences among natives and immigrants in the UK  (with Christian Koch) (under review)

Abstract: In an online experiment, we examine how ingroup bias and fairness concerns shape the redistributive preferences of UK resident natives and immigrants. Natives and immigrants were paired in a series of distributive situations. They chose how to divide a pie created from either party's previous contributions and stated what they believed to be their fair share from the vantage point of UK residents acting as unbiased spectators. In a complementary survey, we obtained these spectator divisions. We found that natives' and immigrants' distributive choices were absent ingroup bias. Their choices were, however, selfishly biased, as they invoked the fact that the pie was created solely from their own contributions. This behavior was eliminated when it disproportionately harmed the partner. Their fairness beliefs showed evidence of egocentric norm adoption: they favored equity as contributors and equality as noncontributors. They also believed that spectators would negatively discriminate against immigrants in favor of natives, but this perception was unfounded in light of spectators' divisions. We discuss the implications of our results for immigration research and integration policies.

Click for the detailed AER preregistration here.

Unexpected waiting corrupts (with Yossi Tobol and Gergely Hajdu) (R&R at JEBO)

Abstract: The experience of waiting is ubiquitous in all areas of life, and sometimes a waiting experience is followed by decisions where morality matters. We present the results of a lab--in--the--field study to analyze the effects of (unexpected) waiting duration on moral behavior. Passengers who had just joined the check--in line at the Ben Gurion Airport guessed how long they would have to wait to check in.  After checking in, they then completed the die--under--the--cup task, wherein they could lie without being caught to improve their financial outcomes. Specifically, passengers rolled a die privately and reported \textit{any} number of dots, knowing that their earnings increase linearly in the number reported.  We found that both the wait duration and its unexpectedness adversely shape morality. For comparison, an expected 100--minute wait and an unexpected 25--minute wait resulted in the same average increase of one dot in the reported number.  We propose that after a wait (especially if unexpected), people seek compensation.  As we fail to find selections on observables, we argue that the setup provides variations that are comparable to random assignments, giving support to the effects estimated. These results underscore that managing expectations about waiting duration could play an important role in mitigating subsequent immoral behavior.

Suffering in perceived isolation: Underestimating the prevalence of embarrassing health conditions due to infrequent information sharing (with Erin Carbone, George Loewenstein and Cass Sunstein) 

Who are the welfare chauvinists? (with Valeriia Chukaeva)