Research
Research
Abstract: This paper examines whether and how political corruption affects corporate carbon emissions. We find that firms in highly corrupt states emit significantly more carbon. The findings are robust to various empirical strategies that address endogeneity concerns, including instrumental variable analysis, propensity score matching, and a difference-in-differences test. The effect is more pronounced among firms operating in highly competitive industries and those with fewer financial constraints. Furthermore, the impact of corruption intensifies following the Paris Agreement, when environmental regulations tightened. Overall, these results suggest that political corruption contributes to higher corporate carbon emissions by shielding firms from regulatory scrutiny and enforcement.
Presented at: Bayes Finance Research Day (2023); YSBC Sustainable Finance Conference (2023); FMA European Conference (2024); ICFAB (2024); Workshop on Climate Finance at Oxford University (2025)
Abstract: We examine how legal protection of public speech affects corporate debt structure. Exploiting the staggered enactment of state-level anti-SLAPP statutes, we find that affected firms shift outstanding debt from bank loans toward public bonds. The shift concentrates among firms with more opaque information environments, stronger stakeholder voice, and stronger managerial concealment incentives, consistent with a transparency channel that narrows bondholders' informational disadvantage relative to banks. New public bonds also carry lower at-issue spreads. Overall, free speech protection emerges as a first-order determinant of corporate debt structure.
Abstract: This paper investigates how data breach costs influence the design of CEO compensation contracts. Exploiting the staggered adoption of data breach notification (DBN) laws across U.S. states, we find that firms provide managers with greater risk-taking incentives following DBN adoption. The effect is more pronounced for firms with risk-averse CEOs, well-diversified shareholders, and greater outside investment opportunities, consistent with the view that boards strengthen CEO risk-taking incentives to counteract the managerial risk aversion triggered by heightened data breach costs.
Presented at: BAFA Annual Conference (2025); Bayes Finance Research Day (2025); EFMA (2025); Benelux Corporate Finance Day (2025)
Abstract: This paper examines how judicial efficiency in patent litigation affects the market for corporate control. Exploiting the U.S. Patent Pilot Program as a quasi-natural experiment, we find that firms in more efficient districts are less likely to be acquired, especially smaller and high-tech firms. Deal-level evidence supports a bargaining-power channel: targets obtain higher premiums and acquirers earn lower abnormal returns. Overall, judicial efficiency emerges as a key institutional factor strengthening the negotiating position of innovative firms.
Abstract: This paper examines whether pressure to improve environmental performance comes at the expense of consumer welfare by exploiting the implementation of U.S. state-level Climate Action Plans as a regulatory shock.